Defence Policy 1970

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 19 November 1970.

Alert me about debates like this

Photo of Lord  Balniel Lord Balniel , Hertford 12:00, 19 November 1970

I was referring, when the right hon. Gentleman intervened, to the serious shortage of manpower which we found on coming into office. We need about 40,000 recruits each year, and this does not include the number needed to make up the shortfall from the past. In 1968–69 recruiting had slumped to 28,000. In 1969–70 it improved, and we recruited about 34,000. But both last year and during the current year we are far from achieving a reasonable level, the level which is required to man these Services.

Manpower will be one of the most difficult problems to overcome, and the difficulties will steadily increase in the years which lie ahead, as a result of the raising of the school-leaving age, the extension of further education and various demographic trends. We will emphasise not only the crucial importance that we attach to young men and women serving the country in the Forces in the cause of peace: we will continuously try to improve conditions of life in the Services.

Last week, for instance, I announced the improved separation allowances. Many recruits to the Services are under 18—indeed, most of them are. I hope to announce very shortly our proposals for their engagement structures, which have been examined by the Donaldson Committee. As a country, almost alone in Western Europe, exactly 10 years ago, we decided to man our Services without conscription. If we are to man them adequately, we must correct the dangerous public impression that defence does not matter. We believe that the positive nature of the defence policies that we have announced will go some way towards correcting this impression.

I turn now to the individual Services, each of which has its special problems. In the Army, manning is the most immediate problem. The Army was engaged in the second phase of the rundown plans of the last Government, involving the amalgamation, disbandment or suspended animation of nine major units and possibly a tenth. This followed the first phase, which had meant a reduction of 17 major units. Sadly, the manning position has become so serious that it was impossible to reverse totally these plans.

The rundown plans were such that there was no scope for expansion—no plans to meet the unforeseen. Units were involved in constant movement, and training was being seriously affected. The situation in Northern Ireland has meant that units have had to be taken from B.A.O.R. and other essential tasks. We have given the Royal Armoured Corps, the Engineers and the infantry units involved in the previous Government's second phase plan an opportunity to remain units of squadron or company size. We hope that as it becomes possible to form additional major units those involved in this second phase will be the first to be considered.

Also, as part of providing manpower in the British Army, we have removed the uncertainty about the Brigade of Gurkhas. We shall retain four or five battalions, and from next autumn one of these will be stationed in the United Kingdom. It will be employed on tasks which would otherwise have been fulfilled by British battalions and so will reduce the strain on the infantry—[An HON. MEMBER: "Such as?"]—such as public duties, training, trials and that kind of undertaking.

As I said, we deplored the destruction by the Labour Government of the Territorial Army. We therefore reviewed their arrangements for the Reserves. It is of the greatest importance to have a reserve of trained and disciplined men, uncommitted to any specific task. The existing TAVR units have an important rôle. They are basically the reinforcement of the regular Forces, and B.A.O.R. in particular. We support them to the full and will assist them in coming up to their full establishment.

We will be raising, however, a new armoured car regiment—to fill a gap which exists in B.A.O.R. There will be few problems of recruiting for this. In addition, we will be building up an uncommitted reserve of around 10,000 men. These units will have the same call-up liability, the same combat dress as existing units. They will have modern equipment, although this will be on a lighter scale than the existing units, which are expected to reinforce B.A.O.R. immediately and to fight alongside regular Forces in Germany.

I now turn to maritime defence, where the two features which stand out are the basic change in the nature and deployment of the Soviet Navy and the weapons gap which exists in the Royal Navy. The past four or five years have seen the steady development of Soviet naval power to a degree that has markedly shifted the balance of power in the Mediterranean. I can perhaps show this by giving a few figures. Five years ago the average number of Russian naval vessels in the Mediterranean was three surface warships, three submarines and 10 auxiliaries. This year—admittedly at a peak period—it has been 24 surface warships, not three, at least 13 submarines, not three, and 24 auxiliaries, not 10.

But the deployment is not confined to the Mediterranean. Five years ago there were no Russian naval vessels in the Indian Ocean. This year there have been seven surface warships, at least four submarines and nine auxiliaries.

The House must not assume that this is a temporary phase in the development of Soviet forces. For example, they are building nuclear-powered submarines at a rate of about one every five weeks. The broad maritime picture is that from World War II until the Cuban crisis in 1962 the Soviet navy was mainly orientated towards the defence of its homeland. After the Cuban crisis there was a gap of about two years while the Soviet Navy reorganised itself to operate on the high seas on a more permanent basis. It can now be said that there is a permanent, or at least a semi-permanent, deployment in the Mediterranean, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and the West Indies.

In passing, I would mention that this development, giving the Soviet forces greater flexibility, is not confined to naval forces. It is echoed in the development of infrastructure and airfield development. The main development of infrastructure which shows military intentions in the long term is that concerned with airfields. Another example is that in Egypt, Iraq and Syria the number of major airfields which the Russians could use has increased from 36 to 65 since 1967, and this includes the literally many hundreds of landing grounds which have concrete shelters for military aircraft and which are suitable for jet military aircraft operations. Development along these lines has taken place in South Yemen and Somalia, and the former British airfield disused in Socotra Island has now been renovated.

Against this background, the former Government's plans left our Navy with a serious weapon gap. Their 1966 White Paper recognised the need for a surface-to-surface guided weapon for use against missile-firing ships. They had originally planned, back in 1966, to phase out the carriers in the mid-1970s and to provide the Navy with surface-to-surface missiles. But, unfortunately, the plans were altered. The carriers were not to continue after 1972, and there were no firm plans to provide a suitable weapon. We have decided, subject to satisfactory negotiations—about production-sharing, among other things—to adopt the French missile Exocet. This is well advanced in development. We intend to introduce it into service as soon as possible and to fit it widely in our surface ships.