Egypt.

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at on 23 December 1929.

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Photo of Mr Austen Chamberlain Mr Austen Chamberlain , Birmingham West

I think that we on this side of the House have some right of complaint, not of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, but of the Leader of the House, in that he has re- fused any opportunity until this day of discussing any one of the subjects to which we wish to direct the attention of the House, and that we are forced to bring forward the first, and only one, of those subjects actually in Christmas week. In a long Parliamentary experience I do not recall an occasion when even a Government with an overpowering majority has ridden so roughly over the rights of a minority, and the right hon. Gentleman can hardly expect, if such treatment continues to be meted out to the Opposition when we meet again next year, that we shall be as passive and as patient as we have shown ourselves to be. This evening I desire to use the tardy opportunity that has been given to draw the attention of the House to the negotiations that have taken place between His Majesty's Government and the late Prime Minister of Egypt for the basis of a treaty being concluded between our two countries. I have to acknowledge that the right hon. Gentleman had voluntarily undertaken that no such agreement should he made until after these proposals had been discussed in Parliament, and that no such treaty should be ratified without a further reference to Parliament. Rut I have two reasons for desiring to bring this subject at once before the House. If we on this side found nothing serious to criticise in the proposals set forth in the Government White Paper, we could very well wait for the opportunity which the right hon. Gentleman would have afforded, but serious doubts are caused by some of his proposals, and we think that, inasmuch as he has made us parties to them, or at least cognisant of them by the publication, it is not. fair to allow the Egyptian Government to proceed further in the matter without, at any rate, some expression of the opinion which we hold.

My second reason fog bringing the subject forward at this moment is that when there arises either of the opportunities which the right, hon. Gentleman has promised, the proposals will be in a more complete and final form, and I presume he will be asking the House to pass a Resolution in regard to them, and to take a Vote upon them. I am glad to have an opportunity such as is offered by this occasion to-day to raise certain issues which, I hope, will have his careful consideration at a time when no Vote will be taken, and no prejudice can arise to these issues by reason of a party decision being sought upon them. The first result of the proposals has not been wholly satisfactory. It was obviously the intention of the Government that Mahmoud Pasha, the distinguished Egyptian Prime Minister, in negotiating with the right hon. Gentleman, should lay his proposals before his countrymen for their consideration, and it was hoped that, with their approval, he might proceed to their elaboration and signature; but the first thing that followed the conclusion of the negotiations in London was the enforced resignation of the Egyptian Prime Minister, who had taken part as a condition sine qua non of their consideration by the Egyptian people, and though the Egyptian people have been consulted in so far as a consultation based upon manhood suffrage in a country where 90 per cent. of the electorate are deprived of the protection of the ballot by their illiteracy, and where only one party is organised—though the Egyptian people have been consulted, if you can call an election held in those circumstances consultation, yet they have not been consulted on the treaty which the dominant party have most carefully refrained from making an issue in the election. What their purpose was in that I need not inquire, but I take note of the fact that the right hon. Gentleman in communicating these proposals to Mahmoud Pasha placed on record that these proposals represent the extreme limit to which I could recommend His Majesty's Government in the United kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to go in their desire to achieve a lasting and honourable settlement of outstanding questions between Great Britain and Egypt. That declaration of the right hon. Gentleman, which he has repeated, and by which, I understand, he stands, is of the greater importance because these proposals appear in a form suitable for a treaty, with a number—rather an undue number—of notes attached. Still, he insists that they are not a draft of a treaty, but only proposals for a draft, and it is therefore the more necessary to make it clear from the outset to the Egyptian Government, to the Egyptian party and to the Egyptian people, while details may be subject to further consideration that His Majesty's Government are pledged from the outset not to go beyond what they have embodied in the White Paper under discussion.

May I at this stage very briefly state again what was the policy of the late Government? I have stated it in despatches, I have stated it publicly on more than one occasion in this House and elsewhere. We drew a broad distinction between our duties, our responsibilities and our authority in the Sudan, and our responsibilities and authority in Egypt. In the Sudan we have a direct responsibility to the people in pursuance of the pledge that was given at the re-conquest of the Sudan, that they should not be allowed to pass again under the corrupt and tyrannical Government of the Pashas, who had brought the country to ruin and distress. Where our responsibility to the people is direct, our authority must be equally direct, and it is necessary that in any particular case our commands should be obeyed.

