Navy Estimates.

Part of Orders of the Day — Supply. – in the House of Commons at on 26 February 1942.

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Photo of Sir Patrick Donner Sir Patrick Donner , Basingstoke

I was saying that we have been told by the Government that the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" were sent to Singapore as a deterrent, but the fact remains that they were sent out unescorted, and therefore did not prove so much a deterrent as an invitation to attack, since their presence, vulnerable as they were, presented an opportunity to the Japanese to attack the battle fleet piecemeal. We have been told why no aircraft carrier was sent to accompany them, but no spokesman of the Government has yet stated why no anti-aircraft cruisers were sent with them. Are we to be told that no anti-aircraft cruisers were available? If so, surely the event proves that they could not have been used to better purpose in any other part of the world. If they were not available, what has happened to our anti-aircraft destroyers? Why were none sent in escort? If the Government do not feel that this is information which can properly be given in Public Session, again I hope the First Lord will arrange to give the House information in private.

It is difficult to see, in the light of what has happened, how the First Lord can divest himself of some of the responsibility for sending these ships unescorted. The loss of them is the cause of all the reverses that we have sustained in the Far East, and it is difficult to understand how he could have sanctioned the sending of them without proper escort or, if they were so sent, how they could have been sent without giving Admiral Phillips when he left this country, specific orders to keep them as a Fleet in being at Singapore. If he had been ordered to treat them as a Fleet in being, as the Italians have used their Fleet in the Mediterranean in this war and the Germans their high seas fleet in the North Sea in the last war, he would have contained a larger force of Japanese ships within striking distance of our aircraft, and they would have become vulnerable to attack by us. I was glad to hear the Prime Minister defending Admiral Phillips, because I believe he had no choice in the matter. Once there, at Singapore, if he had not been given orders to treat the ships as a Fleet in being he had no option but to act as he did.

What is the lesson of all this—the lesson of the consequences of the loss of sea power? The First Lord said that we had only limited cruiser strength, but why is that strength limited? He spoke of the handicap this imposes, but how came it to be imposed? Let us at least learn the lesson: let us never again sign another London Naval Treaty, because that Treaty, signed in 1930, is the cause of our troubles and the fundamental reason why to-day we are in so difficult a position. That Treaty reduced our cruiser strength from 70 to 50. The First Lord said that we had a small cruiser strength when we entered this war, but it was that Treaty which cut those cruisers down. It was that Treaty which prevented our rebuilding of the battle fleet before January, 1937, and which prevented our laying down a single aircraft carrier before that date. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1921 established a 10 years' naval holiday, and between 1931 and 1937 we were due to build 10 battleships. What a different picture would not the Pacific represent to-day if we had those 10 great battleships in commission. It was that Treaty which wiped them out with a stroke of the pen.

Therefore, I say, let this country at least learn the lesson never again to tie our hands with any Treaty and never again to sign such a document. I believe that history provides no greater example of an attempt to cripple, mangle and mutilate the naval power of a great Empire than the London Naval Treaty of 1930. When things go wrong it is surely wise to ask whether all is well with the direction at the Admiralty. I have heard it said in many parts of the country that the Naval Staff is overworked. I therefore made inquiries, and I am informed that the Naval Staff at the Admiralty work seven days a week. They thus work on Saturdays and Sundays. Fifty-two Sundays and half Saturdays equal 78 days, and if at the end of a year the Naval Staff are given a week Or a fortnight's leave, it is plain that it bears no relation to the amount of work they have done. during those 78 days when they ought to have been on leave. Not only that, but the Naval Staff are required to work in the small hours of the night. We can understand the principle that we should work the Naval Staff to 100 per cent. of their capacity until they are worn out and that then they should be replaced by others. We should bear in mind, however, that these men, when they are tired and before they are replaced, are required to take great decisions of far-reaching consequence. The Government will do well to consider whether it is wise to overwork the Naval Staff as they are being overworked to-day.

I should like to raise the question of aircraft carriers. There is some feeling in the country that the Japanese have employed them to great advantage, and the question has arisen whether it would not be wise to build smaller aircraft carriers in addition to those we already possess. I believe our large aircraft carriers have been justified. Not only can they carry a greater proportion of aircraft and aircraft of heavier types, but they can be defended by armour. The bombing of the "Illustrious" showed how valuable that armour was. Had it been the old "Ark Royal" and not the "Illustrious" which was bombed at Malta, she would have suffered much more severe damage, for she carried no deck armour as smaller carriers could not carry armour either. The House will probably wish to have the Admiralty view on this subject, and I shall be glad if the First Lord will give some indication of its policy in regard to building further aircraft carriers of a smaller size.

When the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse" were lost a report was published that although Japanese aircraft were in the vicinity they did not machine-gun our sailors who were swimming in the water. If that be true, it is a remarkable fact. The Germans have never hesitated to machine-gun our men in the water. The Germans are a Continental military Power, and I have been wondering whether the Japanese, who have proved themselves so barbarous in other ways, did not do so because they already had a naval tradition which prevents their acting in this way. If that be so, their failure to machine-gun our men in the water is not only significant but perhaps ominous. I hope that in the future we shall not again under-estimate the Japanese in the Far East. We are told that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour was treacherous. Of course it was, but it was efficient. If, therefore—to come back to my previous point— Admiral Phillips had been given orders, which I believe he should have been given, to treat his fleet as a fleet in being, he could have used his light vessels and smaller craft to feel his way to discover the strength of the Japanese at sea, keeping his big ships in reserve. How valuable would that experience have been to us now.

We have many Micawbers in this country, many people who are always hoping that something or somebody will come along and get us out of our troubles. Only by our own exertions, however, can we possibly be saved. There are people who say that we need not worry because the Russians will deal with Germany and the United States Navy will deal with the Japanese navy. The American Navy is a one-ocean navy which has to deal with a two-ocean war. We are told that there are people in this country, in America and in Canada who are disappointed that the Americans have not been able to give us greater naval assistance in the Pacific than they have. These people sometimes forget that America has to function navally in two great oceans, and she cannot afford to lose too many small and light vessels for when her battleships have been repaired she would not then have sufficient escorts. It would be more than human nature to expect the United States not to take precautions to prevent the bombardment of San Francisco. Therefore, we come back to the fact that we must rely upon ourselves. We must look to ourselves and not to others to save us. Only the other day a distinguished admiral, Admiral Tyrwhitt, said in public that Britannia no longer rules the waves. Well, we rule some of the waves. I am told his audience became angry. Is it not time, however, that we faced facts and realities and realised that at long last we are fighting this war for survival? When we were up against it in the days of Queen Elizabeth, Francis Drake said: I must have the gentlemen to hale and draw with the mariners and the mariners with the gentlemen. Let us look forward in that spirit, because only in that spirit can we win.