Debate on the Address

Part of Orders of the Day — Queen's Speech – in the House of Commons at 12:00 am on 31 October 1962.

Alert me about debates like this

Photo of Mr Edward Heath Mr Edward Heath , Bexley 12:00, 31 October 1962

I think that perhaps the hon. Gentleman should endeavour to live up to the high standard of debate set by his leaders. The President of the United States stated on 13th September that there were defensive weapons in Cuba, if built up to a very large degree, and that there was absolutely no justification for any sort of attack upon or invasion of Cuba. That was the position of the President of the United States.

The importation of offensive missiles to use nuclear warheads with a range as far as Canada and Peru was obviously an entirely different question. If we look to the future, the Americans, as I was saying when I was interrupted, behaved courageously and firmly but with restraint. When the right hon. Gentleman said that one should not speak of a diplomatic defeat for the Soviets, I would say to him that in the later stages of the crisis the Soviets also acted with great care and restraint because they then had a full realisation of how seriously vital United States interests were being challenged.

From this fact that care and restraint were exercised by both sides grows the possibility now of an alleviation of tension between East and West—at least temporarily, and, one would hope, permanently. It is both British and American policy to work for this. In that, I think that we have the agreement of the right hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends. The most promising area lies in the realm of disarmament which was mentioned in the exchanges both by Mr. Khrushchev and President Kennedy, particularly perhaps in the sphere of nuclear tests, and in providing assurance against surprise attack. I do not intend to go into great detail here any more than the right hon. Gentleman did, but one or two points stand out.

We cannot, in the light of recent experience, accept a moratorium on nuclear tests in any environment without some arrangement for effective inspection of unidentified events. This is a limiting factor, but, on the other hand, it does not preclude a partial agreement to stop tests in the atmosphere, underwater or in outer space. Nor does it preclude comprehensive agreement covering underground tests as well, with arrangements for a minimum amount of international supervision which, as we have constantly tried to show, could not be perverted for purposes of international espionage. Nor does it preclude scientific consultation, as has often been suggested by the right hon. Gentleman, to ensure that the maximum number of underground seismic events are identified and the need for inspection is kept to a minimum.

On disarmament, the vital point is that as armaments are reduced the balance between the two sides is preserved. We would prefer to see this balance at a lower level, but we must be sure that the balance exists. Here again, the question of verification is of the greatest importance. From Mr. Gromyko's speech in the United Nations Assembly in September it became clear that he had moved one step in our direction. He has accepted the principle that some nuclear weapons should be retained by either side during the first two stages of disarmament in order to meet this point of preserving the balance of forces.

We are ready to resume negotiations on disarmament at any time and to work patiently towards agreement, but it must be on the basis of the principles about balance and verification which have already been agreed in theory between the United States and the Soviet Union. Surely we can all agree that the Cuban crisis has strikingly illustrated the need to maintain those two principles. In the meantime, while negotiations proceed we are very ready to consider what special measures might be taken to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding and misinformation on either side about the military disposition of the other. This would help to reduce both the chances of any surprise attack and any ungrounded fears that such an attack might take place.

One of the lessons of the recent crisis is the important role which an international organisation can play in such cases at points of special danger. Again, the point has clearly emerged that the Soviet Union has accepted international supervision of the dismantling of missiles. Let us therefore hope that this can be taken as a precedent for dealing with the matters of tests and disarmament which I have been discussing in the last few minutes.

Her Majesty's Government do not abandon the hope and belief that Soviet policy is based on the avoidance of war. Any Governments with first-hand knowledge of nuclear weapons and of what nuclear weapons can do must be against war. We believe that the Soviet Union understands this and understands it well. It has formed the basis of the doctrine of peaceful co-existence. It has been proved once again by the manner in which the Soviets have dealt with this crisis when they found themselves to be in a false position in Cuba. This may lead, therefore, to a more careful and realistic assessment and appraisal and greater caution by the Soviet Union.

This, then, is where our hope lies. Having been through this crisis, there should be greater caution and a more realistic appraisal. If this is achieved it is some compensation for all the anxieties which all have gone through during these last few days. With caution and with realism we can have a reduction of tension and then the opportunity for competitive co-existence. This is a challenge of competition in other spheres, in peaceful spheres, in economics, in technology and, indeed, in culture; where we can gladly accept the challenge and accept it in good heart because we believe that we can meet this one successfully for the good of our countries and for the prosperity of the peoples of the world.