– in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 25 February 1955.
I wish briefly to raise the question of the withdrawal of the British administration from the Ogaden, an area primarily used by Somali tribes. This matter affects some 25,000 square miles and about 300,000 people.
I apologise to the Minister for having changed the subject of the Adjournment, but I am sure he will appreciate that the Somaliland Orders are not debatable and that he will welcome this opportunity to make a further Government statement on a matter which, as his right hon. Friend said, is one of great difficulty. As his right hon. Friend said, it turns on the "unfortunate" Treaty of 1897.
I wish briefly—because of the time allowed—to put several questions to the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs. The burden is on the Government, I feel, to explain why such short notice was given of the Agreement signed on 29th November last and why these sheikhs were informed only as late as 5th January, when the Treaty comes into operation on Monday. After all, this matter had been in abeyance, rightly or wrongly, for a very long time, and in those circumstances I should have thought that much longer notice could have been given and a better and fairer opportunity provided to the tribal leaders to make representations to Her Majesty's Government.
While I realise that it is now unrealistic to press the suggestion of a postponement, made by several hon. Members when the subject was raised this week, I want to ask the Minister, in spite of the fact that the Agreement comes into force on Monday, whether he will endeavour to reopen the question of the boundaries, seek an opportunity for boundary revision—these are, after all, very artificial boundaries—and, if necessary, facilitate boundary revisions by means of such measures as lease or purchase.
Thirdly, I want to turn briefly to the Treaty of 1897, which the Secretary of State for the Colonies himself admitted to be unfortunate. It is an example of appeasement which has had unfortunate repercussions. I appreciate the Government's point of view that they cannot repudiate an international agreement, but I do not think the question is quite as simple as that. Admittedly, I have made only an elementary examination of the Treaty, but it certainly seems obscure and there seems to be an argument on the Treaties of 1884 and 1886 that the tribal elders voluntarily placed themselves under British protection. It is very creditable to our administration that they still seek that protection. They sought it then for the maintenance of their independence, the preservation of order and other good and sufficient reasons.
In short, there seems to be argument that at no time was any territory transferred. Consequently, it was not in our power to give away that which we did not possess. I cannot pretend to speak with any authority on these Treaties, but I should have thought that at any rate there was a case that the 1897 Treaty did not succeed in doing what it purported to do and that it was not within the power of the British Government to transfer these territories. In those circumstances, I invite the Minister to consider negotiating a reference to arbitration and to seek that the matter be referred, without acrimony, to the International Court, or in some other way that an authoritative decision be obtained out with the parties.
I put the further point to the right hon. Gentleman, because I think it arises out of the obscurity and confusion of the conflict between these Treaties, that he should make a statement on the treaties of 1884 and 1886. I invite him to say that those Treaties are still binding and in no way impaired. I should like him to do this for the very good reason that there is conflict between the two Treaties and, even if the Government stand by their present Agreement on the ground that they cannot repudiate the earlier Agreement, we should still maintain the duties and obligations we formerly undertook.
Finally, I would raise with the Minister the matters which the Secretary of State particularly argued in favour of the present settlement, that this Agreement guarantees certain very important rights and that there goes with it certain important assurances. I have had a look at those and find they are not absolute. To have grazing rights recognised in perpetuity is certainly most important, but the rights are not absolute. In an Agreement like this, one would not expect absolute certainty, but the grazing rights are to be ensured "as far as possible."
Article III of the Agreement says that
Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of the Imperial Ethiopian Government …
services, including educational services, are to be "at the existing scale." Those services cannot be extended without negotiation. There is reference to "political agitation" which could go very wide. These are not unexpected provisions in an Agreement of this sort, but I do hope the Minister can deal in a little more detail with the assurances that accompany the Agreement, that we can be assured that the provisions will be liberally interpreted and the guarantees will be properly carried out. I concede at once that it will be of great advantage to have a British liaison officer.
The Secretary of State referred to the high bearing and courage of the delegation he met. He has referred to the very difficult decision at which the Government arrived. I think the Minister of State would accept that there is an obligation on him to give some consolation and satisfactory assurance to these proud people who sought British protection and still seek the maintenance of that protection.
