Foreign Affairs

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 5 November 1953.

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Photo of Mr William Warbey Mr William Warbey , Broxtowe 12:00, 5 November 1953

After an absence of nearly four years it gives me great pleasure to succeed again in catching the eye of the occupant of the Chair. During that period there have been a few changes inside the House. I notice that we sit on different sides and, while there has been a change of sides, there also appears to have been some change of thought.

I was very pleased today, for example, to find myself in a great measure of agreement on leading issues of policy with my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenock (Mr. McNeil), and I derived almost equal pleasure from seeing the hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. J. Amery) and his friends stabbing the Foreign Secretary in the back. I am also interested and glad to note that some hon. Members opposite should, for whatever motives—which I cannot always share—think that we cannot pursue Anglo-American friendship at all costs, as the Prime Minister did a year or so ago.

While there have been changes inside the House there have also been some changes outside. Four years ago there was a movement of public opinion—admittedly slight—away from the Labour Party. Now I think we can say that the tide has set in the other direction, and though, as "The Times" rightly said, the Broxtowe by-election is only a straw in the wind, straws nevertheless eventually add up to a haystack, or at least a strawstack, and the next few weeks may add their quota to the stack.

I now have the opportunity of representing constituents who live in very close touch with the realities of life, and the majority of whom are in particularly close touch, in one way or another, with the soil. Some of them till the surface and produce the white bread of life, and many others dig beneath the soil and bring forth the black bread of British industry.

I find that these honest, hard-working people are concerned, above all, with two things. I regret to say that they are concerned not so much with the issues raised by the hon. Member for Preston, North, as, first, with the question of the rising cost of living and the significant increase in the price of food which has taken place since this Government have been in power, and at a time when world prices have been falling—an increase which is causing heartbreak to old age pensioners and many people in the lower income groups—and, secondly, with the question which must always be in the minds of the masses of people in the world—the question of peace.

I found that their hopes had been raised by the speech which was made by the Prime Minister on 11th May this year, but that they had been dashed by what has happened since then. There have already been many references to that speech, and I do not want to labour the point, but I do want to recall that on 11th May, when the Prime Minister spoke of a high level conference, he said that such a conference should be called without delay.

It is now very nearly six months since that speech was made, and it is quite clear that obstacles have arisen in the path of the right hon. Gentleman. My right hon. Friend the Member for Greenock indicated whence those obstacles may have come. He suggested Washington, but I think we ought to inquire, too, what is the particular nature of the obstacles which have arisen, and I should like to refer to a report of the Washington correspondent of "The Times," published on 29th October. He says: It is understood that Mr. Dulles, when he saw the Prime Minister in London, promised to exert his personal influence on the President to agree to take part in a four-Power meeting at some time in the next few months"— and this is the important part— provided the European Defence Community had been ratified and the Russian Foreign Minister had accepted the invitation to Lugano. I do not know whether "The Times" correspondent is giving an accurate representation of discussions which have taken place, but hon. and right hon. Members opposite, particularly the Foreign Secretary, should know whether there is any truth in the reports that Mr. Dulles gave a pledge to Dr. Adenauer that German rearmament would be proceeded with at all costs and that there would be no attempt at serious negotiations with the Soviet Union about Germany, or, indeed, any other leading question, until German rearmament was in full train.

I know that the Under-Secretary of State, who is to reply to this debate, will say that it is not the responsibility of the Foreign Secretary to answer for what Mr. Dulles may say or what Dr. Adenauer may say, but I submit that this House is entitled to know what are the obstacles which are holding up further progress, and whether the obstacle is in this American determination to face the Soviet Union with a fait accompli with regard to German rearmament before any serious discussions are entered into.

If this is the case, as there is very good reason indeed to suspect, then surely it is not difficult to understand why this wordly verbal exchange of Note and counter Note has, so far, not led anywhere at all. After all, that is the heart of the matter. The heart of the matter is whether or not we are to make a serious attempt to reunify Germany by four-Power agreement or whether Germany is to be partitioned and rearmed and West Germany associated in firm military alliance with the West. It is, of course, nonsense for anyone to suggest that Russia has no need to be alarmed about such a prospect. I should say that not only has Russia reason to be alarmed but that all the countries of Europe, and, indeed, this country, too, which have suffered in the past from repeated German aggression, have good reason to be alarmed at such a prospect.

