Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
5:00 pm
Tony Lloyd (Manchester Central, Labour)
The hon. Gentleman leads me in two different directions. The first is to confirm that I was not going to mention his article in Red Pepper. May I return to his second point later, because I want to make one further point about President Obama?
President Obama announced that in March next year there will be a nuclear summit in which he will bring together the main actors for several important reasons-among them, to discuss two important issues. The first is the security of nuclear material: how do we lock it down and ensure that it is not available to the rogue state or rogue terrorist? That is an important step. The second issue is the lead-up to the non-proliferation treaty review conference, which will take place in May next year.
I turn back to the hon. Gentleman's point. He is right. Actually, our Government have already made some significant steps in the non-proliferation direction, but we could go much further. Part of the conversation that we need to have, not just today but in the weeks and months to come, is about how far Britain can go in achieving consensus across our political system, or at least beginning to build that kind of consensus. Trident replacement has been put back, in effect, until beyond the next election, and the Prime Minister has begun to speak about the capacity for moving from four to three Trident submarines in any case. What that means is that many decisions about Britain's contribution that would have been unthinkable two years or a year ago are now thinkable.
The NPT review is not a British issue but a global issue. Frankly, if this generation of politicians does not seize the political opportunity globally, it will not matter what is done here in Britain. The world can be destroyed from many other places, without a contribution from Britain-although I freely concede that Britain can play a part in destroying the world, if we do not get our own contribution right.
The NPT review conference next year will be of fundamental importance in the process. The treaty is significant in that it placed obligations on non-nuclear states, but it also placed important obligations on nuclear states. The bargain, which has been betrayed by the nuclear powers, was always that the non-nuclear states would not choose to proliferate on the basis of the nuclear states agreeing that they would actively seek a pathway to disarmament. The nuclear states' failure to grasp the disarmament nettle has bedevilled this treaty. That is not the only reason, but it is at least one reason why there has been proliferation since the treaty first came into operation.
The treaty has three pillars, which I will mention in the traditional reverse order, because that will help me make my case. The third pillar guarantees to all states access to the peaceful use of nuclear materials, so that applies in respect of nuclear energy, which can be controversial in itself. Let us not dwell on the philosophy or theology of nuclear power; let us simply say that it is widely accepted. For example, in the debate about Iran, few people argue that the country should not have access to a peaceful nuclear energy programme. However, I urge my hon. Friend the Minister to recognise that, in respect of the four countries that would like to seek access to that nuclear fuel cycle, there are grave suspicions about those that already have it: about whether access to nuclear power opportunities would be allowed on a basis that would not be commercially restrictive or, possibly, politically restrictive in future. That is a difficult argument, but I can sympathise with those seeking to enter the field of nuclear power who feel that they may, in future, be told that for political reasons-perhaps they do not subscribe to the highest standards of human rights legislation or practice-their access to the nuclear fuel cycle may be withdrawn.
We have to accept that the price we pay in terms of matters nuclear is so high. However, even though in different circumstances we might argue that there is a price to be paid, it ought to be paid in respect of access to nuclear fuel only when people are abrogating their obligations under the non-proliferation treaty. That needs to be established beyond all doubt, to encourage the non-aligned states and others to accept that they can buy into a deal on the NPT treaty.
The second pillar of the NPT concerns the guarantees given to the non-nuclear-power states. Historically, we have not moved a long way in that direction. I urge my hon. Friend the Minister to recognise two things. First, if we want to build in a high cost for those non-nuclear powers that would seek to withdraw from their treaty obligations-if we are to make the Irans and North Koreas know that there is a big price to pay, including expulsion from access to peaceful nuclear technologies and perhaps tough sanctions regimes-and if we are to say to the rest of the world, "You've got to be part of shoring up the process of penalising the withdrawers from the NPT process," we have to go back to what I have said about the third pillar. We have to guarantee that people see that peaceful nuclear power and the treaty issue are locked together and that the cost is proportionate and borne only by those who seek the arms route and not the civil technology route.
Secondly, I urge my hon. Friend the Minister to look seriously at the development of negative security assurances, because although the world has gone down that road in some areas we have not explored fully enough the capacity to give security assurances to those who agree that they will not take the nuclear route. It is important that we explore that. I will mention a particular instance in which that is fundamental: I think that my hon. Friend can probably guess which region I will talk about in that context.
The real drama in all this is in the first pillar, which deals with what the nuclear powers do. What commitments are they prepared to give? There are things that must happen, although I do not intend to go through a checklist. A lot of specific points can be made in a shopping-list way, but some things have to be hammered out in the long, patient debate between now and the NPT review conference.
We have to ensure that people can see that the theology of nuclear weapons has changed-that we devalue nuclear weapons as security systems-and make it clear that nuclear weapons play a different, lesser role in security for the long-term future of Britain and the world. Unless we devalue nuclear weapons, we will continue to make them prime in the security structures of the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan and Israel-and now perhaps Iran and North Korea. We must get beyond that.
We also have to build in a recognition for the non-nuclear states that the decisions made by the nuclear powers now are going to be irreversible, because if people believe that this is simply a technical lull to be reversed by changes of Governments, regimes and even changes of climate, the treaty process will be undermined.
I want to finish by talking about a particular region. One thing that bedevilled the last review conference in 2005 was a belief on the part of states such as Egypt that the bargain that they signed up to had not been kept. Egypt worked hard to persuade other Arab states to sign the treaty, on the basis that Israel would be brought into the ambit of the non-proliferation treaty. Egypt felt, rightly, in 2005 that not only had that bargain not been kept, but there was not even any pressure to see how the issue could be moved forward.
Interestingly, the present Administration in Washington has said publicly and loudly to Israel that it must look at its role in signing up to the NPT. That will be so fundamental in moving the agenda forward if we want to persuade the Egypts of this world, and others, to take the NPT seriously. I am not saying that my hon. Friend the Minister needs to make a declaration today about the role of the middle east, but there has to be some framework within which it is taken seriously as part of that treaty review process.