I wish to support my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland, North (Mr. Willey) because perhaps more than any other hon. Member I have been in close touch with the delegation, along with my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan). I wish to say a few sentences about the demean our and bearing of the delegation and the way in which they met hon. Members at Westminster.
We are very grateful to the Secretary of State for the words he said about the way in which the members of the delegation conducted themselves at this most difficult time; for within a few days they will be, not handed over, but leaving us to go under the jurisdiction of the Abyssinian State. Their people can be well proud of the way in which the delegation have behaved in this country. This affair is a shabby thing—I say that quite advisedly—because, being a Protectorate, they have only an Advisory Council and have been kept in the dark. Responsible members like Mr. Mariano have asked for many months, if not years, what was going to happen; and the Governor has said, "You are our wards and we will look after you."
In the actual event, the bombshell came on the 5th of last month, and a bombshell it was indeed, giving so short a time for them to come over here and consult us. It is almost scandalous that they were kept in ignorance and fobbed off in this way for so many months. I hope that the Minister will give us an explanation.
The history of the case is in no doubt whatever. These people came under the Queen's protection in 1884 and 1886, willingly and with full knowledge, and in 1897 we signed the agreement with Abyssinia without their knowledge, and, obviously, without their consent. In the 1930s, they were enslaved by Mussolini. In 1940 and 1941—it is important to say this—we liberated them. After being under the heel of Italy for those years, they now go back to a power like Abyssinia, about which they have doubts and fears. In that they are justified.
I have been in Kenya and know what is happening in South Abyssinia, on the N.F.D. border. Whatever may be said about the cultured and able men in Addis Abbaba, I believe that on the borders of Abyssinia the Ras of Harar does not behave himself in the same way as people in Addis Abbaba. These Somali people, about whom we are so concerned, are rightly hag-ridden by the fears of the old days and are scared of going back to Ethiopian rule.
The Somali delegates have told me that about 40 Ogaden sultans and tribal chiefs now live in Mogadishu as political exiles. The Somalis who reside under Ethiopian jurisdiction do not dare to exercise freedom of expression, and the sultans are compelled to sign "By order." It is most important that the people who are now going over the line, so to speak, should be safeguarded by our administration in every possible way.
On Wednesday last, the Secretary of State for the Colonies admitted that the Haud and the Reserved Areas are used predominantly by members of the British protected tribes from the Somaliland protectorate. May I ask the Minister whether or not the members of these tribes will be considered foreigners, with no safeguards, if, for instance, oil were to be found in this area by the American Sinclair Oil Company, and the area were to be urbanised? As I understand the Agreement, it is only people who use grazing rights, who are nomadic and on the move, who are to be safeguarded. If there were to be a fixed settled community, would it come under the Ethiopian regime? Are people who settle in farms and towns safeguarded under the Agreement?
In some respects, we have given way upon this issue. I am not one who has used the expression "scuttle"—I never have done and never will—but there is no doubt that our prestige will suffer. There will be talk in the bazaars all the way to Kenya and Aden on this matter, and I wish that we might have found some other way of settling it, particularly for the benefit of these people, who have fought with us ever since the campaigns of the "Mad Mullah," who fought against Mussolini and who now look to us for protection in these difficult modern times.
There can be no hon. Member of the House who does not regret the fears and anxieties which the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of November, 1954, has caused among the people of Somaliland. Certainly, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has made his position in the matter very clear, and I should like to join him in paying my tribute to the dignified bearing of the members of the delegation during their visit here and to the loyalty of which they have given such proofs to this country. On the other hand, I believe that in all the circumstances the Agreement itself was a good one.
To see the matter in its proper perspective, we must look back over the historical background of the area during the past seventy years. In July, 1884, the Egyptian garrisons were withdrawn from the Somali coast following the successful rising of the Mahdi, in the Sudan. For the purposes of preserving order and the security of British interests in Aden, which was largely dependent upon the Somali coast for its supplies, the Governor of the day occupied Berbera with a British force. In 1884 and 1886 respectively Agreements were signed with the Elders of the five tribes residing in the area. The first of those secured British rights in the territories of the tribes, and the second Agreement formally extended to them and the territories under their authority and jurisdiction the protection of the Queen.
