John Maples

We have heard some interesting speeches on Afghanistan. The hon. Member for Halton (Derek Twigg) and the right hon. Member for Pontypridd (Dr. Howells) looked at the same facts and came to rather different conclusions. The problem I have with the right hon. Gentleman's analysis is that we cannot act unilaterally. We went in there with the United States, and we have to come out with them; we cannot conduct a unilateral withdrawal. The problem I have with the analysis of the hon. Member for Halton is that it does not acknowledge that it is our very presence that has focused, if not caused, the insurgency. That is a big factor. We have succeeded in uniting against us most of the Afghan insurgency, as we did in Iraq. I do not want to discuss Afghanistan, however, although I have a few words to say about it. Instead, I want to talk about the conduct of foreign policy over the last 12 years and how it will change if my party wins the next general election, because some serious and fundamental errors have been made.

When Robin Cook became Foreign Secretary, he made a speech about setting out what he called an ethical foreign policy, as though, somehow, previous foreign policy had not been ethical. There was also talk about being a force for good in the world. I think this has led us into making some serious errors-unintentionally, and in many ways with the best intentions, it has led us into error.

In many respects, this is a rerun of the old argument about whether one should promote one's interests or one's values in foreign policy. I think the answer is both, but values certainly seem to have taken the upper hand over the last 12 years. They have led to a series of errors. I want to comment on two of them, one of which is merely irritating, but the other one of which is dangerous.

The irritating error is the predilection of the current Foreign Secretary and his predecessors for gratuitous moralising about what goes on in other countries where we have no influence and no interest. We get this the whole time; certain other countries get almost daily lectures from the Foreign Secretary about how they ought to conduct their affairs. He does it in an arrogant and patronising way, too. He has said,

"we want to see...Russia on a different course",

and that he has have been talking to President Assad

"for over 18 months...about his responsibilities in the region".

How does the Foreign Secretary think that sounds to those countries, and in what way does it possibly promote our interests? This reached its ridiculous conclusion in his comments on Sri Lanka. He criticised its Government-who were finally coming to grips with the Tamil terrorists and the insurgency-and then, when the Tamils expected some support, he gave them none and we ended up with a huge demonstration in Parliament square. We had no dog in that fight; we had no interest and absolutely no influence. What was the point of that gratuitous comment?

That approach comes from people assuming they have somehow taken the moral high ground because they have asserted it, and they are therefore entitled to tell other people how they think they ought to conduct their affairs. I think foreign policy is about something different, however: if we have an interest we pursue it, and if we have the power to affect an outcome, we use it, but we do not make gratuitous comments, particularly from a moral point of view, about what other people do if we do not have either that interest or that power.

How would we react if President Assad started making comments on our fiscal irresponsibility over the last few years, or the Chinese President criticised us over our rather weak financial regulation? We would be pretty unhappy about it, and I think the press and Members in all parts of this House would unite in opposition to such criticism. Such comment sounds arrogant, and if a first-world country directs it at a third-world country, it does not just sound arrogant, it sounds neo-imperialist as well. When my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) becomes Foreign Secretary-which I very much hope he will in a few months' time-I hope he will resist the temptation to comment, particularly from a moral point of view, on issues over which we have no influence and little, or no, interest.

That is merely the irritating aspect of this so-called ethical foreign policy, however; the dangerous bit is the predilection for intervention. That has been a growing tendency, and it seems to me that no lessons have been learned from one such episode to the next. That is, of course, where ethical foreign policy, or a moral crusade, leads-military intervention. We had a little bit of success in Sierra Leone, and I think that whetted the appetite. That episode involved a gang of essentially armed robbers trying to take over a west African country, and that might be about the extent of what we can take care of by ourselves. We watched the United States' success in Bosnia, but there was a very specific objective-to get the Serbs to the negotiating table in Dayton-and force was used to achieve that. Our first adventure was therefore Kosovo. That war was probably illegal; there was certainly no United Nations Security Council cover for it-we did not even try to get it, because we knew we could not. I think we were very lucky in Kosovo. We were on the verge of having to invade-of having to send our Army in-and I do not know what the result would have been. One day, I would love to know what Martti Ahtisaari and Viktor Chernomyrdin said to Milosevic that made him back down over Kosovo, but I think we ought to thank God that they did what they did, because otherwise we would have ended up in the kind of mess that we have ended up in in other places where we have intervened. It is so easy to start these things, and so difficult to see where they will go.