In Egypt, the situation is quite different. By the declaration of 1922 we recognised the independence of Egypt, subject to and conditioned by certain reservations. We, at the same time, sent a circular to the foreign Powers stating, in terms of unmistakeable clarity and even bluntness, that, in view of the special interest of Great Britain and the British Empire in Egypt, and of the special connection established between that country and ourselves, we should regard any interference by a foreign Power in the affairs of Egypt as unfriendly action which would be resisted with the whole of the forces at our command. There, therefore, our interests, in our opinion, were sufficiently protected by the reservations, and our duties were confined to seeing that those reservations were respected. What is their main purpose? It was, in the first place, to secure direct British interests by guarding vital communications of the British Empire. The relationship which exists between Egypt and ourselves has not been a matter of choice but the result of the geographical position occupied by Egypt on one of the high roads and arteries of imperial communications. It is to that fact that our intervention in Egypt originated. It is to that fact that the occupation of Egypt by British forces is due, and it is, first and foremost, to protect those interests that British forces have continued in Cairo, Alexandria and elsewhere, as our guarantee for the security of these vital interests.

But when we undertook to form a treaty which permitted no interference by any foreign Power in Egypt, we necessarily undertook an obligation to those foreign Powers. If we announced that we would not permit them to defend their own interests or to assert their own rights, if they are identified in Egypt then we simultaneously undertake the obligation to see that their rights are respected and that they do not suffer injustice and wrong. Accordingly, the second of the points which our occupation and our reservations were designed to protect was the security of foreigners in Egypt, including not only the important British colony there, but also large foreign colonies who might be endangered by any violent disturbances resulting from mis-government or from racial or religious feeling. Apart from that, it was the policy of the late Government and the policy of their predecessors, dating back to the time of Lord Cromer himself, to interfere as little as possible in the internal affairs of Egypt; to act wherever possible with and through the Egyptian authorities and only to intervene when the circumstances were of sufficient gravity and the peril to these important interests sufficiently great to render such direct intervention, not only desirable, but necessary

How is our position, as thus stated—I do not think that my description of it would be challenged on either side of the House—affected by the proposals which have been made by the right hon. Gentleman? As regards the Sudan, there is no direct change in the situation, but there is a contingent promise to allow an Egyptian Battalion in certain circusnstances to return into that country. I regard that as a dangerous and a retrograde step. The circumstances in which the Egyptian troops were expelled from the Sudan must still be fresh in our memories. The warning solemnly given by the present Prime Minister when Secretary of State to Zaghloul Pasha, had been wantonly and persistently disregarded. The Egyptians had been taught to regard loyalty to the Condominium as incompatible with loyalty to Egypt, and they had abused their position in the Sudan to stir up disloyalty and disaffec- tion to the British Government and its officials. They had carried this agitation to such unbridled lengths as at last resulted in the murder of a gallant and a most sympathetic British officer.

It was in those circumstances that it fell to the late Government to take the steps foreshadowed in the warning given by their predecessor and to say that since his warnings had been disregarded the Egyptian troops and Egyptian personnel in the Sudanese Administration must be withdrawn. How dangerous had been their activities was shown by the disturbances which occurred and by the revolt of a Sudanese battalion under the instigation of Egyptian officers in the course of that withdrawal. I know of nothing which has since occurred which renders it safe to retrace that step. I know that the right hon. Gentleman may reply to me that he has not made an unconditional promise. I think it is very dangerous to make this kind of conditional promise, which, if for any reason His Majesty's Government feel it impossible to implement when the time comes, will certainly be cast up against them as a breach of faith and will bring discredit upon our good name. We have no desire to disturb the Condominium. It is recognised by our flying the Egyptian flag with the Union Jack on the principal Government buildings—but the time has not come—if ever it should come—when we can divest ourselves of any part of our responsibility for government in the Sudan. The time has not come when we can share again that responsibility with the Egyptian Government or people.

I assume, or perhaps I should rather say, may I assume, that if the Egyptian battalion is sent back to the Sudan, it is within the contemplation and intention of the right hon. Gentleman that it should be made perfectly clear that its continuance in that country depends solely upon the decision of His Majesty's Government here, and that, if there should be any repetition of the offences which caused the expulsion of the Egyptian troops before, it will be the prerogative of His Majesty's Government, uncontrolled by reference to any other authority, whether at Geneva or The Hague, to order and enforce its withdrawal? I ask the right hon. Gentleman to note my first case and to give me an answer. For my part, I will only add that my hope and my expectation is, not that fresh troops would be brought into the Sudan, but that as government there developed, as the Sudanese defence force proved its value, instead of Egyptian troops going back, some of the British troops might have been withdrawn.

