I am coming to that. I said that I would take this in sequence. I do not object, but it all comes in turn.

This deals with the action I took with some colleagues up to the date of Mr. Profumo's statement in the House. I wish to make this clear to the House and the country. At no time had I any indication either from the security service or from the police that there was any reason to doubt Mr. Profumo's statement as to his connection with Mr. Ward and his short—as his account said—friendship with Miss Keeler. All the rest was rumour which he strenuously denied.

There is one report—I wish to tell every fact to the House—dating from this period to which I must now refer. When the Lord Chancellor was making his inquiries, at the beginning of this month, he found that the security service had received at the beginning of February certain information from the police. Miss Keeler made a statement on 26th January when being seen by the police in relation to her appearance as a witness in the High Court that on one occasion, when she was going to meet Mr. Profumo, Mr. Ward asked her to discover from him the date on which certain atomic secrets were to be handed to West Germany by the Americans—this was at the time of the Cuban crisis—and that she did not put this question to Mr. Profumo.

I should explain that there is some confusion both about what she said and about what she was asked to find out. Certainly, on 30th January, 1963, a report was received from an inspector in the Special Branch to the effect that Miss Keeler had told someone that she was asked by Mr. Ward to obtain, if possible, certain secret information from Mr. Profumo relating to a transfer of documents from America to Western Germany. On 25th March, about two months later, the security service received a report that someone else had stated that Miss Keeler said Mr. Ward had asked her to ask Mr. Profumo when the Germans were likely to—I quote the phrase—"get the bomb".

Finally, in a statement made to the police on 4th April, 1963, Miss Keeler herself said that Mr. Ward had asked her to get information from Mr. Profumo about the Americans giving the bomb to the Germans. The one consistent point throughout these stories is that Miss Keeler always denied having asked the question whatever it was. Already, there is some confusion about the dates. I have told the House of the first statement on 26th January, when she said she was asked to obtain information at the time of the Cuba crisis last October. This would contradict the view that her association with Mr. Profumo ended earlier.

However, in an article in a newspaper yesterday she states specifically that she was asked to get this information in 1961. But quite apart from this confusion in the various stories, I do not attach great significance to this from the purely security point of view because of the character of the information which she says she was instructed to obtain.

What is significant—and I fully admit it—is that this is the first and only time that any suggestion came to the notice of the authorities that Mr. Ward was trying to use Miss Keeler as an instrument for obtaining information. This was 30th January. The security service did not pass either of these reports to me. [Hon. Members: "Oh."] I am only giving the facts. In view of the discussion between my private office and the security service, at the beginning of February, and as things have turned out, I think it very unfortunate that this information was not given to me, but the head of the security service, in considering these reports, did not take that as of great importance.

As Ivanov had left the country he was satisfied, in the investigations he had already carried out, that the indirect contact between Ivanov and Mr. Profumo had not involved any breach of security. Yet I must repeat that I strongly regret that this information, which came originally from the police, was not, through the files of the security service, passed on to me.

I have time only to give the facts to the House today and I think that I have the right to do so. I turn to the second part of the narrative: what happened after Mr. Profumo's statement until the time of his admission of the truth. I will deal, first, with the communications I received from the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition—to which he referred today—and to the discussions I had with him. I will also deal with other reports which are alleged to have been sent to me during this period. I have dealt with everything up to the time of Mr. Profumo making his statement and now I wish to deal with what happened between the time that statement was made to the House—in which I had every confidence [Hon. Members: "Oh."]—Indeed, I think that that applies to the whole House—and his ultimate confession.

The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition came to see me about this case for the first time on 27th March, that is, five days after Mr. Profumo's statement. I am not complaining that he did not come earlier—if he thought that these security things were so dangerous—but, in any case, he came after the statement was made. He brought with him a copy of a letter he had had from Mr. Ward in November, 1962—about five months before. I do not complain about this delay, although, if I am accused of dilatoriness, I am entitled to observe that the right hon. Gentleman's description of Mr. Ward as a "self-confessed intermediary of the Russians"—if he thought him to be that—should have led him to have forwarded the letter to me. But he did not. Before dealing with this letter, which had nothing whatever to do with Mr. Profumo at all but which described the activities of Ivanov in October, 1962—at the time of the Cuba crisis—I ask hon. Members to cast their minds back to that critical period.