Those Agreements, I should like to assure the hon. Gentleman, are certainly as binding and valid today as they were when they were signed, but the exact area covered by them was never defined. The only indication of its extent was a reference to two points on the coastline in a notification which was made to the Powers which signed the Berlin Treaty of 1885, which we know as one of the Congo Basin Treaties. Nothing was said whatever about the limits of the extension in the hinterland.
In 1897 the Ethiopians, no doubt taking advantage of the unsettled conditions arising out of the Anglo-Egyptian operations against the Khalifa, in the Sudan, made a number of territorial claims which included half of what is now British Somaliland. In the face of this pressure the late Lord Rennell of Rodd, who was then on a mission to the Emperor, was successful in concluding a treaty delineating the boundary of the British Protectorate, and thus setting a limit to Ethiopian pretensions. I must say that at that time we had not the forces in that area to resist an attack had the Ethiopians decided to press it.
However, it was then recognised that this line had the unsatisfactory effect of cutting across the traditional grazing areas of the Somali tribes, and letters were accordingly annexed to the Treaty providing that the tribes on either side of the frontier were free to cross that frontier for the purpose of grazing. Those grazing areas which were known as the Haud were never administered by the Ethiopian Government, and the others, the so-called Reserved Areas, were administered only very much later, shortly before the Italian invasion of 1935. What happened was that British officers followed and administered the British-protected tribes on their annual migrations over the border. Then, in 1935, when the Italians took possession, the Haud was detached from Ethiopia proper and incorporated into Italian Somaliland. The territory was then administered by the Italians, but certain facilities were given for the use of the grazing areas by the tribes, in return for some facilities in Berbera.
After the liberation of Ethiopia in 1942 a large area of Ethiopian territory, including the Haud and Reserved Areas, remained under British military administration. In 1944, parts of this territory were handed back, but again without prejudice to Ethiopian sovereignty, as specifically stated in the Agreement, the Reserved Areas and the Haud were left under British military administration. This Treaty was liable to denunciation on three months' notice by either party. Immediately after the war steps were taken to try to replace the 1944 Agreement by a more permanent arrangement.
In 1946, negotiations were opened with the Ethiopians on the basis that the Haud should be exchanged for a strip of territory in the north of British Somaliland, which would give the Ethiopians access to the sea through the Port of Zeila. There were many difficulties in the way of this exchange, and nothing materialised. Of course, since then Eritrea has been federalised with Ethiopia, and the Ethiopians have their access to the sea in that way. Attempts were also made to lease the Haud, or alternatively to extend the status quo, but these, too, were not successful.
We now come to last year, when the Ethiopian Government made it clear that they wished to resume full sovereignty over the Haud and the Reserved Areas. I must point out to the House that had they chosen to press this to the point of denouncing the 1944 Treaty there would have been no alternative to reverting to the situation which arose at the time of the 1897 Treaty. It was, therefore, decided to negotiate in the hope not only of securing the protection of tribal grazing rights but of allowing the tribal organisation to function properly in the grazing areas under the control of British liaison officers.
The arrangements which were concluded last November provide that the Protectorate Government should be authorised to furnish veterinary, medical, educational and other services, and to negotiate for the extension of water supplies and various other concessions. They also enable British officials to maintain law and order among the British protected tribesmen and to hear in the Protectorate cases arising across the border affecting them. I must emphasise that these provisions represent real and substantial concessions which, if, as we hope, they operate successfully, should preserve the tribal life of the British Somalis, whether entering or residing in the area. In reply to the query by the hon. Member for Rugby (Mr. J. Johnson), as I understand it the tribesmen residing in the grazing area will be entitled to the same privileges under the Treaty as those who are merely entering or going out.
Even though an oil field were to develop on the lines of Kuwait?
As far as I know, it certainly would not extend to matters such as the development of oil, but they certainly would not lose automatically their British protected status under the Treaty.
What does the right hon. Gentleman mean by "automatically?" Either they lose it or they do not.
They do not lose it, but, as in any other country, people who settle in the country would have the right to become naturalised at a later date, if they wished.
