I have read the order and I challenge it tonight. The Financial Secretary says it is a waste of time. The whole point is—is this order adequate to ensure that our exports are sent to destinations where they will earn for us goods and services in equal respect to that which we have spent on them in this country? I suggest to the Financial Secretary that this the very point he cannot prove and the only reason why we move this Prayer. I must admit that this Order 2072 is couched in such difficult terms that, particularly as regards Paragraph 5, it is left to the discretion of the Bank of England, which in effect means the Treasury; and it is very difficult for any member of the Opposition to evaluate what it means. I hope the Financial Secretary, after the interruptions he has made, will take great care to answer the case I am now putting.

There are two great dangers which face us at the moment. The first is that no old sterling under this payments agreement is used to pay for current transac- tions. The Chancellor of the exchequer has admitted that only 50 per cent. of old sterling has been funded and therefore we are entitled to assume—and I use the right hon. Gentleman's words—that 50 per cent. is free. Secondly, long-term import surpluses due to soft currency areas are not transferred under the terms of this agreement to hard currency areas to pay for our exports, and so leave their import surplus from those countries entirely convertible into dollars.

The statements made by the late Chancellor and the present Chancellor of the Exchequer show that there is obviously a leak of at least £300,000,000 per annum between that which we should receive from our trade and that which we actually do. I would ask the Financial Secretary to explain that. I would ask him further to take certain specific examples. Under Order 2072, for payment purposes the countries of the world are divided into specific groups. Paraguay is on its own. There is a blocked group of sterling in Schedule 2. Schedule 3 comprises the convertible groups, and Schedule 4 countries with transferable accounts. Why has he made it possible for all these countries in Schedule 4 to be able to transfer sterling to Schedule 3? Why is it possible for so much sterling, which bears no relation to our import requirements, to be used to offset those exports which we are now making at cost to ourselves?

That is the major problem, and to go into rather more detail, I would like to take the instances of three countries. Let us take Argentina, a country I choose simply because of the adverse balance of trade between it and ourselves. We know, if one looks at the figures, that the adverse balance has been steadily growing. In June it was £5.2 million, in July £9 million, in August £13.3 million, and in September £14 million. In other words, our trade with the Argentine has been steadily deteriorating. Under the Schedule it is perfectly possible for the Argentine to pay in every respect with sterling whatever we export. If one takes the overall balance we see that it is perfectly possible that the sterling surplus accruing to Italy and Spain can be transferred to the Argentine, and that the Argentine can pay with that sterling for whatever we can export to them. Yet according to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, under Clause 1 (2) of the agreement with the Argentine, they charge us for everything we take from them in convertible sterling? That can only lead to the conclusion that those exports to the Argentine are completely unrequited, and that in fact whatever we are sending abroad to that country is simply being repaid by I.O.U.s

from other countries, and as far as benefiting ourselves or our future or immediate prosperity—