Palestine

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 11 December 1947.

Alert me about debates like this

Photo of Mr Richard Crossman Mr Richard Crossman , Coventry East 12:00, 11 December 1947

On the contrary, I was horrified to observe that the Latin-American States were being rather actively advised to abstain. Pressure in U.N.O. is not all one-sided, and we ought not to complain of pressure because we do not like a decision. It occurs with every decision.

Let us turn to the practical question of what we can do to help this decision. I do not think that we ought simply to consider getting out as fast as possible. We have to do that, but do not let us put our whole mind simply to getting the troops out. We have a serious responsibility in that area. On our policy depends greatly the success or failure of partition, for firstly we have a great influence on the Arab League. In fact, we created it and still sway its decisions. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will use all his influence. He went on record against partition. His personal view was opposed to it. He could, I think, go to the Arab League and say, "The peace of the world depends on U.N.O. I do not like this either, but we have to accept this if we believe in law and order." I hope that will be the attitude of British diplomacy in all its dealings with the Arab League. Secondly, we have quite special influence in Transjordan, which covers the whole Eastern frontier of Palestine. We can make certain that no illegal arms go through Transjordan to Palestine to either side. We can make sure that no "volunteers" from the Arab Legion go into Palestine. If they do go in, the rest of the world will rightly say, "If Transjordan soldiers volunteer for Palestine it is done with British consent." I hope that it will be part of the Government's policy that Transjordan remains really neutral.

There was one point that worried me in the Colonial Secretary's speech, and that was the suggestion that the U.N.O. Commission should come in late. I see the point that we cannot have a period of many weeks before the actual transference of sovereignty, but the presence of the U.N.O. Commission at the beginning seems to be essential if the idea of U.N.O. and the authority of U.N.O. is to be brought to bear in Palestine. That authority is the only thing today that stands between Palestine and civil war, confusion and disaster. Unless U.N.O. can make itself felt with something of real authority there is no hope for that country. I beg the Colonial Secretary to see that in every way the presence of U.N.O. is made real and effective in Palestine from the earliest possible date, and that the transfer takes place speedily and effectively.