Yes, Sir, and of course we are all watching what the agricultural negotiations will be in Europe before we proceed into the next round, which is the Kennedy Round. I have discussed that with the various Governments concerned and it is impossible to see exactly how things will develop. But it was encouraging to have general support for the approach to the Kennedy Round and, in particular, to hear a powerful speech from the German Foreign Minister, Dr. Schroeder. I had a wide-ranging talk with M. Couve de Murville. The French reserve their position on East-West relations and other matters, but at any rate we have got closer to understanding each other's point of view, which I hope may be of mutual advantage to us and to Europe as a whole.

Elsewhere in Europe of course we must work together in O.E.C.D.—when I was chairman it was called O.E.E.C.—and in the Council of Europe where members of the European Free Trade Association and of the European Economic Community and all the free countries meet together. I look forward to attending a meeting of the Ministers of the Council of Europe in Paris next month when we hope to carry on the good work that has been done by Parliamentarians and others.

With this short description of what happened at The Hague and the outlook of the Kennedy Round I want to go at some length into the prospects of East-West relations. We find general support for our view that it would be valuable to probe for further progress in resolving, at any rate in the first place, the peripheral problems between the Soviet Union and ourselves. I must make clear that the discussions with the Soviet Union are subject to three conditions of the highest importance. The first is that the West can agree to nothing which would have the result of upsetting the military balance to our disadvantage. Our very survival may be at stake here.

Secondly, no agreements can be reached with the East and no negotiations conducted which are likely to impair the cohesion of the Western Alliance, for unless the Alliance remains clearly united it cannot fulfil its prime function of deterring aggression. And the unity of the Alliance could not survive the suspicion that the interests of its members were not being fully considered.

Thirdly, the Western position in West Berlin and the objective of self-determination for the East Germans are of vital interest to the free nations.

Negotiation does not imply one-sided concessions, nor could agreement be ever reached which was at the expense of the vital interest of any member of the Alliance. These three conditions impose the need for the fullest possible inter-allied consultation as a basis for all negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's fundamental aims remain unchanged, and we must recognise that.

In attempting to judge the future, it may be valuable if for a moment we get a clear idea of what the nuclear Test Ban Treaty signifies and what it does not.It is an important and valuable measure in itself, and all credit goes to the ex-Prime Minister and the ex-Foreign Secretary and others who did so much in the international scene to make this possible. Its signatories can no longer pollute the atmosphere. It should make it more difficult for nuclear weapons to spread to countries which do not possess them at present. Although it is not a measure of disarmament I think that it prevents yet another spiral of costly competition.

We cannot be sure of Soviet motives in deciding to conclude the Treaty but, as the right hon. Gentleman for Smethwick said, it seems that during the Cuban crisis they were brought face to face with the full dangers of trying by sudden means to alter the strategic situation between East and West. In passing, in reply to the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Smethwick in relation to Cuba, I should say that I was very close to my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley (Mr. H. Macmillan) throughout these discussions, and I think that the right hon. Gentleman gravely underestimates our influence and contact during the course of the Cuba crisis. The strength of our voice, through the decision on policy and weapons which we had already adopted, was clear, in contra-distinction to the right hon. Gentleman and his friends.

The Soviets have come to see that high-risk policies only have the effect of strengthening Western will and defence capability. Besides this, there is a serious conflict of priorities on the use of Soviet resources. There are agricultural problems and increasingly powerful consumer and investment demands. Mr. Khrushchev himself has spoken about these problems.

It is also possible to speculate about other factors. Certainly the quarrel with China had gone so far that there was nothing to be lost by an agreement with the West. Indeed from the point of view of the other Communist parties there were advantages to be gained from having something to show for the policy of peaceful coexistence. Since the signature in Moscow and in subsequent discussions with the representatives of the Soviet Government, we have encountered a greater readiness to listen to the Western case even when they have disagreed.

Unfortunately, the Soviet military on the Berlin Autobahn have not shown the same reasonable spirit. Since 10th October three American military convoys and one British military convoy have been held up for long periods because Soviet checkpoint officers tried to introduce new and more stringent procedures. Eventually the Russians dropped their demands and the convoys went through.

We trust and hope that there will be no more such incidents. I should like to make clear that there is no need for incidents, since the established procedures are well known to both sides and have not been changed by us. If the Soviet military do make more difficulties we shall be forced to wonder whether the Soviet Government intend to cause renewed tension over Berlin despite the more hopeful signs elsewhere. I trust therefore that there will be no more incidents. In any case, we shall continue to work in close consultation and concert with our allies.