Foreign Affairs

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 27 April 1959.

Alert me about debates like this

Photo of Mr Desmond Donnelly Mr Desmond Donnelly , Pembrokeshire 12:00, 27 April 1959

No, I mean nothing of the kind, and if my hon. Friend will bear with me a little he will see what I mean.

I am saying that if we want a British initiative it must be a successful British initiative. That is the test of whether it is of any use. I am saying that the Prime Minister's handling of the situation, even supposing that his policy is right, was inept. That is what I am saying, and I say it because I believe that his handling of the situation will now achieve nothing because of the misapprehensions which he has aroused.

What, basically, are Mr. Khrushchev's aims? By that I mean not just what he has declared as the immediate, short-term proposals involving Berlin and Germany. The first thing which he is seeking to do is to arrive at a legalisation of Stalin's Empire in Europe. The truth is—and Mr. Khrushchev knows it, just as much as we know it—that there are very few Communists in any of the Eastern European Communist countries. He knows and we know that none of those Governments would survive for a week without Russian military support. He is seeking to bring about a Western signing on the dotted line to recognise these East European countries as permanent spheres of Russian influence. That is his first aim. His second aim, which is subsidiary, is the removal of the Western shop window in Berlin.

There is, however, a much larger Russian aim which we sometimes tend to forget and which sometimes is repeated in such platitudes that people do not recognise it for the threat that it is. It arises from the fact that in the long run a large proportion of the Russian regime firmly believe in world domination. They do not necessarily mean to achieve it by military means.

I do not think that anybody here is under any apprehension about Mr. Khrushchev's intentions in considering whether he means war or not. I think it is clear that he does not mean war, because he is fully conversant, just as we are, with the consequences of nuclear war to the Russian revolution as well as to the Western capitalist system. The danger is that, as people have done before him, Mr. Khrushchev may blunder into war by a misreading of the Western intentions, and the duty of the Foreign Ministers' conference is to make these Western intentions so abundantly clear that there can be no doubt whatever in Mr. Khrushchev's mind as to where we stand.

In the formulation of any Western policy we have to answer four questions. We can have all the communiqués and all the nuances of words, but fundamentally it comes down to four questions. First, is an arbitrary attempt to change the Western position in Western Berlin to be regarded by the West as a casus belli? In short, do we fight for Berlin?

The second question is, if not, are we prepared to face the consequences of giving way? Does anybody here think that the collapse of the Western position in Berlin would not be followed, first, by the collapse of the Western position in Germany and then by its collapse in Europe?

Thirdly, if we decide to fight, if it comes to the point, with what do we fight? The hon. and gallant Member for Norwood talked about negotiating from strength. As any hon. Member knows who takes his mind for a moment off the hustings, which preoccupy us so much these days, the truth is that the defences of this country are worse today than they have been at any time in our history since Stanley Baldwin. We have practically no Air Force, and what we have is out of date. We have hardly any Navy, and what we have is out of date. What Navy we have is stretched to the limit with the fishery patrols around Iceland. The Russians have a vast submarine threat. We have hardly any Army which is effective, and what we have is grossly short of equipment. What we have are a few hydrogen bombs, with doubtful means of delivery. What it amounts to is suicide or surrender, because of the Government's present defence policy. Unfortunately that is outside the context of the debate except as an instrument of foreign policy.