Orders of the Day — Disarmament.

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at on 13 November 1928.

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Photo of Mr Stanley Baldwin Mr Stanley Baldwin , Bewdley

It was not thought worth while at that time even to ask him, hut, had he been asked, I doubt if he would have replied, because at that time no effect hail been given to them, because they had not been discussed by the other naval Powers. This compromise was—and I use the past tense—no more than a perfectly honest, straightforward attempt to get out of the deadlock which had occurred in Geneva, and was threatening the whole work of disarmament.

I will go back for a moment to the early efforts of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament. No one knows the difficulties more than the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs, and the great difficulty of that Preparatory Commission, when they came to investigate the methods by which limitation should be applied to military, naval and air forces, and to lead to a discussion finally at a disarmament conference, lay in this, that we had submitted a draft and the French had submitted a draft. There was a wide divergence of principle. We, of course, stand for the Power that has a small army, and whose first line of defence is the navy. The French stand for a land force, whose main important armament is, and always has been, their army.

There was a wide divergence of principle, a division on the military side and a division on the naval side, and the Committee was split really into two groups. The differences between them seemed unbridgeable, and they adjourned. Then hope centres on the naval conference at Geneva, which was invited by the United States of America. As we all know, that conference failed.

I am not going into any details with regard to the naval proposals. My right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty will speak later in the Debate in order to deal with the more technical subject of the size of ships and so forth, but I would observe at this point, and I think it should never be forgotten, that we did put forward proposals there which were far-reaching and detailed and which would have led to a strict limitation of every class of vessel, and to an economy of some £50,000,000 over a term of years. That was a proof of our sincerity, and that was the kind of disarmament which we should have liked to have, and should like to have now if we could get it. But it was not acceptable. That is the history of that failure. How neither America nor ourselves would accept the other view is fresh in the memory of all. But after that conference had failed, everyone who had been working at disarmament at Geneva was reluctant to let the matter stand there. It was felt that a fresh effort, however forlorn it might appear to be, should be made. I would call the attention of the House to an extract from a speech delivered by the Italian representative, which is quoted in the White Paper. It is worth quoting at this point. He said: I should be prepared wholeheartedly to support the judicious suggestion put forward this morning by Mr. Gibson, the American representative, namely, that we should postpone our next session until there is some hope of reaching an agreement and should not risk a repetition of the results of the first meeting. Mr. Gibson demonstrated very clearly that if the Commission means to reach an agreement we must allow time for conversations to take place between the Governments with a view to eliminating the most salient points of difference. I merely quote that at this moment to show that the American and the Italians were at that time encouraging the other parties to go forward with conversations to see whether any progress could be made. We know now that those conversations proceeded.

Before I go on to the subject of the so-called Pact, I should like to say a word here with regard to what the right hon. Gentleman said about military forces and reservists, because that is an extremely important question. I would say in starting that we have been very strongly criticised on the ground that we have made concessions to the French and conferred some immunity upon them which they do not at present enjoy. Of course, that is not the case. They remain, as all the conscript countries remain, where they always have been. There is no question about that. We wanted to get the conscript countries to share our view of the limitation of land forces and the inclusion of the military reserves. So far, as is well known, there is no sign of them giving way. We hold our view, they hold theirs, and, until they do give way, it is perfectly clear that no progress can he made on military disarmament.

Here I would like to say a word or two about universal service. We have to persuade these other nations to make concessions. You cannot bully them into doing so. It is no good saying to them, "You have got to do it." We shall make no progress at all by that method. The only way in which we can hope to make progress is by persuasion. The House ought to try to realise the point of view of those who are opposed to us, because that may prevent us saying things about those countries who do not agree with us on this matter which might make their attitude even stiffer than it is at present. I will take the case of France, because France is the country in Europe which has had conscription longest. It is, perhaps, more bound up with her whole system of life than is the case in any other country. Remember this, that France, and those who think with her, regard conscription 'as an essential part of the doctrine of democracy. It has been so in this country, but it does not fallow that it is not so in France, and I want our people to try to realise this in order that they may see what is the difficulty that we are up against in this of matter military disarmament. Universal service is advocated in France by all sections—Right and Left, the extreme Socialists, all—and it is advocated as giving expression to those very principles of equality which were the child of the Revolution. Conscription in France dates from the Revolution. It was first imposed by the Directory at the end of the eighteenth century. It was modified during the period of the Second Empire; so far as my memory serves me, that is all. From that day to this the system has continued, and, as the right hon. Gentleman who leads the Opposition will remember, "the armed nation" was strongly advocated by a man who, I believe, was a friend of his, Jaurés, the great leader in France.

