Orders of the Day — Austria.

Part of the debate – in the House of Commons at on 2 March 1938.

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Photo of Mr Arthur Henderson Mr Arthur Henderson , Kingswinford

I desire to raise the question of the recent Austro-German agreement. The issues raised by this agreement have been somewhat overshadowed by the recent political crisis in this country, but none the less hon. Members will agree that very serious issues are raised by this agreement. Unfortunately, the agreement made at Berchtesgaden between the Austrian and German Chancellors was surrounded by so much secrecy—incidentally, I think it exemplifies secret diplomacy at its worst—that we have not proper information at our disposal, but the Chancellor of the Exchequer last week informed the House that from information received from Austrian sources an agreement was reached, the main point of which was: The Austrian Chancellor will take far-reaching and conciliatory measures with a view to furthering the internal pacification of Austria."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st February, 1938; col. 6, Vol. 332.] If the Austrian Chancellor had freely, voluntarily and of his own accord decided to take the measures he has taken in his own country no one in this House could object, but was that the case? I read in the "Times" of 16th February an account which was sent from Vienna by their correspondent, and I do not think anyone will accuse the "Times" of being particularly unfriendly to the German Government. This is what it said: Herr Hitler used the plainest language in stating his demands, and it is understood that he indicated grave consequences if they were not accepted. According to credible report he referred to the German reoccupation of the Rhineland two years ago, pointing out that the dangers attendant upon that enterprise were greater than any that confronts Germany to-day. It is understood that he recommended compliance to Herr Von Schuschnigg in the most emphatic terms, and expressed the view that the Austrian Government had no backing to hope for in any third quarter if they were obdurate. The presence of three German generals … gave a suitably impressive background. Is not that evidence that the Austrian Chancellor was faced with an ultimatum, that he was coerced into making an agreement, in circumstances which seriously compromised the sovereign independence of his Government. The Prime Minister stated on Wednesday of last week: The measures so far taken by the Austrian Government in consequence of the discussion at Berchtesgaden do not appear to be a breach of the obligations which Austria undertook."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 28th February, 1938; col, 730, Vol. 332.] Surely it is not enough to consider the steps taken internally by the Austrian Chancellor but it is also necessary to consider how the agreement came to be made. In this connection I venture to refer the House to the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1922 which was signed by the British, French, Italian, Czechoslovakian and Austrian Governments. In that protocol, the Austrian Government undertook, in accordance with the terms of Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain, not to alienate its independence, and it also undertook to abstain from any negotiations—I notice that the Prime Minister used the word "discussions" and I hope that there is to be no fine distinction drawn between "negotiations" and "discussions"—or from any economic or financial engagement calculated, directly or indirectly, to compromise the independence of Austria. Therefore, I suggest the test must surely be this: has the Austrian Chancellor, at the behest of the German Chancellor, undertaken to conduct the internal affairs of his own country as required by the German Chancellor? I imagine that on both sides of the House there will be common agreement that it is only too evident that he has.

I should like now to address two questions to the Prime Minister. First, have the legal advisers of the Crown considered the various legal aspects of the agreement and the circumstances in which the agreement was made? Secondly, will the Government indicate that they reserve their right to raise the matter in the League Council? Hon. Members will remember that in 1931, when the proposed Austro-German Customs Union caused so much excitement in Europe, the question of the legality of the proposed Customs Union was considered by the League Council, at the suggestion of the then British Foreign Secretary, whose attitude and action were endorsed hy tbe late Sir Austen Chamberlain. It was finally submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice, and it was decided, in September, 1931, that the proposed agreement was contrary to the treaty obligations of Austria.

Finally, I would remind the Prime Minister of the recent declaration by the French Foreign Minister that the independence of Austria is an essential element of European peace. Will not the Prime Minister take this opportunity to endorse that courageous declaration by M. Delbos? If he does so, and if he will agree that His Majesty's Government will use all their diplomatic power and influence to achieve the end referred to by M. Delbos, namely, that the independence of Austria is essential to European peace, I believe he will give a great deal of moral encouragement to the people of Austria in their struggle to maintain their independence and also a measure of hope to the other small nations of Central Europe.