I confess that the last few days have not been very agreeable to me, but I must say, for the reasons I have given, that although the whole of this is so horrible and distasteful the week of the Cuba crisis—and I have been through some in peace and war—was the week of most strain I can ever remember in my life. It then seemed to many of us—and I think that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition shared this feeling—that in the struggle of wills between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, primarily the United States, the world might be coming to the brink of war.

During that week, as the pressures developed and built up to the climax on Friday and Saturday, the strain was certainly very great. Naturally, the same was true of the Soviet Government, who were doing all they could to further their policy and weaken the resolution of the West. Part of this Soviet activity was public, for example, the statement issued by the Soviet Government on 23rd October, and some of it was private.

For example, Mr. Loginov, the Soviet Chargé ďAffaires, called on the Foreign Secretary on 25th October at his own request—that is, the request of Mr. Loginov—and expressed the hope that Her Majesty's Government would do all in their power to avert developments in Cuba which, as he said "could push the world to the brink of a military catastrophe." Mr. Loginov's aim was apparently that Her Majesty's Government should bring pressure to bear on the United States Government. Similarly, many members of the Soviet Embassy—not only in London but, I think, elsewhere—were making approaches to various diplomatic missions in London and to other people from about 24th October until the crisis was resolved on Sunday, 28th October.

Ivanov, with the assistance of Mr. Ward, was perhaps rather more persistent than most; but he was not the only one to try to bring this pressure to shake us and, by us, bring what pressure we could on the United States. But since these matters have been mentioned, I think it right that I should give the House a chronological account of the activities at that time with which Ivanov, whatever Tassmay say, was involved.

On 24th October, 1962, Mr. Ward telephoned the resident clerk at the Foreign Office and gave him, to pass on to Sir Harold Caccia, an account of a conversation he had just had with Ivanov. Among other things, Mr. Ward said that Ivanov had stated that the Americans had created a situation in which there was no opportunity for either the Americans or the Russians to compromise and that the Soviet Government looked to the United Kingdom as their one hope of conciliation.

The next day, 25th October, my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham (Sir G. Nicholson) informed Sir Hugh Stephenson, then Deputy-Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office—I think that my hon. Friend was one of Mr. Ward's patients—that Ivanov had been to see him to give a somewhat similar story and to ask for some indication that the British Government were considering working towards negotiations at the Summit. This day was the same day as that on which the Foreign Secretary had seen Mr. Loginov; and later the same afternoon Mr. Ward spoke to Sir Harold Caccia's private secretary to convey similar information.

On the following day, 26th October, Mr. Ward telephoned Lord Arran and asked to bring Ivanov to his house for a discussion the next morning. Lord Arran agreed and Ivanov and Mr. Ward came to see him on 27th October. Ivanov again stated that he wished to get a message to the British Government by indirect means asking them to call a Summit conference in London forthwith. Lord Arran reported this initiative at the time both to my office and to the Foreign Office, and later sent in a full report.

It is thus clear that at the time of the Cuba crisis Ivanov was using all the methods at his disposal to try to persuade the British Government to take some initiative. But he was not alone in this. Nor were we in any doubt about the motives of these approaches, which must have been to drive a wedge between ourselves and the United States at this very crucial moment. It is not uncommon, at a moment of crisis, that a lot of worthy people should be used to see whether they could be of some assistance. That has often happened. Ivanov's approaches were, therefore, only a small piece of the jigsaw; they were a natural part of the Soviet attempt to weaken our resolution. Our reply at the time was that the ordinary diplomatic channels were open.

