Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 1 June 1965.

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Photo of Mr James Johnson Mr James Johnson , Kingston upon Hull West 12:00, 1 June 1965

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Sir Alec Douglas-Home) both made wide-ranging speeches of great depth. They used the experience of their high offices in their speeches. I have much less experience and I also have much less time in which to make my speech. I do not intend in any way to attempt to answer the questions of the Leader of the Opposition, for they can be answered by the Prime Minister himself—questions about U.N.C.T.A.D., about education and all others of economic aid, etc. I want to make a compact speech based on two territories in the Commonwealth, both posing odd problems, one on the desk of the Colonial Secretary and one on the desk of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

I should like to take the second first, because Rhodesia is of enormous importance at this moment. This is a problem taxing the minds of all Africans. The Leader of the Opposition said that he pays no attention to the United Nations Committee of Twenty-four which has been meeting in Lusaka and when I consider the composition, with a Mali chairman, a Soviet delegate, a Venezuelan, a Tanzanian and others, some well-disposed and others not so well-disposed. I also perhaps do not pay so much attention to what they have been saying. I get much advice about Southern Rhodesia and for a few moments I want to think aloud and to give my right hon. Friend what little benefit I can from my thinking aloud.

There is no clear solution to this problem. I can see a way out of the problem of the other territory which I want to discuss, Mauritius, although it is not easy; but I cannot see any clear answer for Rhodesia. My right hon. Friend spoke of "a just and lasting solution" and also of "patience and negotiation", but we have been speaking of those for a long time. The Government have been getting plenty of advice, for example from Jomo Kenyatta, whom I respect very much, but he has had a different experience in Kenya, and speaking at that distance from Rhodesia the problem is not as easy as might be imagined. The difficulty in Rhodesia is unique. Each place has its different problems, but those in Rhodesia cannot be compared with the problems in Kenya or Ghana or any other African territory, where there is a mixed community of white and black. There are 240,000 whites, at least four times the number in Kenya. Rhodesia has been self-governing for 40 years, while Kenya was never self-governing. Rhodesia has a white police force and a white army and possesses jet aircraft, including bombers. All this puts the question in a special position, and when one speaks of a possible solution, one has to remember that if the white population does not like it, there is no way of enforcing a solution.

The problem is not quite so hard as that of South Africa, but the position is that we are faced with many Europeans who are our own kith and kin, and who do not wish to hand over their political power. I have met Zimbabwe leaders like George Nyandoro, who is now in Tanganyika, or Nelson Samkange, in London with others. All of these are devotees of black nationalism, and wish soon rather than later to have a State in which one man has one vote; a State modelled on Kenya, Ghana, or Nigeria, where the Europeans will be technicians and advisers, as they have been in other parts of Africa.

However, I do not see how in the near future, with these opposed divisions, we can expect anything in the way of a just and lasting solution for all the sections of the population in Rhodesia. I should like the Prime Minister to say how the Govern- ment intend to approach the problem. I understand that Mr. Johnston, the High Commissioner, is in communication with the Government and that messages are moving backwards and forwards. I should like to know what plans we are putting forward, for despite close study of the problem, I cannot find any easy solution which will satisfy the Africans.

The view of the Africans is that a conference should be called immediately. They say that it does not matter if the white Rhodesians do not come. They say that a constitution should be made at this conference and the white Rhodesians should be warned that we would use force to impose the constitution. Force means invading. I cannot imagine any Government of this country invading and using force against 250,000 people in Rhodesia. I frankly do not contemplate my own Government taking such a course with helicopters and paratroopers. Perhaps we can be told what the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State have in mind. I cannot visualise our engaging in civil war on the lines of what happened in Algeria. I do not think that any Government which took that course would get the support of the country.

I do not know what is in the mind of Mr. Smith. He blows sometimes hot and sometimes cold, but he is certainly now the master of the country with some 50 seats in the legislature. I am convinced that if Mr. Smith did not satisfy his supporters, he would go the way of those before him; people like Field, Garfield Todd and Whitehead. The difficulty in Rhodesia is that the Europeans there do not wish to take up the positions that were adopted by Europeans in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia. I shall be happy to listen to anybody who can tell me how to persuade them to do so.

If Mr. Smith goes for a unilateral declaration of independence, what do Her Majesty's Government do? He could be outlawed, and I presume that he would be by all the Commonwealth countries and in the United Kingdom. I suppose that he would get support from Portugal and South Africa. Are we to see a sort of Common Market south of the Zambesi, with Mozambique, Rhodesia, Angola and down to the Union? This is a possibility which we might have to consider later. Presumably we would apply economic sanctions and refuse to buy Rhodesian tobacco. The Rhodesians would then cut off power to Zambia—or would they?