I pass from the Sudan to consider the changes made by the proposals of His Majesty's Government in regard to Egypt, and here these changes are much graver. The objections which I have to them centre in their effect upon the protection of British interests, particularly as represented by our lines of communication, and in the protection of foreigners. They deal more particularly with Clauses 9, 4 and 6 of the proposals for a treaty. At first, may I say a word about Clause 5? Clause 5 is the equivalent in the new proposals of Clause 2 of the treaty which was finally negotiated with Zaghloul, and which, of course, was never proceeded with. Clause 2 of the Sarwat Treaty reads as follows: His Majesty the King of Egypt undertakes not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude incompatible with the alliance or liable to create difficulties for His Britannic Majesty; not to oppose in foreign countries the policy followed by His Britannic Majesty; and not to conclude with a foreign Power any agreement which might be prejudicial to British interests. In many respects, the present proposals follow so closely the proposals made in the Sarwat Treaty that one has naturally examined with some care those features in which they differ from them. What has happened to that clause in the new treaty? It has become a clause mutually binding the two Governments: Each of the High Contracting Powers undertakes not to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or will create difficulties for the other Party thereto. In pursuance of this understanding they will not oppose each other's policy in foreign countries, nor conclude with a third Power any agreement of a political character which might be prejudicial to the interests of the other Party. There is something fantastic in making a clause of that kind mutual between His Majesty's Government, and in effect the British Empire, and the Government of Egypt. It was natural, it was right, it was necessary, that since under the Sarwat Treaty we were to conclude an alliance with Egypt and to guarantee her protection that she should give us that assurance, but it is really ridiculous to say that the foreign policy of the British Government and the British Empire is to be governed by the interests and the circumstances of the Kingdom of Egypt. The elephant undertakes to protect the mouse, and thereafter the elephant's march is to be conditioned by the mouse's trot. The obligations are too unequal to make a clause of that kind based upon a mutuality which does not exist in fact fair or just in practice to the greater of the two and the one which undertakes the greater responsibility and runs all the risks. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will reconsider that clause. I am quite certain that, drawn as it is, it is a clause which no British Government could honestly undertake, for no British Government could, in effect, so condition its policy on the interests of the Egyptian Government.

Here, in passing, I would say that this clause becomes of greater importance, because it is proposed that Egypt should join the League—a proposal with which I heartily agree supposing that the Treaty concluded is satisfactory—and because His Majesty's Government further proposed to sign the Optional Clause. Each clause may therefore become the subject of an appeal to the Court at The Hague to be determined by legal tribunal. Is that the intention? There is some reason to think that it is not. I notice that a Member of His Majesty's Government observed that, if Egypt joins the League, the question of the reservation of the Optional Clause must be considered. If Egypt is joining the League of Nations, or, let me put it rather, if we have already signed the Optional Clause, it is too late to reconsider the question of the reservation. The reservation must be made now. The provision must be put into the Treaty itself, or the right. hon. Gentleman will find that, by signing the Optional Clause, he has bargained away the liberty which his colleagues in another place obviously thought that it had been his intention to retain to His Majesty's Government. The fact that the Government have signed the Optional Clause leads to the position that we may be hailed before not merely a political body like the Council of the League, but before a legal Tribunal like the Permanent Court of Justice at The Hague, and our foreign policy be challenged under this Article as incompatible with some fancied interest of Egypt, even though it may he vital to the safety of the British Empire.