It is not only on the ground of national security and as a protection against external enemies that the French have had conscription. The existence of a conscript army does not necessarily make a country militant. Militarism is a product of the spirit; although I agree thus far with the right hon. Gentleman, that if we have that system we have the powder which may be ignited in certain circumstances, as it was unquestionably ignited in the German Empire. In France they hold the view that if every man has to go to fight when a war begins, the mass of the people will be much less keen about going to fight, and that statesmen will thing twice before they order them to do so. But there is another paint. If you look at French history, if you consider the French temperament, you can understand why there has been in France a certain nervousness about having a small and efficient standing army. They are afraid of a coup ďêtat. They are afraid that such an army may lose touch with the people, may lose touch with the principles of the Revolution, by which they stand and to which they believe the greatness of their nation is due, and that with their history and with their temperament, such an army might become the tool of either a successful general or a successful statesman who wished to make himself Dictator. France has suffered from that kind of thing before and she is nervous about it. I have just touched on this point to try to give the House the French view, as I see it, in order that the House may realise that it is not irrational, that it is bound up with French history, that it is a part of their own faith, and that if we are to get them to alter their system it cannot be done by lecturing them or taking the view that we know much better what is good for them. They will have to be approached in other ways.

It has been said often that those who entered on the discussion of this compromise must have known they were foredoomed to failure. I do not quite see why. They had been encouraged by observations from an Italian and an American representative. During those temporary discussions both England and France had agreed to compromise, and to give up something so as to facilitate a wider settlement and to bring down the existing Washington agreement from the two limitations to further limitations, in the hope that these in turn might lead ultimately to a universal limitation. I cannot see that it was so unreasonable that they should do this and should communicate the result to other countries, or think that those countries would not be willing to examine what had been done and in their turn make some concession too. As it has turned out, that view was not right. No concession would be made, and there was no prospect of carrying the matter any further. The whole work has gone for nothing, and such agreement as was come to then now scrapped, and we have to begin all over again.

A good deal was said about the secrecy of these discussions. There was no mystery at any time. The existence of the conversations was known, and the effect of the agreement as far as it had gone and the next step following was announced by my right hon. Friend. Why was it not published at once, we have been asked? The reason why it was not published was partly on account of the ordinary diplomatic courtesies and partly because there were cogent reasons in the character of the conversations. The conversations were tentative, tentative in this way, that they could only be final when they had been considered, approved by and embodied in an agreement by the five Powers, and when you are still hoping that conversations may so progress and be so embodied, the very worst thing for them is publicity. I have no stronger authority on my side in saying that than the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal party. We may have been wrong in our hopes and expectations, but having the hopes and expectations we had it would have been lunacy on our part, if I may borrow his word, to have made full publication. I have here a most pertinent and apposite quotation from the speech by the right hon. Gentleman. He was speaking in December, 1919. The discussion in which he was speaking is immaterial, because the principle is true right through. We listened to the case presented on one side and the other, and I make free to confess that, after hearing the whole discussion and hearing what was to be said against the point of view which we adopted at the start, we changed our view. And that is perfectly right. One has to hear every side. He has had more experience of these discussions than most of us. But it would be very difficult to effect a change of course, which was essential if we were to get anything like agreement; if declarations in the initial stages had been published and discussed and supported on one side and criticised on the other. Everyone who has negotiated labour matters knows that that is just as true of them as it is of national affairs. There is no doubt about that. We were criticised last year and the Government of the United States were also criticized because it was said there was insufficient preparation. There was no preparation before the Geneva Conference. We tried to get some preparation before this Conference but we failed, and I profoundly regret it.

There is another criticism to which I would like to devote one or two words. and it is that this agreement, so far as it has gone, was directed against some other country. Those who are not at all particular in what they say have gone so far as to say that it was directed against the United States of America by Great Britain and France. There are one or two things I should like to say about that criticism. Here is a telegram which was communicated to the United States Secretary of State. It has already been published, but I will read it again: We desire to emphasise the fact that the Anglo-French Agreement is not a treaty or even a final binding agreement in regard to naval disarmament. Unless it should lead to the signing of an agreed convention at Geneva its purpose will not have been achieved, and it will he necessary to make further attempts to arrange a compromise if we are not to abandon all hope of a limitation of armaments by international agreement. This compromise has now been submitted to the United States Government in order that they may consider its terms, and, should they see fit, give us the benefit of their considered observations and of any suggestions which may occur to them. A similar message was sent to Italy, and an intimation of what was going on was afterwards given to Germany.