I want to call attention to one small point which has just been mentioned, but which I do not think has been quite fairly and thoroughly explored. We may pass over at once any suggestion that the rights of the subject are in danger in the picturesque way in which they have been in danger in previous centuries. I quite understand, and the House now quite understands, that the proviso in Clause 2, to which we are objecting, does not relate to the enumerated cases, though I am still a little uncertain about fraud, but it does relate to a number of cases which may not seem important to hon. Members, which may not seem to have anything to do with the liberty of the subject, and which have been referred to as small and unimportant cases. The proviso, which enables a Judge to deprive the litigant of his right to trial by jury, is not limited to small and unimportant cases, or to cases which are supposed to be not suited to be tried by a jury. The Judge, apart from the enumerated cases, can deny the litigant the right to trial by jury in any case where he thinks it would be better dealt with by a Judge without a jury than with a jury. It is not where he thinks it is not fit to be tried by a jury, but where he thinks it would be better tried by a Judge without a jury than with a jury. It has nothing to do with the criticism which has been expressed chiefly by members of the legal profession as to the efficacy of trial by jury in a great many of these cases. If the House and the Government want to except certain cases from those in which the litigant has the right to a jury, then let the Clause enumerate them. What we object to is that it should depend upon the length of the Judge's foot or perhaps upon the conceit of the Judge in thinking that the case, though quite suited to be tried by a jury, would be better tried by a Judge without a jury than with a jury. There is no limitation in the proviso to cases which are unfit to be tried by a jury or which cannot properly be tried by a jury; it is cases which can be better tried by a Judge without a jury than with a jury. If the right hon. and learned Gentleman wants to deprive a litigant of the right of trial by jury, it ought to be on the ground that the class of case is such that it is not suited for the Intervention of a jury. Before the War, in various complicated ways, a jury could be dispensed with in a number of cases, but in the Majority of cases it was with the consent of the parties. That is entirely different to being deprived of the right of trial by jury by order of a Judge. I have no objection to the parties agreeing to dispense with a jury, but if that is done, it is no argument for entrusting a Judge with the right to deprive a litigant of his right to a jury. It is no answer at all to our case.

The suggestion which has been made by the Solicitor-General, that the House ought not to vote for this Amendment because it would involve the loss of this Bill, is to my mind nonsense. Does anyone believe that if the House by a majority agrees to the Amendment, the British public and the legal profession would be deprived of the improvements embodied in this Bill? Of course they will not.