I am not suggesting that the purchase of colonial cotton will stop altogether. Certain kinds of colonial cotton will be required on quality grounds, but I am saying that once these long-term contracts come to an end there will not be that assurance in the Colonies which will cause them to plant that amount of cotton.

I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman the Member for Cheadle (Mr. Shepherd) did not give us the benefit of his knowledge of these questions during the Committee stage, because we were able then to show in successive sittings that the scales will be loaded so heavily in favour of American cotton, because of the futures contract and the rest, that it is unlikely there will be the same bias in favour of using colonial cotton as there has been in the last few years. Therefore, once we run into a dollar crisis, we shall find that Lancashire will be in a serious position simply because production will have been cut back in certain Colonial Territories, and Lancashire will be more dependent on the United States.

Equally one must ask what will be the consequences to the Colonies. Only a few days ago we were debating the Japanese Trade Agreement. I do not want to repeat the arguments used on that evening because most of them would be out of order tonight, but I think it is in order to mention the question of the purchase of raw cotton from Uganda, which was the subject of a letter in the "Manchester Guardian" not many days ago. The Committee will recall the position with regard to Uganda cotton.

During the war, and for the first few years afterwards, this country, in association with India, bought practically the whole of the Uganda cotton crop. In 1951 we bought on our behalf, or on behalf of India, because we did the bulk purchasing for India, £9,460,000 worth of Uganda cotton. Japan got what was left over, which was about £250,000 worth. In 1952, once the President had started his depredations on the activities of the Raw Cotton Commission, whilst we bought about £8 million worth, the Japanese bought £3 million worth. I should not be surprised if in 1953 the figures worsen still further.

Of course, from now on we shall have the position that the Japanese will be free to buy all the Uganda cotton they want, and they will do it in a much more purposeful manner than our private buyers. Indeed, I should not be surprised if the greater part of that cotton will be going to Japan and only the smaller part of it coming to this country. I suggest to the President that this is not a matter for the mirth in which he appears to be indulging. It will not be a matter for amusement in Lancashire. It is difficult for him to go to Lancashire now, but I do not think that he will dare show his face there at all in a few years' time when the mills are stopping because, in this wanton way, he has cut off colonial supplies to Lancashire.

The same is true of other cotton territories. One could mention the Sudan, on which my hon. Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Mr. Rhodes) is a great authority. My hon. Friend has been invited more than once by the Sudan Government or the Gezira Board to go into the question of Sudan cotton and marketing arrangements. We know that one of the reasons for the spectacular increase not only in cotton production but in development generally in that area is that the Sudan authorities and the Gezira Board were able to obtain a market in this country for their products.

I should imagine that the authorities in the Sudan, with all the political uncertanties and unsettlements that there are in that country at the present time, must be very worried indeed because the President of the Board of Trade has cut off the source of the demand, the purchasing authority, the Raw Cotton Commission, which was buying that Sudanese cotton. That is very serious indeed. The Foreign Secretary and others at the Dispatch Box opposite say how they hope that the Sudan will not be unmindful of this country's friendship for her, and at the same time the President, just because of this sell-out to the Liverpool cotton speculators, destroys all the good that successive Governments have tried to do in building up relations between this country and the Sudan.

I very much fear that this will lead to a reversal of that wonderful success story, perhaps the most successful in the whole history of world development, that has been unfolded in the Sudan.