This is an Adjournment debate about railways, and I should like, at the start, to say that our thoughts turn tonight to all those involved in the serious accident which took place a few hours ago.

I have sought this debate to raise the issue of the purchasing procedure of the British Transport Commission for three principal reasons which I wish to discuss. First, I do not believe that justice has been fully done to my constituent, Mr. Gethin, whose charges were the basis of the investigation which was made by Sir Harold Howitt. Secondly, I do not believe it is possible to over-emphasise the cautionary tales which can be drawn from the report of the investigation. Thirdly, although I believe that much good has already come from the report, there is still more to be done.

Mr. Gethin was the chief contracts adviser to the British Transport Commission for almost two years. After his departure from the Commission he cited a number of important cases in which he thought that the Commission has purchased unwisely. As the Commission was engaged on a modernisation programme, involving the expenditure of some £1,200 million, this was obviously a matter of national importance.

Sir Harold Howitt investigated these charges, and we should be grateful to him for, in his own words, setting out the relevant facts in some detail so that they may speak for themselves. The narrative that he has written has been of great value, even if at times he has seemed to make two and two equal five, which is an odd action for a distinguished accountant.

Many informed commentators, notably The Times and the Financial Times, believe that Sir Harold Howitt has been rather less than fair with Mr. Gethin, that, in fact, the narrative supports Mr. Gethin rather more than Sir Harold will allow. Indeed, in the words of Mr. R. J. Mitchell, the President of the Purchasing Officers' Association: there is a general feeling, which many of us share, that Sir Harold's findings hardly do justice to Mr. Gethin. Mr. Gethin made four minor allegations, if one can call them that. Sir Harold has had some rather sharp comments to make about many of them, noticeably that of the replacement of the s.s. "Dinard", which was originally supposed to have cost just over £1 million and, in the end, cost more than £11 million. Sir Harold has made certain strictures, even if they are not always clearly expressed.

Mr. Gethin made three main charges: first, about signalling; secondly, about overhead electrification; and, thirdly, about the provision of vacuum brake cylinders. Sir Harold has found, certainly in the first two of these cases—signalling and overhead electrification—that no money was wasted. Of course, if one asks only one firm to tender and does not call for competitive tenders, it is quite impossible to prove that any money spent has been wasted.

But it is interesting to note that the efficiency of the financial safeguards imposed by the Transport Commission can he checked, because there is the case of the vacuum brake cylinders. On 23rd April the Commission's Supply Committee agreed that the Westinghouse Brake Company should supply 500,000 of these cylinders, and the price was to be just over £30 apiece. There then followed a period of controversy, and the British Motor Corporation was brought into the field. The Corporation offered to supply cylinders at £21 14s. 8d. apiece. Westinghouse then lowered its price to £23. It is possible to believe that Westinghouse would have lowered its price without this spur of competition, because it was bringing in new manufacturing processes, and it is impossible to believe that the moon is made of Gruyère cheese.

The British Transport Commission's Financial Department had agreed that £30 was a fair price far these vacuum brake cylinders, and when the British Motor Corporation bid came in the Commission decided to inquire of the Corporation to find out whether it really was possible to produce these vacuum brake cylinders at the price offered—to quote to satisfy ourselves that they can, in fact, produce a cylinder for the price quoted. This is the only case in which it is possible to check the efficiency of the Commission's financial safeguards, and I do not believe that in this instance they have proved to be efficient. I hesitate to follow Sir Harold in his belief that they have worked in signalling and in overhead electrification.

Now to the future. The new British Transport Commission purchasing directive is an improvement on the old one, but, as Sir Harold says, everything depends on the spirit in which it is implemented. It is common knowledge that in many big industrial firms there is a clash between the engineering men on the technical side and the contract or purchasing side. There is always bound to be. The engineers are interested in fancy, specifications. The contracts men are interested primarily in costs, and they believe in competitive tenders. In this situation an effective contracts officer is almost bound to have his run-in with the engineers, and I believe that this is what has happened in the British Transport Commission. I believe that Mr. Gethin, who is a trained engineer, was sacked because various engineers were tired of what they considered to be his meddling and interference in their traditional preserves. They did not like the new methods that he was trying to introduce and they threatened to resign if he was not sacked.

In a normal profit-making firm the contracts officer can count on the cooperation of the board of directors, because they are interested in saving all the money that they can. In a nationalised industry, of course, the members of the board are interested in not wasting money, but they are not so immediately, personally involved as people in a private firm. Therefore, in a nationalised industry it is particularly important that the contracts officer should have all the help that he can get.

Will the fate of Mr. Gethin encourage his successors to stand up to the engineers? What will happen if they do? Will they get a handshake from Sir Brian Robertson, or an illuminated address or a pat on the back from the Parliamentary Secretary, or will they get the sack? Mr. Gethin got the sack.

How can we strengthen the hand of the contracts officer? I would like to see the establishment of a small board of outside auditors who would, at irregular intervals, descend on the various nationalised industries to check the procedure and practice of contracting. Perhaps even one man could do the job. The establishment of an external watchdog would have one further benefit. At the moment, manufacturers who deal much with a nationalised industry are inhibited from complaining when they think they have been unfairly treated. They are frightened of making a fuss, because they think that they will lose what business they have. The appointment of one small poodle of a watchdog would give them an additional means of access and an additional avenue of complaint.

Of course, the key to all this is competitive tendering. It has often been said that the Transport Commission departs from competitive tendering only with the greatest reluctance, but in 1956, when £120 million was spent, only 41 per cent. of this amount went out to competitive tendering. That is clearly not good enough. It is the secret allocated contract which is the root of this evil. Let us, at best, have a watchdog committee. Let us, at second best, have just one watchdog. At third best, let us have a rule that all allocated contracts should be made public with the accounts each year. This would be a poor check, but it would be better than no check at all.

I close with some more words by the President of the Purchasing Officers' Association: By sacrificing his personal security in order to protect the national interests, Mr. Gethin has earned the respect of all. What a pity his intervention was needed before the Transport Commission started to put its house in order.