Orders of the Day — Cyprus

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 5 May 1955.

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Photo of Mr Reginald Paget Mr Reginald Paget , Northampton 12:00, 5 May 1955

I wish to discuss mainly the strategic question, but before doing so may I say that it seems to me there are some propositions here which are not open to argument? One of them is that it has been, it is, and it will be, to the economic advantage of the people of Cyprus to stay within the British Empire. It is equally clear that it may well be to the social advantage of minorities to remain within the British Empire. I think it equally clear and past demonstration that one reaches a point at which it is not wise, expedient or possible to do people good against their clearly expressed will, and that is the situation which we are up against in Cyprus.

It has been made abundantly clear that the overwhelming will of the Greek majority in Cyprus is that they should return to the Greek nation to which they claim to belong. That is not because they think that they would be better off, or because they think that they would enjoy more freedom. It is demanded by Communists who, in a good many instances, know perfectly well that they would be in gaol under a Greek Government, or even executed.

Yet, irrational as it may be, this emotion exists within Cyprus. It is not for prosperity, but because they want to feel they are the sons of Achilles, the pupils and heirs of Aristotle and Plato, and fellow citizens of Pericles. It is an idea of emotion. One might call it a religion. It has nothing to do with material things, and it cannot be answered by a material solution. What, then, is the point of proposing a Constitution which would meet any reasonable demand or aspiration, when the whole basis of this aspiration is irrational and emotional? It is, from the beginning, an utterly futile exercise.

The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs ended his speech by saying that so long as the tension in the world remains, we shall insist upon maintaining our position in Cyprus, and that we shall not be deterred by acts of violence. Let us reflect how often and to how many people that has been said. And has it ever been taken other than as a challenge to violence? Here is the whole problem.

We are at the beginning of what may again be a tragic chapter in our history. It is no use saying we do not submit to violence, because at a point, we do; and that point is steadily built up in greater bitterness. The time comes when we do submit to the will of a population prepared to be violent and then we do it on the worst terms for them and for ourselves. Do not let us do that again here. And in any case, do not let us do it for an imaginary strategic advantage which, if not antediluvian, is certainly ante-atomic.

In this atomic age, I cannot conceive of what military advantage Cyprus can be to us. Let us try to understand what is a base. I remember, when we were discussing the matter in another context, the right hon. and gallant Member for Leicester, South-East (Captain Water-house) told us, "You want a base where you are going to use your troops." Of course, that is precisely opposite to the truth.

The whole point of a base is that it is somewhere where it is not proposed to use troops. If it is necessary to use troops at a base, then the base becomes a commitment and not a point of manoeuvre giving additional mobility. Any base which holds down troops needed to defend it has lost its function as a base, because it ceases to be a point from which can be obtained added mobility in the sphere of manoeuvre. Therefore, to try to make a base where it is necessary to hold a position against a hostile population is, in my submission, an act of strategic insanity.

Further, in what sort of a war do we contemplate using this depository of troops? In point of fact, it will not be a base; it will be a garrison and a commitment. But in what sort of a war do we pretend that we shall draw troops from this garrison to use in what sort of an area? I should have thought that it was plainly obvious that it could not be in an atomic war, because anywhere more atomically vulnerable than the Cyprus base would be hard to imagine.

As I understand it, a command post occupying about 4,000 men, not one of whom will fight, is being built there. What is the point of such a command post, which in any case will be across the sea, in Cyprus? Such a command post ought to be a long way below the earth in any case. But if it is to be across the sea at all, might it not just as well be in London or in Paris as in Cyprus? When controlling by wireless it makes little difference if one's distance is rather longer or shorter.

But perhaps it is not to be used in an atomic war. Have hon. Members opposite in mind the sort of intervention in which the Tory Government were tempted to indulge in Persia—incidentally blaming us for not doing so? If they think they will go into Iran or make small interventions and little Tory wars in the Middle East, it would, in the first place, be better if Cyprus were not there—to keep them out of temptation, if for nothing else. But in point of fact even then it would be useless.

If we were to deal with that sort of situation we should deal with it today by means of an airlift—and we could work our airlift from here. It may be that there would be a certain number of ferrying operations, in which case there is perhaps some advantage in shorter distances, but with our limited aerodrome and airfield accommodation in Cyprus, compared with our unlimited airfield accommodation here, the greater facilities here would make the sheer operation of movement from here to the Middle East as fast as, and probably faster than, the same operation—to the Middle East—with the limited facilities in Cyprus.