That was what the letter was mainly about. I was not quite sure whether it was a reproach to me for not having yielded to the pressures. Some people thought that we should have taken the initiative. It was not a very easy decision to make and hon. Members must remember our close discussion all the time with the President of the United States. That is what the letter was about and I have told the House about it in detail. It was, of course, known because Sir Hugh Stephen-son and all these people were involved init.

The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition next wrote to me on 9th April and sent me a copy of a memorandum, prepared by the hon. Member for Dudley, of a conversation he had had with Mr. Ward on 26th March—four days after Mr. Profumo's statement. I at once forwarded the right hon. Gentleman's letter, and enclosures, to the security authorities. They examined the material and concluded that there was no evidence in it of any breach of security and, indeed, that there were no new points in it. There was nothing of Mr. Ward's conversation, reported in this memorandum, not already brought to their attention, either by Mr. Ward or through other reports. It was a long memorandum and it is interesting to note that, among other allegations—and I hope that I am correct in this—it included the statement that there was no impropriety in the association between Mr. Profumo and Miss Keeler.

On 13th May the right hon. Gentleman wrote me a letter asking what action I was going to take on his material and I replied that it did not seem to me that any further action was necessary. On 23rd May the right hon. Gentleman sent me a letter he had received from Mr. Ward which, among other things, said that Mr. Profumo had not told the truth in his statement in the House of Commons. On the following day the right hon. Gentleman asked to see me before the Whitsun Recess and we met on 27th May, when the right hon. Gentleman expressed the view that there were still security implications which required further examination.

I said that I would consider the right hon. Gentleman's representations and inform him. I had, in addition, to consider further statement made by Mr. Ward. Whatever value can be given to them, I must consider them. On 7th May he had telephoned my Principal Private Secretary and asked for an interview with him. I was in some doubt about whether it would be advisable to grant this request or what useful purpose it would serve. But I decided that as it might be possible that Mr. Ward had some information to give bearing on security my Principal Private Secretary ought to see him. I arranged that he should be accompanied by a member of the security service, and this, in fact, was done on the same evening.

It transpired that Mr. Ward wished to complain about certain inquiries which the police were making at that time and which, as we now know, led eventually to his arrest. He was, of course, very properly told that this was nothing to do with me or, indeed, with any other member of the Government; that the police were charged with the duty and responsibility of investigating any alleged criminal offence and were not in any way in this country under political direction or control.

During the course of his complaints, Mr. Ward let drop the remark that Mr. Profumo had not told the truth. This, of course, was the opposite from what he had been saying earlier in his conversation with the hon. Member for Dudley. I do not know how many people Mr. Ward wrote to or spoke to. He did write to the Home Secretary on 19th May, asking for the police inquiries to be called off and making allegations about Mr. Profumo's untruthfulness. He also wrote to my hon. Friend the Member for St. Marylebone (Sir W. Wakefield) and to the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, on 20th May. Of course, without saying again that this case is sub judice, it seems fairly clear that what he was hoping was that the police activities would be discontinued.

As a result of these fresh allegations by Mr. Ward, Mr. Profumo was again closely questioned on several occasions and each time he firmly maintained the truth of his statements. On 29th May I learned for the first time about the statement that Miss Keeler made to the police on 26th January, which I have already described to the House. I heard of it for the first time on 29th May. This was the story that she had been asked to obtain certain information from Mr. Profumo and had not done so.

Although I found and still find it difficult to attach weight to this story, I felt that in view of the doubts expressed by the Leader of the Opposition on the security angle and in view of this information which had only just reached me it would be right to take further action. I therefore decided to ask the Lord Chancellor to look carefully at the security reports and other documents which I had received in connection with the case and to make any inquiries which he thought necessary from the security service and the police and to advise me whether, in his opinion, he thought that any further action seemed desirable. I informed the right hon. Gentleman by letter of my decision on 30th May.