Several hon. Gentlemen have asked me why the Agreement was not announced earlier. The fact is that after the conclusion of the Agreement in November there were a number of subsidiary points which had to be cleared up with the Ethiopian Government, and, at the same time, proper preparations had to be made for explaining the position to the tribes. That took the few weeks between the conclusion of the Agreement and the beginning of January, during which time the delegation which had been over here negotiating the Agreement had to return to British Somaliland.
I was asked why it was not possible to discuss the revision of the boundary with the Ethiopian Government. Minor rectifications of the frontier would really make no contribution at all to the solution of the problem. The only thing which I think would have satisfied our Somali friends would have been the cession of the whole area, and I am satisfied that there was no possibility of persuading the Ethiopian Government to agree to abandon their sovereignty over any of this territory.
I have also been asked whether there was not a case for a reference to the International Court, because of the alleged conflict between the Treaty of 1897 and the agreement previously signed with Somali leaders. There can be no doubt that any submission of this question to the International Court could only have led to a reaffirmation of Ethiopian sovereignty. In a matter of this sort the Court would be bound to base its decision on the Treaty of 1897, which, as an international instrument, leaves no doubt as to where sovereignty lies. Moreover, such a reference to the Court would certainly have provoked Ethiopian hostility and would have rendered far more difficult the task of obtaining the practical concessions in the interests of the British-protected tribes to which I have referred.
The right hon. Gentleman says that he thinks the Court would be bound to take a certain view. Surely it would be much more satisfactory from the point of view of the people who are affected that they should know definitely the view of the Court after the submission of the case to the Court. They would then know finally rather than have the right hon. Gentleman's view of what the Court might or might not decide.
I was not saying what I thought. The point I made was that the 1897 Treaty is an international instrument, whereas the other Agreements were not.
The fact is that this Agreement is a great improvement on the previously existing legal position. The only alternative which would have remained to Her Majesty's Government had they not decided to conclude such an Agreement would have been to repudiate the obligations which we hold under international law, and, in those circumstances, we should have had to be prepared to hold by force an area which was legally Ethiopian territory and which, for sixty years, we have recognised as such.
As a nation which upholds the rule of international law, we could not possibly do this. Had any British Government thought they were able to do it, the Ethiopian Government would have been entitled to bring the matter before the United Nations or the International Court, which could only have led to a humiliating withdrawal on our part.
While Her Majesty's Government fully understands the point of view of the Somali tribes, which have been so clearly expressed to us by the members of the delegation, and while we sympathise deeply with their anxiety, we believe that in the very difficult circumstances in which we were placed, having done everything we could to secure an arrangement by some other means, the best way of safeguarding Somali rights was to conclude a treaty in which we obtained the maximum possible concessions to make sure it works.
I hope that this debate this afternoon will perhaps throw further light on the origins of this problem and, indicating the sympathy of this House and of the British people with the tribes in British Somaliland and our appreciation of their loyalty, will serve to convince them that their true interest lies in carrying out this Agreement harmoniously and with good will.
On the other hand, we are equally entitled to expect the Ethiopian Government to see that the Agreement is carried out both in the letter and in the spirit, and with full regard to the interests and the feelings of the British Somali tribes. The House can rest assured that, as far as Her Majesty's Government are concerned, we shall be vigilant in seeing that the rights of the tribesmen and of Her Majesty's Government in this new Agreement are fully preserved.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Rugby (Mr. J. Johnson) said, this is a sad and shabby deal. It is a sad end to a shabby piece of history about which this country has no claim to be proud. If this had been carried out by a Labour Government there is no doubt what we should have heard from hon. Gentlemen opposite and from the Conservative Press. As it is, with the notable exception of the "Daily Express," which has been true to its convictions on this matter and has not been afraid to say what it thinks, the Conservative Press has remained silent.
I think we need only remember what the Prime Minister said on a famous occasion, "I have not been called upon to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." This is a very small part of British territory and we have given up the administration and responsibility for these people. As the Secretary of State himself said, they have behaved in a brave, dignified and honourable manner. All of us have the deepest regret that it should have been thought necessary by the Government to bring this new Agreement into force and with such indecent haste.