I recall that the Prime Minister, in his speech of 11th May, spoke one sentence which I thought was rather ominous. He referred to Dr. Adenauer as the wisest German statesman since … Bismarck."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 11th May, 1953; Vol. 515, c. 889–90.] It seemed to me a very ominous parallel indeed, because Bismark's wisdom surely lay, from the point of view of this country, solely in the fact that he kept away from the Channel; but it did not prevent him from leading Germany into aggression against Austria and Denmark and France, nor did it prevent him from laying the foundations for the further German aggression of 1914 and 1939. While this country suffered only in the last two German wars, France suffered in three German wars.

I think we ought to recall those facts when we are considering this fundamental problem of Europe and of world peace. I think we ought to realise that we and our American allies are in serious danger of making again the kind of mistake that was made in the last century and between the two world wars in utilising the interval between the wars to rebuild the military strength of ex-enemies at the expense of ex-allies. It was, after all, the Government of this country which, through the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, set Germany again on the road towards rearmament and becoming a decisive and dominant military power in Europe, and today we have the situation in which not only we but also the United States are following that path in regard to Germany, and in the Far East also with regard to Japan. We must view this as a serious danger not only for the countries of Europe who have felt it more closely than we, but as a menace to ourselves as well.

We have to make up our minds what we want to achieve in regard to Germany and Europe. What is our aim? I was very interested to read a remarkable letter in the "Manchester Guardian" the other day by the hon. Gentleman the Member for East Aberdeenshire (Sir R. Boothby), who asked, so far as my recollection goes, did we fight the last war to establish the Red Army on the Elbe and the German Army on the Channel? I ask hon. and right hon. Members opposite, is that our purpose in Europe? Do we want to fix that position as the pattern for the future? Because that is what we shall be doing if we proceed with our present policy of hastening on the rearmament of Western Germany and its inclusion in E.D.C.

I should have thought that the aim of all of us on both sides of the House would have been first to have tried to secure the withdrawal of Russian military forces to the east within the Soviet frontier, or, at least, as far as the Oder, and also, at the same time, to prevent Germany again securing the hegemony of Europe. We have the opportunity, I believe, at this time, and since the changes which have taken place in the Soviet Union, to which reference has been made today, to achieve these two objectives.

We have to seek out in this matter a common interest with the Soviet Union. We have to try to find a basis on which the Soviet Union would be willing to make that withdrawal and to make those concessions which we regard as indispensable to the future welfare of Germany and of Europe. We regard free elections as essential in Germany, both on this side of the House and on the opposite side of the House. But how can we hope to secure Russian agreement to free elections when the Russians know very well that under present conditions the Government elected by such elections would be an anti-Communist Government and would immediately be free to join the Western military alliance?

It is nonsense to suppose that Russia could accept any such situation; and if we are to follow the advice of the Prime Minister and to study the national interests of the countries with whom we are trying to deal, let us realise that if agreement is seriously desired with the Soviet Union on the question of Germany and of Europe, then we cannot put the Soviet Union in face of such a situation

What, then, should we do about Germany? Many proposals have been advanced. It was suggested by the Foreign Secretary that there are basically only two alternatives—either that Germany must be included in the Western military system through E.D.C. or, as other right hon. and hon. Gentlemen have advocated, through N.A.T.O., or that Germany should be left in a vacuum, free to build up her national armies and offering them, perhaps, to the highest bidder. But those are not the only alternatives. I suggest that there is another—one which has been proposed before and which can still be tried. I suggest that we try to seek the neutralisation of Germany by four-Power agreement.

In my opinion, if we were to make it clear to Russia that we did not intend to include Germany in the Western military system, then we should get from the Russian side a good many concessions on the points which we are seeking. I believe that if we make that concession on our side, they, in their turn, will agree to the free elections which we are seeking.

We should need a four-Power agreement providing for the disarmament of Germany for a period of years—say five or 10 years—limiting her potentialities for constructing weapons of war and providing that she was not free to enter into a military alliance with any other country.