Vote a. Number for Air Force Service

Part of Orders of the Day — Air Estimates, 1963–64 – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 7 March 1963.

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Photo of Mr Michael Foot Mr Michael Foot , Ebbw Vale 12:00, 7 March 1963

That is the kind of answer which casts doubt on everything else the right hon. Gentleman says. His view is that at the exact moment when he would like to get rid of Thor missiles on technical grounds we have done so; but he is still defending having them a few years ago. That casts doubt on his whole judgment in these matters, because anyone who had studied the matter could see for himself that Thor missiles could only be used first, and it is no good this country, of all countries, having a nuclear weapon, whatever may be the other argument against it, that can only be used first. During the Cuban crisis, if general war had broken out, one of the reasons why this country would have been exterminated would have been because of the presence of these Thor missiles, which were of no use to us anyway. Does the right hon. Gentleman deny that? It is a very serious matter. Many of us have said that these weapons are provocative, anyhow, and that we should clear them out. The Government would not listen and have only been prepared to take them out when the Americans have insisted on it.

During this debate we have had a general argument about the independent nuclear deterrent, which is, after all, the main purpose for which the Air Force exists. I know that that is not its only function, but it is its primary function. The right hon. Gentleman shakes his head. I know that the Air Force has other functions, but if his claims for the deterrent are as great as they have been no one can dispute that this is not the most important function of all. That is what he has been saying.

I have been waiting for hon. Gentle men opposite to try to answer the arguments put from this side in the two-day defence debate and today about the independent nuclear deterrent. I must say they very rarely attempt to do so, because they go on repeating the same thing. The hon. and gallant Member for Macclesfield speaks on this issue, and I can understand his point of view. He says that we cannot trust the Americans for ever even if we can trust them now, and he is not too certain about that. The Government say much the same thing, although they phrase it rather more delicately than the hon. and gallant Gentleman; that however much we trust the Americans, we cannot trust them for ever. I can understand that point of view, and if I did not think these weapons were highly dangerous for other reasons, and if it were possible for this country to have a nuclear deterrent of its own which could defend us, I could see the argument. I do not trust the Americans all that much.

One of the troubles—and this was put very powerfully by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Jenkins) in the debate on Monday and Tuesday—is that for a country of this size, capable of maintaining a nuclear force of this size, it is an extremely dangerous kind of weapon. In one sense —a technical sense if you like, though it is more than that—if I might summarise the argument crudely, if we have huge nuclear armaments with the possibility of choosing between different nuclear weapons and conventional forces, the possibility of our being forced to use the weapon first is much less. I concede that argument. Hon. Members opposite have never attempted to answer the point.

Always the British Government, because of their obsession about the independent nuclear deterrent, make statements which would be dangerous enough if they were made by the Americans but are infinitely more dangerous when made by spokesmen of a country like ours. Quite a number of people in the United States, arguing about these matters, say that it would be a very good idea to have a common agreed declaration between the Russians and themselves and everybody, if it could be obtained—