Defence

Part of Bill Presented – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 3 March 1965.

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Photo of Mr John Hay Mr John Hay , Henley 12:00, 3 March 1965

The right hon. Gentleman says "Absolutely the contrary". I am sorry, but I disagree with him. Again, this is not the way in which the Government should approach Parliament.

There has not been much talk today—perhaps we shall have more tomorrow—about why defence costs increase. Many of the criticisms of our record contained in paragraph 1 of the White Paper are themselves answered in the remainder of the document. For example, paragraph 6 refers to the way in which the costs of weapons increase. Similar references are made in paragraphs 32, 33 and 143. I do not propose to take up time by quoting them, but they provide the answer—if an answer is really needed—to the question why the proportion of the national income now spent on defence has had to rise year by year.

We all know that the costs of these highly sophisticated weapons are extremely difficult to forecast when we begin the process of research and development. Inevitably programmes slip. Inevitably the requirements change as new knowledge becomes available. We need not imagine that this country is alone in this. I am sorry that the hon. Member for Goole is not here. He was somewhat critical. I would remind him and the House that other countries have exactly the same trouble. The United States has had long experience of this kind. Skybolt—one of the great projects of the past—had to be cancelled simply because the requirements had changed and the development schedule slipped. The TFX itself—which the Government are thinking about—is a weapon which was proposed to come into service some time ago. That, too, is slipping.

That brings me to the problem of cost control and the reorganisation of the Defence Department. Paragraphs 32–47 contain a factual account of the new machinery which my right hon. Friend set up in the Ministry of Defence before he left it. I would remind the Government that we set up that machinery. Anyone reading the White Paper might imagine that all this had been done in the last two or three months, but we did it. By all means let us make use of United States experience, which is very great in these matters, but I warn the Secretary of State, and especially the Minister for the Army, that neither should expect too much from this machine.

There are two things which all the computers which can be put to work will not give—the first being plain common sense, and the second the long and detailed experience of the professional soldiers, sailors and airmen, who form the nucleus of the defence machine. Their knowledge cannot easily be fed into a computer. I hope that the Secretary of State will take account of the salutary warnings given to him by his hon. Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Mr. Sheldon) on this point.

I repeat that the reorganisation of the Defence Departments was carried out by my right hon. Friend. We were very glad to read the progress report contained in the White Paper, but, as my right hon. Friend said this afternoon, the next move to the functional approach will have to be made soon. The question is when and how it will be made, and not whether. I hope that the Minister for the Army will say something about this. We were extremely interested in the mention made in paragraph 46 of the review which is to take place of the reorganisation, under the hon. Member's direction, with the help of a Committee, as I understand it, How does he envisage his task, and propose to go about it?

I turn to some of the other major matters which have been canvassed. Basic strategic concepts are mentioned in the White Paper. Paragraph 19 quite rightly says, in connection with our rôle east of Suez, that the British contribution to peace and stability in this area is paramount. I note that the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget) rather disagreed with this point. It is one to which my hon. Friends and I attach the greatest importance. It underlines, of course, the importance of the bases, particularly those of Aden and Singapore. I would remind the Government that this is an extremely large area. The whole of the Indian Ocean basin covers many thousands of square miles. I wonder whether, having regard to what they say in the White Paper about the paramount importance of our rôle in that area, the Government now accept the need for a seaborne strategy, with emphasis on amphibious forces? With all due respect to my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich (Mr. Ridsdale), who was a little critical on this point—he and I may disagree about it, but it is my opinion which I give—we cannot hope to discharge the many response- bilities which we already have in that area, unless we are prepared to accept a seaborne strategy and all the things which go with it.

The hub around which an amphibious force has to be built is the aircraft carrier. This is quite clear in the present time. I should like to refer to paragraph 60 of the White Paper, which I think—this is perhaps not deliberate but accidental—is a little misleading. It says: Our largest forces outside Europe are in the Far East, where we have a combined commitment to S.E.A.T.O. and to Malaysia. The deployment of aircraft carriers and Commando ships is flexible as between the Middle East and Far East and we expect to maintain a total of three in the area East of Suez. At a first, quick reading of that sentence, one might think that the Government were committing themselves to the maintenance of three carriers east of Suez. In fact—and I ask for confirmation—they do not intend that, at this stage at any rate.

I must therefore put to them the problem. We must assume that there will be, for almost all the time—as far as it can be done in accordance with the refitting schedules and so on—two carriers east of Suez. That was what we always tried to do. We tried to maintain them. We found it a little difficult, but this is the essential thing to aim at, two carriers east of Suez. I do not think that even that will be enough.