The Lord Chancellor accepted this duty and in the course of it not only made a large number of inquiries from the security authorities and from the police, but questioned a number of Ministers and Mr. Profumo. I received his report and, as I undertook to do, I sent a copy of it to the right hon. Gentleman. I have no complaint about the courteous way in which the right hon. Gentleman referred to the report and made use of it only to the extent of referring to things within his knowledge.

Very serious things have been said about me and I must reply to them. I will now deal with the serious accusation which has been made that I had either received, or ought to have received, certain statements from the police authorities and from Mr. Eddowes which should have led me to question the probity of Mr. Profumo, In view of the importance which the Press has attached to this matter, I must deal with it fully. Here I will summarise with quotations a statement made to the police. I have placed copies of the whole of this statement in the Library.

On 24th March, at a time when Miss Keeler was out of the country, her mother, Mrs. Huish, volunteered a statement to the Buckinghamshire police. She said that a Mr. Eddowes had called at her home on the previous day saying that he was concerned for Miss Keeler's safety, that she was in danger and that he was prepared to do anything to help. He suggested that Miss Keeler should make a statement saying that Ivanov was her boy friend and that she got information from Mr. Profumo and gave it to Ivanov for a joke.

Mr. Eddowes went on to say that Miss Keeler would have to keep to this story to protect herself. He said that she would get £5,000 to £10,000 when the Press had the story. In that respect, it was an underestimate in my view. Mr. Eddowes added—this is what he told the mother—that the Government would be forced to open an inquiry to which Miss Keeler would state these things and turn out a little heroine.

On 29th March, that is, five days later, a chief inspector of the Metropolitan Police saw Mr. Eddowes at the latter's house in London. Mr. Eddowes made a statement and handed the police an aide-memoire. This included the allegation that Miss Keeler had said she often met Ivanov at Ward's flat where she also met Mr. Profumo. He alleged that Miss Keeler said that Ivanov had asked her to obtain information about nuclear warheads, which she said she had not done. Mr. Eddowes was told that his information would be placed before the proper authorities. Of course, all this was hearsay, that is, Eddowes's account of what he said Miss Keeler had told him.

As the police had already obtained a statement, to which I have already referred, and were, moreover, aware of the statement made by Mrs. Huish to the Buckinghamshire police, Eddowes's allegations did not have the importance which otherwise might have attached to them. Eddowes was not told, as he claimed, that his report would be on my deck the following morning. He was told that the matter would be dealt with by the proper authorities. A few days later Mr. Eddowes rang up the police, on his return from abroad, and asked what had happened to his statement and was told by the police officer to whom he spoke that the matter was out of his hands.

This was at the beginning of April. From that date until 13th June, Friday of last week, Mr. Eddowes took no further action although there had, of course, been sensational developments in the meantime. Whatever the reason for the timing may have been, Mr. Eddowes wrote to me on 13th June and sent the letter to the Press. The House, I think, may draw its own conclusions of the way this story reads.

I have now to complete the narrative of events. The Lord Chancellor began his inquiry on Friday, 31st May, the day after I asked him to undertake it. On the same day, the Friday, Mr. Profumo left for a short holiday in Venice. He had been told that the Lord Chancellor would want to see him in connection with the inquiry on the following Thursday, and he arranged to return in time for that. In the event, the Lord Chancellor made more rapid progress than he had expected and asked Mr. Profumo to return a day earlier, on the Wednesday.

Mr. Profumo returned on the Whit Monday, and that evening he asked for an urgent interview with my Principal Private Secretary, saying that there had been a serious development. This meeting took place at 10.30 the following morning, Tuesday, 4th June, when my right hon. Friend the Chief Whip and my Principal Private Secretary saw Mr. Profumo. He said at once that his protestations of innocence had been untrue and that he had, in fact, had an improper association with Miss Keeler. He immediately tendered his resignation and indicated his intention of applying for the chiltern hundreds.

All this was reported to me at once and the information was announced by way of the exchange of letters, as the House and the country know.

That completes the narrative. I must now summarise the position. In August, 1961, I had never heard of Mr. Ward and, indeed, I never did till February—