I beg to move, in page 9, line 28, at the end, to insert: (3) The Governor-General's financial adviser shall have access to all records, documents and information contained in or possessed by any department of the Federal Government. I move this Amendment with the intention of securing to the financial adviser to the Governor-General the completest possible powers. Anyone who has had experience of the work of an adviser working under conditions such as obtain, and will obtain, in India, will know that that work is not so easily conducted in the East as it might be in our less difficult climate. Anyone having had than experience will know that it is not infrequent that documents mysteriously disappear and are kept out of the way, and that the person who is most anxious to give his advice is deprived of the opportunity of doing it. If this financial adviser's duty is to be conducted properly with benefit to the Government of India and to the Governor-General, it is highly desirable that he should be supplied with the fullest possible powers. It is no reflection upon the Indian people that one should envisage difficulties arising in the execution of the duties of the financial adviser, because all through the debates on this Bill those possibilities have been envisaged not only by the opponents of the Bill but on the Government Bench. Indeed, the safeguards which are found throughout the Bill are provided for the sole purpose of setting up some barrier against Opposition to the full working of the Measure. So I do not apologise for suggesting that obstacles might be raised by the various members of the Indian administration to the financial adviser conducting his duties as he might wish to conduct them.

If I follow the advice given the other day by the Noble Lord the Member for Horsham (Earl Winterton) and attempt to state the arguments on the other side as well as the arguments which I, myself, find most impressive, perhaps I may be able to move the heart of my hon. Friend the Secretary of State, who, so far, has not shown any great tendency towards softening of the heart in dealing with the Amendments which have been put forward. It may be said that the financial adviser will have his duties confined to what may be called the higher Imperial issues. That may be an argument against furnishing him with these powers, but even if he is dealing with the higher Imperial issues and not with the routine work of day-to-day administration, it will still be necessary for him to be able to put his hands upon all the information which is available in the Government Depart ment. It may be said that these powers will follow automatically from the general measures of the Bill. If that is so, and if it is intended that the financial adviser should have these powers, I feel that there can be no objection to providing them specifically in the Bill. After all, finance is one of the most important questions with which the Governor-General will have to deal, and I feel, from a certain amount of personal experience of this sort of work, and from what one knows will go on, that these powers should be specifically provided.

10.48 p.m.

I hope in two or three sentences to be able to satisfy the Committee that this Amendment is not necessary. The Governor-General, whom the financial adviser will serve, has full powers under Clause 17 (4) to give directions for any papers or any information to be sent to him if he so desires. The Governor-General, therefore, has the fullest possible powers to give instructions to the Ministry that all or any papers he desires should be regularly sent to him, and sent to him through the financial adviser if he so desires.

He can do that?

He can do that. That makes the position completely clear. The proposal in the Amendment would have this great danger, that it would look as though we were constituting the financial adviser into a rival Finance Minister. That is not our intention, and if it were our intention it would be a very foolish intention. The financial adviser is definitely the servant of the Governor-General, and it is for the Governor-General to give instructions as to what papers are to be sent to him and what information is to come to him, and through what channels. I can assure my hon. Friend that the position is quite safe and that the alternative he suggests would 'have considerable difficulties inherent in it.

May I ask whether the financial adviser is covered in the words "requiring ministers and secretaries to the Governor-General to transmit, etc." The financial adviser is certainly not a Minister, and he hardly seems a secretary to the Governor-General.

The hon. Member is confusing two things. The direction to the Ministers is a direction of another kind. The financial adviser is the Governor-General's servant. The Governor-General can direct the Ministers and secretaries to send all the papers be requires and to send them if necessary through the financial adviser.

I do not wish to press the Amendment. I am not entirely satisfied. I think the Government are making a mistake, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

10.52 p.m.

I beg to move, in page 9, line 40, to leave out from "discretion," to the end of the Clause.

This relates to the proviso which lays it down that the Governor-General before appointing a financial adviser must consult his Ministers. The object of the financial adviser is to enable, among other things, the Governor-General to exercise his financial powers under Clause 12. In other words, the financial adviser is intended to be a watchdog of the Ministers, and therefore in these circumstances it seems that the position is going to be diminished if the Ministers are to be consulted with regard to his appointment. I certainly take the view that the Governor-General ought to act entirely in his discretion without reference to his Ministers in relation to his advisers.

May I ask a question as to the meaning of the word "consult"? Does it mean that the appointment can only be made on the advice of the Minister, or is he not obliged to accept the advice?

10.53 p.m.

I hope my hon. Friends will not press this Amendment. It would, in my view, be a great mistake for the Governor-General not to consult the federal ministers in an appointment of this kind. The ultimate appointment rests with him. There is no question of that at all, but it must be remembered that the financial adviser is intended to be something much more than a watchdog upon the federal ministers. I hope very much that he will be in the closest possible contact with them, and he will be helping them with his advice, given them of course, of their own will, for he will have no statutory authority to tender advice. It is very desirable to have a a man who is accessible to both sides in the Government, and I do not think that that need in any way detract from the clear, unblurred responsibility of the Governor-General, and from the position of the financial adviser as directly under the Governor-General. I hope that, in view of these circumstances, the hon. Member will not press the Amendment.

Would it not be much better if it were put in the Instrument of Instructions?

I think it is much better to have it here.

A statutory obligation to consult has a very definite and far-reaching significance.

I do not differ in principle from the Secretary of State, but I think any sensible Governor-General would consult. That is a very different thing from being compelled to consult. If he is compelled to consult, it must put him under some obligation in respect of a matter in which he ought not to be put under an obligation. I regret that the Secretary of State is not willing to accept my point. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."

10.55 p.m.

Before the Committee parts with this Clause I should like, on behalf of my hon. Friends and myself, to say that we do take a very strong objection to this appointment of someone whom the right hon. Gentleman describes as rather more than a, watchdog, that is to say, handing over the whole control of the finances of India, and thereby the control of the Indian ministers, to someone who is not necessarily at all acceptable to those ministers.

It is rather worse than the Chancellor of the exchequer's position in the Cabinet in this country. You will have someone who, quite apart from any of the democratic side of the Government, will be able to step in on every conceivable issue and say that anything that is proposed to be done may interfere with the financial stability and credit of the Federal Government, in much the same way as was indicated by the Lord President of the Council the other day when he said that the credit of the country was jeopardised because someone in the City thought there might be a Labour Government in the future. Any rumour or feeling of that kind which may evince itself in India will apparently be a good cause for this gentleman who is the Governor-General's financial adviser to go to the Governor-General and say, "You must stop this Minister or that carrying through this or that bit of policy," which otherwise the minister would have the right to carry through.

From our experience of the sort of financial adviser who has gone to different parts of the Empire in the not very distant past, it is probable that he will be the type of person who will try to curtail every social service because of his quite genuine belief in the very orthodox system of capitalist finance. Therefore, you will have a splendid method by which to shut down the whole of the effective work which might otherwise be done by the Indian ministers For those reasons, we protest against this Clause and shall divide against it.

Question put, "That the Clause stand part of the Bill."

The Committee divided: Ayes, 260; Noes, 34.