New Clause. — (Meaning of Trade Dispute.)

Part of Orders of the Day — Trade Disputes Bill – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 18 May 1965.

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Photo of Sir Elwyn Jones Sir Elwyn Jones , West Ham South 12:00, 18 May 1965

The purpose of the Amendment is to allow proceedings in respect of causes of action which arise before Royal Assent to the Bill to be decided under the law as it now stands provided that they are brought within six months of Royal Assent. The Bill as it stands would apply to all proceedings which were commenced after the Royal Assent even if the cause of action had already arisen. This could mean that a potential plaintiff who had a right of action before the Bill became law would lose that right. If the Amendment is adopted he will have six months' grace in which to bring an action under the present law.

I emphasise that this period of grace will apply only to proceedings in respect of acts done before the Royal Assent. The Bill will apply to proceedings in respect of acts done after the Royal Assent whether proceedings are instituted within the six months or not. The Government originally took the view that the application of the provisions of subsection (1) to all proceedings which were commenced after the date of Royal Assent, whether the act of which the plantiff first complained occurred before or after that date, would give rise to no practical difficulty, and it was desirable to achieve at the earliest possible moment certainty about the legal position of all who were concerned and thereby remove as soon as possible all doubts and difficulties arising from the decision in the case of Rookes v. Barnard.

But we are most anxious, on the Government side, to be fair to all concerned, to potential plaintiffs as well as potential defendants. Therefore, we have looked at this question in the light of our discussions in Standing Committee. It seems improbable that more than one or two potential plaintiffs, if, indeed, any at all, would be frustrated by the provisions of subsection (2) as it stands, but there is, at any rate in theory, a possibility that a person in whom a right of action accrued shortly before the Royal Assent might lose that right because there was insufficient time for him to take legal advice and issue his writ before the Royal Assent was given. We propose, therefore, that to eliminate this possibility the putative plaintiff should be allowed six months in which to institute proceedings by the issue of a writ.

8.0 p.m.

The courts have expressed at least three different reasons for supporting the existence of statutes of limitation or time-limiting provisions. First, it is said that long-dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, and that the limitation Acts are acts of peace. This ought to be a principle particularly pertinent, I suggest, to disputes in industrial relations. Second, the view has been taken by the courts that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim. Third, the principle that the law applies is that persons with good causes of action should pursue them with reasonable diligence. We have, therefore, a whole series of limitation provisions in our law.

I have most carefully considered whether six months will be enough. I am satisfied that it would be. Even if it be necessary for the potential plaintiff to apply for and to obtain a legal aid certificate before he is in a position to institute proceedings, six months is, I am assured by the legal aid authorities, more than ample for this purpose. I understand that, provided that the proposed plaintiff answers letters and keeps appointments with the legal aid committee, six weeks is invariably sufficient.

I am satisfied that the successful applicant for legal aid will, within a few weeks, be granted the necessary certificate for the launching of his proceedings.

I ought to add that, if there is any question of time running out, a certificate can be issued under the legal aid machinery limited to obtaining counsels opinion, and, if that is favourable, taking the initial steps in the action by the issue of the writ to keep the right of action alive. As has been said more than once in our debates, the eyes of the country are very much on the Bill. There is an awareness of the right of action, and there will be an awareness of the limitation of time imposed by its terms.

There are precedents for what is proposed in the Amendment. There is the precedent for a limitation period of six months in the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934, which provides that proceedings in tort against the estate of a deceased person must be instituted not later than six months after a personal representative takes out representation. That was the period recommended by the Law Revision Committee, and it was accepted without question by the House as achieving the right balance between the interests of the potential plaintiff who wishes to proceed against the estate of a deceased, and of the personal representatives whose duty it is to distribute the estate to the beneficiaries with the minimum of delay.

In the same way, in my submission, the period of six months now proposed in the Bill achieves the right balance between the interests of the potential plaintiff and the potential defendant. It will suffice to enable all potential plaintiffs whose cause of action accrues before Royal Assent to start their proceedings and, at the same time, it will within a reasonable period put an end to the uncertainties arising from the decision in the case of Rookes v. Barnard. I should say that there is a further and, perhaps, more immediately comparable precedent for a limitation period of six months to be found in the Truck Acts. Proceedings by a workman for the recovery of improper deductions from his wages made by an employer must be commenced within six months of the date of the deduction.

Right hon. and hon. Members opposite have put down Amendment No. 9 to extend the period to three years. I am satisfied that that would in the circumstances be too long and that it is not necessary for the adequate protection of the possible plaintiff. It would expose trade unionists to an excessive spell of uncertainty as to whether they were at risk in regard to actions possibly being brought against them for acts long since passed, and this fear and uncertainty could well have an unsettling effect on industrial relations. It might also involve the courts themselves in considerable difficulties in interpreting the law as it now stands long after the Bill has come into effect and that law has been amended and, perhaps after a new volume of case law—I hope that it does not come to pass but it might—has arisen on the provisions of this Bill, and perhaps, even after the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Association has reported.

In other words, it would seriously detract from the objects of the Bill, which are to remove the anxieties and uncertainties created by the decision in Rookes v. Barnard, allowing the Royal Commission to approach its task unimpeded by doubts among trade unionists about their legal position. As I have said, the Government are anxious to be fair to all those concerned, and I believe that that result will be best achieved by the Amendment.