In 1947 the Government set a number of targets and if the livestock position is not what we would like to see it, that is because the Government failed to import the necessary feedingstuffs. My right hon. Friend asked the Government: What is the likely position with regard to the price level of coarse grains which we have to import largely from countries which have not yet followed our devaluation? Some of these grains are imported from America, from the Argentine and from Russia."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 27th September, 1949; Vol. 468, c. 44.] An answer should really be given to the farming community on that point if they are to get on with their job.

The extraordinary thing about the Chancellor's speech in this House was that he was vague about economies, vague about capital expenditure and vague—it may not have been entirely his own fault—about what the Washington agreement really meant—but the one thing he was absolutely definite about was to clap on an increased Profits Tax on British industry. That is clear, easy, punitive and popular, but I do not know what sort of incentive it is meant to be to anyone in any rank of British industry. [Interruption.] If the hon. Member feels better after taxation, I am glad, but I would judge this on the consequences to the export drive, and I wonder if the workers feel better. Everyone in this country must want the export drive to succeed. Hon. Members opposite are always taunting us with not doing or saying what they think we should do, but they are the first to put on a punitive tax which must hit the very companies to which they are appealing.

This Debate has put the Chancellor's broadcast into a better perspective. I must tell him that was one of the most extraordinary and, I think for his reputation, the most deplorable utterances he has ever made. It is quite true that he began with a statement of the gravity of the situation. I listened to that full of expectancy as to what was to follow, but the tone of the whole of the rest of the broadcast was just like that of a conjurer who has just brought off a very clever trick and expects everyone to join rapturously in the applause. That was the impression it gave me, and I do not think I was the only one in the country to gain that impression. The worst of it was that what the Chancellor said in his broadcast was listened to by millions, but what he said in this House would be read by only hundreds of thousands.

He gave a false impression about our price levels. I am sure that prices of raw materials will go up to a greater extent than the Chancellor forecast. I will say why. Everybody knows that dollar prices must go up to the extent of the devaluation, but the prices of other commodities will go up—commodities which we produce in the Commonwealth, such as rubber. Of course they will. In a sense we hope that they will, because the Americans will pay more for them in devalued sterling. I cannot see how this can do other than affect the cost of living. I have tried to make calculations as no doubt other hon. Members have done, but it is very difficult to do so. However, I would guess that in time devaluation will probably affect the cost of living by anything from 5 to 10 per cent. I hope I am wrong. I would like to know whether the Prime Minister can deny that, and whether he can give us any reassurance on that tonight.

This Motion of the Government is one of confidence. I do not suppose that the Prime Minister himself really expected that we would approve this Motion without any Amendment of any kind. Many of its sentiments are impeccable, but that is not all. Successive Chancellors of the Exchequer—and not only Chancellors—have shaken our confidence in them. The Minister of Health, who is fascinated by historical parallels, might find a close correspondence between this dollar crisis and the fuel crisis of the former Minister of Fuel and Power. That Minister's attitude was exactly the same, in the face of the developing danger and the warnings he got up to the very last moment, as the Chancellor's in the face of warnings until the last reserves began to disappear.

During the period of the American Loan we went through exactly the same cycle. We had every sort of assurances and disappointments. The then Chancellor of the exchequer told us that convertibility had been largely discounted. What happened? Under the American Loan Agreement sterling became convertible on 15th July, 1947. On 20th August, six weeks afterwards, the then Chancellor announced that the strain on our resources had proved too great. Convertibility was ended and a series of cuts was imposed. We have had this thing over and over again. The former Chancellor completely underestimated the rate at which the American Loan would run out, just as the present Chancellor completely wrongly estimated the rate at which our gold reserves would be reduced. So we have had crisis after crisis, or if the House prefers the words of the Oracle: We have tried ever since the war to overcome our difficulties by a series of expedients, which led to a series of crises as each expedient became exhausted. I could not hope to put it better myself.

But there is one final issue which divides us, that is, nationalisation. We believe that the experience of nationalisation so far has been to increase costs. I would ask even the most enthusiastic nationaliser on the benches opposite whether he does not think that there is at any rate a case for having a "look-see" how it is working out. [An HON. MEMBER: "Read 'The Economist.'"] I intend to read a passage which appeared in "The Times" on Monday—we can still choose our literature—which said that railway operating conditions: are probably affected most by the quality of coal, which is worse than before the war, but it is worth noting that the annual coal bill of the railways today is about £24 million more than the pre-war figure of about £12.500,000. Does that not contrast rather remarkably with the comparatively small increase in our steel prices which are still the cheapest in America or Europe? Hon. Members may think that is an accident, but it does not so appear to us. Yet we are to have more nationalisation. Not only iron and steel, but a new list is being fabricated which includes our greatest dollar earner, except whisky, which is the insurance industry. All these things are to be done for the encouragement of our trade.

For all these reasons we have no confidence in the Government's ability to lead this nation in times of even greater stress and strain than confront us now. We ask the House to support our Amendment in the confident knowledge that, though they may not do so tonight, the country will when the time comes.