The allocation of 1950 is not strictly comparable with this, because our requirements for both sulphur and sulphuric acid were rising sharply over the year. A number of new plants are coming into operation. In the course of the last month a number of major plants—oil refining, the beginning of the Margam project in steel, and so on—are placing new demands on sulphur. Perhaps the right answer to that question is that something like 110,000 tons might enable us to maintain a reasonable level of production in this country. Therefore if we get 100,000 tons we shall be considerably short; if we get 81,000 tons, we shall be facing a disastrous situation.

There is perhaps one further point I should make clear about sulphur. It has been suggested in certain quarters that our sulphur problem is due to our failure to buy earlier, and to dollar restrictions. This statement is completely false. Even in the worst phase of the dollar crisis, dollars were not restricted below the supplies the industry wanted to buy and the supplies physically available in the United States. And on cotton, and indeed non-ferrous metals, the Committee will realise that if more dollars had been available in the first half of 1950, the quantities then bought would have been taken into account and deducted from the allocation made by the American authorities. This was, in fact, done in the case of cotton and other essential materials last autumn.

On non-ferrous metals, particularly molybdenum, tungsten, nickel, copper and zinc, the position is if anything worse than when the Committee last debated the situation. And on these metals not only our general industrial production, but our defence programme itself will be in the gravest danger unless, as a result of the international discussions now proceeding in Washington, larger allocations are made to us. In the interests of the common defence production of all our partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Committee I am sure will agree that current defence production and other essential uses should have priority not only over the building up, but even over the maintenance of stockpiles. This fact is, I think, well realised by our friends, and the Members of the Committee will watch the progress of the discussions in Washington, in which we took the original initiative last autumn, with anxiety, but at the same time with confidence in the sense of responsibility of all who are taking part in them.

On other raw materials, paper and pulp, jute goods, a whole range of chemicals and others, also causing anxiety, there is no time to go into detail, but perhaps I should leave the raw materials situation with one encouraging reference. Softwood at least, though our stocks are now seasonally at their lowest level, looks like showing a big improvement. The hon. Member for Kidderminster (Mr. Nabarro), asked about stockpiling last week. Perhaps he would like to hear my answer before he rises. Thanks to Timber Control's big Canadian purchases this year—purchases on a scale considerably exceeding a normal pre-war year production; thanks to heavy, though not panic buying by the private trade in Europe, the timber stock position this autumn and winter looks like being better than for a very long time past.