I am told that we should call their bluff. This is a very difficult game, because Zambia could lose her copper exports in such a bluff. The City of London could sever loans to Rhodesia and we would not allow Rhodesia access to our money markets. Rhodesia would then be crippled economically and financially, with a visible lowering of standards of living of the Europeans. This is the warning given to Rhodesian politicians by ourselves and others, such as their business community.

I have not met Mr. Smith and I do not know whether he is as tough as he is supposed to be. He talks about "going it alone" and some people believe that he would. What is imperative is that Her Majesty's Government must be quite clear and definite in telling Mr. Smith and the Southern Rhodesians what are the choices facing them. The public should know quite clearly also, so that if and when something serious does happen they will know why and how it happened. I hope no sort of catastrophe does take place, but it may. The African leaders say to me, "If you cannot settle this yourselves give it to somebody else." Zambia or Tanzania could not successfully invade. I have heard it suggested that the Americans and the Soviets might get together and jointly settle this problem. I should very much like to know what is in the mind of Her Majesty's Government about this particular situation.

To turn to Mauritius. I do not want to see Mauritius go the way of British Guiana. This possibility was touched upon by a former Secretary of State for the Colonies, now Lord Boyd, in this Chamber 10 years ago when we were discussing the polyglot nature of the population in Mauritius. There are about 700,000 people with varying percentages Hindu, Muslim, Chinese, Creoles and a small minority of Franco-Mauritian whites. I know something about Mauritius, because I have known their political leaders since 1950, many of them intimately. The Labour Party in Mauritius is a microcosm of the society, and they pick their constituency candidates on an ethnic basis. Hindu, Chinese, Moslem and Creole are apportioned during the election campaigns to the different divisions as party candidates. We need to get away from this idea which the Sunday Telegraph and other newspapers have put before us lately, of a Labour Party which is Hindu; and which will simply crush any minorities when in power after independence.

In Mauritius the Labour Party has been for some time the majority party, but at the moment there is a National coalition. An emergency was declared after rioting. British soldiers have been sent in to keep the peace. We heard at Question Time last week in this Chamber about a "Social Democratic" party. There is no such thing. There is the Parti Mauricien which is a party of the bourgeoisie, which represented the sugar millers, the bankers, shipping companies, plantation owners and the like. Their leader is Mr. Koenig, and his party was essentially a white party.

In the late 1950's they felt that to combat the appeal of the multi-racial Labour Party they should take a coloured or Creole man on their platform. So they adopted a young lawyer called Monsieur Duval. They have financed him and he has been the liaison to invite Members of this House to visit Mauritius and see local conditions. Over the past months allegations have been made, with some evidence, about his demagogic activities, on a platform leading to violence. Under the banner of the Parti Mauricien, by means of speeches splitting and dividing the people, he has done much damage. I would advise him, since he is a junior member of the all-party coalition Government, to be more loyal to his seniors, and more helpful to his coalition comrades. If he did this I think we might see less public dissension and island tension, and less need in the future to invite British soldiers to restore order to this beautiful island.

If he cannot behave thus, I would advise that the Governor asked him to leave the coalition government. Before constitutional talks begin in September in London, we need to have a much more balanced society in the island with a well-informed public opinion. Monsieur Duval and people like him must come out into the open and be in genuine opposition, and no longer a wooden horse inside the coalition.

I see a coalition Government, after the talks in September, consisting of the Labour Party plus the Muslim Party led by Razak Mohammed and others, line the independent bloc, who would take over government after independence. This I hope would be granted in the summer of next year. We could possibly have an agreement whereby in the unfortunate event of any difficulties following independence, the Mauritian Government could call in, as it has at this time, English soldiers to help with defence and external affairs.

I do not believe we need anticipate in Mauritius the sort of situation which arose in British Guiana. I think it is possible that we could clear up a lot of misunderstandings at our talks in September. A definite date for independence should be fixed for July in the summer of next year. If people in the island know what their future is, and thus have a future to aim at, I think they will buckle to, and make an effort to work out a future just as any other former Colony has done. Leave them in the confusion they are in now and we shall experience much worse conditions, setting section against section of society, Creole against Indian and the like. I am certain that no one wants this. It is possible to avoid disaster if our talks go well in September, when we can set an independence date for Mauritius in the summer of 1966.