Cyprus

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 15 July 1957.

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Photo of Mr Frederic Bennett Mr Frederic Bennett , Torquay 12:00, 15 July 1957

Of course it means how they will be governed, but at what point is it decided who decides who is to be governed by whom? Unfortunately, there are two racial and religious elements in the island—as in Ireland there are two religious elements—and that difficulty cannot be resolved merely by overall self-determination. It just is not applicable in the present circumstances to imagine that the Turkish minority or the Turkish Government are prepared to accept the idea of self-determination for the island as a whole leading to Enosis. Anybody who goes to Turkey and talks to Turks must realise that that is an absolutely plain fact and a reality with which we have to deal today.

We have heard a good deal about the needs of the Greeks, the Turks and the Cypriots. I reiterate that we should recall, especially at this time, what are our own British interests. It was rightly said by my hon. Friend the Member for Lanark (Mr. Patrick Maitland) that in thinking of a solution we should not entirely neglect to consider essentially British interests, military, strategic or economic; otherwise we shall have to abdicate our whole position as a leading Power—and that is not merely a jingoist term; it is because, we are a leading Power that we can maintain our trading communications across the world and maintain our standard of living. When considering the solution of the Cyprus problem, therefore, it is essential for hon. Members on both sides to dwell a little upon purely British interests.

I do not pretend to be a military strategist. I do not know what are our strategic needs in the Island. But I say that when the Government are clarifying our strategic interests and the way in which to safeguard them they should not put forward reasons on any other basis but the absolute truth of our strategic needs. They should not, for instance, be misguided by the argument which is so often heard, that because the Suez episode was in some respects a failure and that Cyprus was not successful then from a military standpoint, it is necessarily of no military use. It may well be that the preparations in regard to Suez were not such as to equip the Cyprus base for the purpose for which it was ultimately used. But do not let us think that because it was not successful before, it could not be successful in the future.

When I hear talk about moving our base to East Africa I become somewhat nervous. I was looking up my correspondence only this afternoon and I found that I wrote to the Ministers concerned four years ago, pleading the case for a base in East Africa and much less dependence upon Cyprus. I put forward what I thought to be an awful lot of convincing arguments why it would be better for us to centre our military interests in East Africa and to cut down in Cyprus and elsewhere. I received long and authoritative letters from Her Majesty's Ministers giving an awful lot of good reasons why it was utterly impossible to consider a base in East Africa, and why we must stick to Cyprus. If Her Majestys' Government go into reverse and take up what, in all humility, I may call the Bennett position of four years ago, I hope that they will give me some convincing reasons for doing so, otherwise I shall not know whether to believe what they said four years ago or what they are saying now.

In my few remarks I have deliberately tried not to make matters more difficult. I must ask hon. Members opposite to believe that if, even unwittingly, they give the impression in Athens, or to Archbishop Makarios, that somehow or other the Greek Cypriots and Greece will get a better deal under a Labour Government—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—at the expense of the Turkish minority and the Turkish Government, they will make it almost impossible for my right hon. Friend to carry on any sort of successful negotiation to settle this dispute. I should have thought that that was a matter which was above all party considerations, and that we were all determined to bring this sorry chapter to a happier conclusion as soon as possible.