Clause 19. — (Powers of Taxation.)

Part of Orders of the Day — Government of Ireland Bill. – in the House of Commons at on 28 October 1920.

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Lieut.-Commander HILTON YOUNG:

I am sure one might discuss for long as to whether this Bill was federal or separatist in its tendencies, and one might discuss for even longer whether the Irish question was capable of settlement by reference to any fixed theory of federalism or separation. Indeed, I believe it is not, and that the only solution of which it is capable is a purely empirical one, and I am one of those who think that, in searching round for the empirical methods which will lead us to a solution, we have come, in the course of our discussions on the Bill, to the essential and most important practical point. In the most persuasive speech of the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Education there was one argument which appealed with almost overwhelming force. It was that which he based upon the proposition that a fiscal barrier is never a good thing, and is always a bad thing. That is also a proposition with which I have always found myself in agreement. In the most lucid and exhaustive speech of the hon. and gallant Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Lieut.-Colonel W. Guinness) I observed. I think, a tendency in the argument to suppose that there is no constitutional objection inherent in a fiscal barrier as such. That only shows that from this empirical point of view, starting from opposite points, one may arrive at the same result. So strongly do I think that point of great importance, that, if indeed I were to suppose there was a very grave danger under the proposal of this Amendment of new fiscal barriers being created, it might give me serious pause, but I do not. Is there any real danger of tariff walls? The hon. Member opposite says: "Yes, in a moment of passion." In a moment of passion, of course, anything may happen. Unfortunately the relations of the countries now are in that condition, but, were the experiment tried, the result must be so immediately disastrous to either part of Ireland, that it would learn a very bitter lesson in a very short time.

This matter has been argued with so much lucidity by the hon. and gallant Member for Chelsea (Sir S. Hoare) that there is only one word I would say in emphasis of his argument. His argument which I think so forcible was that in the state of dependence in which Irish producers are upon British markets, a tariff wall must be suicidal, and that condition is growing from year to year. Year by year the specific products of Ireland meet with more and more competition in the British markets. Year by year her position here becomes more and more insecure, and her dependence on the British markets more absolute. There was one argument, at first attractive, in the right hon. Gentleman's speech which, on further reflection, I wondered I found so convincing. His argument seemed, at first sight, so impressive that the tender Parliaments in Ireland must be protected from too heavy responsibilities, and that you must avoid placing too much of a burden in their infant hands. That, of course, makes a strong appeal to the feelings. The appeal becomes less strong if one detects, as one perhaps does, that the analogy is not perhaps correct. The legislative capacities, the political capacities, of the Irish people are of no infant growth. They have had a long, vigorous life for very many centuries; yet they have a specific character. I should say, at the present moment, that they suffer not from infancy, but from a specific ailment. The ailment from which they suffer is lack of responsibility.

What they need, then, if that be true, is not a sedative, but a tonic. There is no tonic so stimulating as direct responsibility. I believe that a wide principle, which lies at the root of all good government, is contained in this Amendment. It is that you cannot establish any sound system of government unless the same men who are spending the revenue are also responsible for collecting it. Under the present scheme, according to my calculations—whether it be right or wrong, I will not venture to dogmatise—Ireland will be directly and truly responsible for only 6 per cent. of the revenues she collects. Under those circumstances, there can be no such responsibility as would brace statesmen and politicians of Ireland to the establishment of their own new system upon a sound basis. There may be risks in the policy recommended by the Amendment, but they are economic risks, and risks of the smallest extent. On the other hand, there are political risks—risks involved in the continuation of the present situation, in the non-acceptance of the Bill by moderate opinion in Ireland. Ireland is not economically formidable Politically formidable she is. What a gain, then, to transfer our risks from the political to the economic sphere!