Defence

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 5 March 1953.

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Photo of Mr Frederick Bellenger Mr Frederick Bellenger , Bassetlaw 12:00, 5 March 1953

I am taking the figures in the White Paper, and I include, of course, the women, because they are doing administrative services, and they amount to something like 7,000. At any rate, that small element does not alter my comparison, namely, that the number of all ranks in the British Regular Army has increased over what it was in the years between the wars.

In addition to that, there is the National Service content, which we did not have before the war. That National Service element, with its two years' training period, in my opinion and in the opinion of many in the Army, is not really adequate for what the Army requires. I speak of the Army's problems because I am more familiar with them. The Army itself would prefer a longer period for effectiveness, not only in training, but in the actual fighting which the Army has to do on many fronts. If they could get it, they would prefer a period of three years.

Therefore, I am asking the House why we have this period of two years' National Service training. Originally, to a large extent, because the White Paper says so, the purpose of National Service was to create trained reserves, and we have reached a position today when the Government say in the White Paper that, by 1954, we shall have something between 400,000 and 500,000 trained National Service reserves. If we are to consider what is the right period for that purpose, should we not also consider what was the period of training which men received in the Army during the war to make them fit for immediate battle? The period was eight to 10 months, and they were then—[Interruption.] I can assure the hon. and gallant Gentleman that I am not speaking without my book, because these are official figures. The period was eight to 10 months, and, after such a period of eight to 10 months' training, the recruit or National Service man was liable to be involved in battle.

Let us look at another Army which I hope will be created before very long, because I believe that that fact will alter the whole strategic picture in Europe. I refer to the German Army. If re-armament comes in Germany as a result of the ratification of E.D.C., what do hon. Members think will be the period of National Service for which the Germans will ask or which they will be allowed to have? I doubt whether it will be anything like two years. Indeed, about a year ago, I was speaking to a German Army Group Commander who had had considerable experience on the Eastern Front, and who said: "If I could have my way completely, I would turn out trained soldiers from zero in six months." I rather queried that, because I still think it takes longer than six months to turn out a trained infantryman, to say nothing of the technical arms of the Services.

Therefore, I come to this conclusion. As far as training is concerned, it is not necessary to have two years, and, indeed, if it had been, why did not the present Government, then in Opposition, challenge the Labour Government when they introduced the period of 18 months, later reduced to 12 months? It is true that they criticised us for reducing it from 18 months, but they never asked for it to be increased to two years. Indeed, I go further and say that no demands were put forward by the expert advisers to any of the three Services for a longer period than 18 months.

What is the real reason why we have a two-year period of compulsory service? The reason is, of course, that in 1950 we had the war in Korea, and my hon. and right hon. Friends who were then in office decided, no doubt on expert advice, that it was necessary to strengthen the Forces. That period of two years' training was not necessary in order to supply the troops we have in Korea, because our contingent in Korea is comparatively small. It is true that we have certain heavy commitments in Malaya, but, in speaking to this Amendment, all I have to show is, not that it is possible—although it is no doubt desirable on many grounds—to reduce the period of training immediately, but that it is possible in the next two or three years, if the conditions are not likely to be different to what they are now. After all, we cannot look many years ahead, but can only take conditions as they are now and assess what they will probably be in the next two or three years, and then make up our minds on that assessment. Indeed, I imagine that that is what the Staffs do.

I am one of those who believe that it will be possible within a period of two years to reduce the term of National Service from two years. I will not state a figure or a period to which that term should be reduced, because I think it should be reduced, not at one attempt, but probably by easing off from the two years down to what I think will be an adequate period of 18 months. On what do I base this opinion? I am not going to attempt to argue the question of commitments or the cutting of commitments. I think it would be the height of folly to advocate now, that we should come out of Egypt without further ado while we are undertaking delicate negotiations with General Neguib, which we hope will be successful.

But I do say, in regard to the Middle East, that our Treaty runs only for a further period of four years, and, within a certain period of time, if we observe our Treaty obligations, we must leave. I estimate that, if the Government are successful in their negotiations with Egypt, we shall be able to have in reserve, for some purpose or other—either for reducing the period of National Service or any other purpose—a substantial pool of men. That is all I want to say about our commitments in Egypt.

I now want to draw the attention of the House to the strategic defence picture in Europe, which has changed considerably since 1950, when the Labour Government increased the period of National Service from 18 months to two years. Since then, a Treaty has been made between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, and that Treaty has tremendous possibilities from a defence point of view. Two of these countries—Greece and Turkey—are members of N.A.T.O. Each of them has well-armed and on the whole well-equipped forces, and if those forces can be used in Eastern Mediterranean defence, there is no doubt that they will protect the vital flanks and relieve this country of a considerable burden which we have been undertaking for a long time.

Turkey—whose small contingent in Korea has shown that it can fight—has something like 22 divisions, of which 14 are fairly well equipped. They may not be up to the standard of the four British armoured divisions in Germany, but, nevertheless, they are a well-equipped and a good fighting force. I do not know the size of the Greek and Yugoslav armies, but I know that if the necessity arose each of these three countries could give a good account of themselves militarily, and that is what we want in allies.

One of the reasons I have consistently supported the re-arming of Germany is that the Germans, provided they fight on the right side, are soldiers with whom British soldiers would be glad to fight. British soldiers, of course, are always able to give a good account of themselves.