I come now to the question of the protection of foreigners, and from that to the question of the British occupation. The Clauses which deal with this question are Clauses 4, and 6. Clause 4 reproduces, but with very significant and, as I think, very unfortunate alterations, Clause 4 of the old Treaty. It provides that. Should any dispute with a third State produce a situation which involves a risk of a rupture with that State, the High Contracting Parties will concert together with a view to the settlement of the said dispute. The first comment that I make is, that it again places the two Contracting Parties under exactly the same Treaty obligation to one another, although the situation of the two Powers is completely different. Egypt gives us no guarantee; we did not seek one, and no one would think of asking for one. Because of the obligation which we took under the Sarwat Treaty and because we guaranteed the safety of Egypt, Egypt undertook these obligations to us. We are now to take similar obligations to Egypt because we guarantee Egypt. If we have a dispute with a third party which menaces a rupture, we are obliged to take Egypt into our counsel, and concert with Egypt a settlement of the dispute. Did the right hon. Gentleman mean to do anything of the kind? Is not this another little slip which, having been pointed out in time, he may remove when he comes to the final draft? Observe further, in relation to this Clause, what words have been omitted. These consultations take place only when a situation has arisen which involves risk of a rupture. In the Sarwat Treaty they were to take place as soon as anything occurred likely to imperil the good relations between His Majesty the King of Egypt and a foreign Power. I think that while if it is wrong to bind His Majesty's Government to consult the Egyptian Government if we, unfortunately, should be involved in a dispute in which they were not concerned, it would be right to provide that the Egyptian Government should consult us not merely when a rupture has arisen, but as soon as anything arises to imperil the good relations with a third party.

Finally, the Government have omitted words which, I think, are of vital importance. Not only were the Egyptian Government to consult us if good relations with another Power were imperilled, but if anything arises to threaten the lives or the property of foreigners in Egypt. The right hon. Gentleman has put into his proposal a further Clause in which, His Britannic Majesty recognises that the responsibility for the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt devolves henceforth upon the Egyptian Government. His Majesty the King of Egypt will ensure the fulfilment of his obligations in that respect. Having regard to our Declaration to foreign Powers, we cannot shirk our responsibilities in that way. Do we intend to maintain that Declaration? I understood—I beg the right hon. Gentleman to correct me if I have misunderstood—the right hon. Gentleman to say the other day, in answer to a question, that that Declaration against interference by foreign Powers was unaltered by any proposal in the Treaty, and that it stood in full force and would stand in full force when the Treaty was concluded. If that be so, then surely it implies the obligation upon us to see that the protection which we do not allow foreign Powers to obtain for themselves we can secure for them, and our disavowal of an interest in the safety of foreign nationals and its exclusion from the subjects which are to bring about an immediate consultation between the two Governments on any threat to foreign lives or property, is incompatible with the duty that we owe to foreign nations and, being incompatible with that duty, it is incompatible with our proper maintenance of our old doctrine of non-interference. What will happen if the Egyptian Government is unable to preserve or fails to preserve at any time internal peace and order? Such things have happened before in Egypt. Such things led to British intervention.

Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us what will happen if his proposals become actually the form of the Treaty ratified by the two Powers? Our troops are to leave Cairo and Alexandria. They are to be placed away in an isolated zone on the Canal. Have they the right to go back at once if the lives of foreigners in Cairo or Alexandria or elsewhere in Egypt are threatened? That is a pertinent question and a fair question. It was put in another place. The answer was that in such a case the Treaty would have been broken, that we could resume our rights and that our troops would have the right to return, if necessary, to Cairo or wherever they were wanted. Is that the intention of the right hon. Gentleman? Does he affirm that statement, and if so, what protection has he taken in any words in this document to make it clear that the right is reserved, and cannot be disputed at Geneva or The Hague? I view with profound anxiety the consent of His Majesty's Government to the removal of our troops. I thought that when I was negotiating on behalf of the late Government, I made a very generous offer to Egypt. I thought, and I still think, that I had gone to the extreme limit that His Majesty's Government could go.

The right hon. Gentleman has chosen to destroy one of the few safeguards that I retained. I do not know with what authority or on what advice he has taken that step. The Prime Minister told us last July, for our comfort, and it was for our comfort, that this question was being considered by the three heads of the Service Departments. What the result of that consideration was, I do not know, but I know what was the advice which the heads of the Service Departments gave to the late Government. Has that advice been changed? Have they altered their opinion? Are the Government acting in accordance with that advice when they accept the cantonment of our troops on the Canal, or was their advice the same advice which was given to the late Government? Because that cannot be a satisfactory or safe solution of the problem.

The right hon. Gentleman in his proposal speaks as if the only imperilled communications which were at stake in these regions were those through the Canal. Has he forgotten the Sudan? Our primary line of communication with the Sudan is through the Nile valley, and the presence of our troops in Cairo was not merely a guarantee for the safety of the Canal, but a guarantee for our direct line of communication with the Sudan, for which we are pledged, and under this Treaty we remain pledged, in consequence of the guarantee which we gave to the Sudanese people at the time of the re-conquest of the Sudan. For that pledge we must ever remain directly and nationally responsible.