This Amendment raises a very definite and distinct point of considerable constitutional importance, but it is not, I think, a point that we need discuss at any very great length to-day, because it has already been discussed twice in the House. I put down on the Paper a series of Amendments which, I believe, would have had exactly the same effect as this one, and, although this is the third time of asking, I do not wholly despair of persuading the Committee to accept this Amendment, nor am I without some hope that the Government themselves may be disposed to modify their view to meet it. I think the House decided against this Amendment when it was raised on the Financial Resolution, and practically decided against it when they voted on the Amendment which I moved on the Second Reading, not so much because they wished to indulge in this retrospective legislation—which I believe is abhorrent to all Members of the House—as because the President of the Board of Trade alarmed them by the large figure which he mentioned as being involved in the Amendment and in the passing of this Bill. The right hon. Gentleman said, I think on the Financial Resolution, what I think very much impressed the House—and it is borne out by the white paper—that, unless the Bill is passed, the Treasury stand to lose anything up to £18,500,000. I think it has been that statement that has made the House hitherto decline to face the exact issue raised by this Amendment.

I submit that that statement is wholly inaccurate. I do not think that the Attorney-General will for a moment bear out the statement of the President of the Board of Trade that there is any sum of that kind involved. The only sum of money involved, and the only claims that fall to be considered, are, I submit, those claims which were lodged within the period provided by the Indemnity Act. My right hon. Friend, the Member for Ealing (Sir H. Nield) gave the date of that Act as 1922. He had forgotten that the Indemnity Act was passed in 1920, and it gave notice that in respect of all claims against the Government or against any officials for acts done during the War, an indemnity was granted, except in the case of such claims as were lodged within 12 months of the termination of the War. That date, namely, twelve months after the termination of the War, had not yet been fixed when the Indemnity Act was passed; it was left to be fixed by an Order in Council, and the date ultimately fixed as the official termination of the War was the 31st August, 1921. That gave suitors and claimants until the 31st August, 1922, to lodge any of these claims, and here I want to submit to the Government a point that was not dealt with in the earlier Debates.

The Indemnity Act, when it fixed the date within which claims might be brought, practically said to suitors and claimants in this country, "If you have any claim against the Government, bring it within 12 months after the termination of the War, or your claim will be barred." It was like executors advertising that Bills must be presented within a certain time or they would not be met. It was an invitation to people in this country who had been aggrieved by the action of Departments or Ministers to lodge their claims within that period, and I really am surprised that the very Government which passed that Indemnity Act actually proposed a War Charges (Validity) Bill, which blocked claims which had arisen even after the Indemnity Act had been passed. That is not the way in which Parliament should handle claims by the subject. The Indemnity Act is passed, and the date is fixed within which claims must be lodged. Those claims are lodged, and the Department, finding their actions challenged, draft a War Charges (Validity) Bill, which is to block those very claims. The President of the Board of Trade appears to be under some apprehension lest the whole £18,500,000 may be involved. I have no such anxiety, nor do I think the Attorney-General has any such anxiety, but, if the right hon. Gentleman feels that anxiety, let the Government accept this Amendment and pass the Bill. That, at any rate, will bar all these undefined and vague charges My reason for feeling certain on this point—I have no claim to pronounce on any point of law—is the High Court decision which was delivered on the very day on which the Financial Resolution was being discussed in this House.

7.0 P.M.

A claim was made after the 31st August, 1922—a petition of right. It came before the High Court, and the Judge ruled that the petition was not lodged within one year from the termination of the War, and therefore it was too late. I appeal to the Attorney-General to tell us whether, in his opinion, that case does not really govern all these cases and that no possible claim can arise against any Government Department in connection with any of those acts committed during or immediately after the War. The purpose of the Amendment is to secure that in those cases a legal decision shall be given. Where a legal decision has been given, it shall stand; where it has not been given, it shall proceed to a decision and the Government abide by it. I cannot find out precisely what amount of money is involved. From my point of view, that is not very important. As a matter of fact, I do not think the sum reaches £100,000. I am confident it cannot reach £250,000, and I submit that we ought not to pass retrospective legislation. Large or small, I submit that this claim should not be barred. If the sum at stake be small, the principle is a great one. Is it not most unwise and unjust for this House to intervene in the middle of legal proceedings and block the subject from the legal redress he has sought. If the Department broke the law, they will be brought to Court. The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade, and the right, hon. Gentleman the late President of the Board of Trade, joined together in regard to this Amendment. They both urged, "It is all very well, the claimants are small in number, and the amount involved may not be large." "But," said the right hon. Gentleman opposite, "all of us brought pressure to bear upon the claimants not to proceed with their cases, because we were going to pass a War Charges Validity Bill." "And," says the President of the Board of Trade to-day, "I cannot do justice to your claims, because there are those who would have had a claim if they had not been induced not to put it forward." I recognise the fact that there are such people in this country. I am sorry for them.

The right hon. Gentleman (Sir P. Lloyd-Greame) has just come in. His argument was that we could hardly do justice to the people whose claims would be considered under this Amendment because of those other people in this country whom he, and other Ministers, had impressed with the fact that the late Government intended to bring in a War Charges Validity Bill and to pass it into law, and that therefore they should refrain from taking legal proceedings. There is a good deal of force in that argument. I am sorry for those people who were induced by the blandishments of the right hon. Gentleman to refrain from having recourse to the law. It would be a very evil day for this country if it were to be said that the word or promise of a Minister is the same thing as the law. The pledge of a Minister is a very different thing from an Act of Parliament. It by no means follows that because a pledge is given, any attempt will be made to fulfil that pledge. Still less is a claimant justified in treating promises to bring in a Bill as equal to the Bill being passed, and that therefore they must stop their proceedings because of the intention of the Government. I am sorry for the people who were deceived by the promises of the Government. It must be admitted that, looking at the experience of politics and life in this country, they are very imprudent people who treat pledges and promises of Ministers as if they were Acts of Parliament. All Ministers think that they are there for life and that they cannot be dispensed with. As a matter of fact, Ministers are the creatures of a day. They are here one day and gone another, and to treat their pledges and promises as if they were in fact law is really not ordinary common sense.

Therefore, I submit to the Committee that it is no good reason for not allowing these cases to go forward to a decision that, but for the promise of the passing of this Bill, there would have been more claims of this kind to consider. What we have before us is a demand from the Government that we shall deprive claimants of their legal and constitutional redress, and for no reason except that there are some others who might also have claimed redress and have not done so. I think that is a wholly unreasonable course for the Government to take, and I hope it will not pass this retrospective legislation with no great cause. I have no particular sympathy that I know of with the suitors. I do not know many detailed cases such as the hon. and learned Gentleman stated. Some of the claimants, I believe, are brewers. I am not likely to stand up to advocate their claims. I am advocating the claims of justice, whoever it may be, whether shipowners, brewers, or milk distributors who had a real grievance against the Government and who brought their actions. I think the House ought to do justice to them and not intervene in the cases between the Courts and the suitors.