We then went into Iraq, which exposed the dubious legality of our actions-by implication there was the need to revive a previous UN Security Council resolution. We also then found that the grounds for the war-the weapons of mass destruction-not only did not exist, but the method by which the Government had come to their conclusions was cruelly exposed to the light of day by the Foreign Affairs Committee, on which I served at the time, and subsequently by other inquiries. We were, at best, misled, and intelligence was manipulated to political ends that seemed to me to justify decisions that had already been taken. Both we and the Americans had initial military success in Iraq. We were welcomed as liberators, but it was not long before we were being targeted as insurgents by nationalist groups of one sort or another. I believe that the entire mission conducted by us and the Americans in Iraq acted as both a recruiting sergeant and a training ground for al-Qaeda and its terrorists. They were not in Iraq before, and it certainly gave them a lot of practice. It also gave them something by which to recruit people to its cause-the idea that a western army was on Islamic soil. We should have learned the lessons from that before we went into Afghanistan again in 2006. Whatever success we had in Iraq-the right hon. Member for Cynon Valley (Ann Clwyd) set that out-has to be set against the fact that we have left the region less stable than it was, and that the big winner is Iran, which now does not have a stable, strong country on its western border to act as its counterweight. We are now dealing, at least in part, with the consequences of that, in a much more assertive and much stronger Iran, because it knows that there is nobody in the region who can take it on and stop it.

After Iraq, we went to phase two in Afghanistan. We had cleared the Taliban out in 2001-02, but in 2006 we went back in. Almost as an afterthought, we went into Helmand, and the then Defence Secretary said it was to protect the provincial reconstruction teams. We sent in 3,000 troops and he rather optimistically hoped they would come out without a shot being fired; that is obviously what he thought would happen, too, although he now says that is not so. The reason given for that action was to protect the provincial reconstruction teams, but the Prime Minister said that a large part of our mission was to stop the heroin trade-the hon. Member for Halton also referred to that. In answer to a question from me, the deputy leader of the Labour party, the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), said recently that girls' education was a crucial ingredient in our mission. The Prime Minister has talked about building a democratic state. This is not mission creep; it is mission gallop. We went in there to protect an aid effort; we have ended up trying to build a democratic state.

I now see that our objectives have reduced to training up the Afghan security forces so they can support the Government. The decision to reduce our objectives is, I suppose, one way of getting our capabilities and objectives into line. However, we never had a clear objective, and our presence there has fuelled the insurgency; I have just made that point. It is our very presence as foreigners that has united the various forces in the Afghan opposition against us. They do not like foreigners on their soil, and I dare say we would not like them very much on ours. We should have cleared the Taliban out and then pursued a different strategy. We are there now and it is not that easy just to leave, but we should recognise that our presence produces and fuels the insurgency.

The biggest and most misleading of all the reasons given for our being in Afghanistan is that it makes the streets of Britain safe-it palpably does not. There were serious bombings here in 2005, most of which originated either here or in Pakistan, not in Afghanistan. The idea that al-Qaeda has no place to go aside from Pakistan is nonsense, because there are masses of failed or semi-failed states around, some of which have been mentioned. Those that have not are in the Islamic part of north Africa-in Mail, in Mauritania and in the southern bits of some of the other countries there, which are not really under the control of their Governments. Al-Qaeda is already operating in those places and it has plenty of places to go to if we deny it Afghanistan. If we want to stop al-Qaeda bombing people on the streets of Britain, we have to do so with our own security and intelligence forces, not by fighting foreign wars, which are as likely to stir al-Qaeda up as deter it.

In no way do I intend to detract from the fantastic performance that our Army and military have put in. One could not read "A Million Bullets", as I have done, without being incredibly impressed at what these people have been doing. However, one had to ask at the end: what has been achieved by all that incredible bravery and loss of life? It was difficult to see that much had been sustained. What has been lacking is a clear political objective. If we had had one, we might have been able to put behind it the clear political support for which the hon. Member for Halton was calling. In times of economic hardship, it is also worth reflecting on how much this has cost. It has cost £12 billion and it is costing £3.5 billion a year, but the cost is not just the treasure-it is also the blood. Every Wednesday, we are reminded of the cost of this action in human life.

I am glad that President Obama is giving serious thought to what our mission should be and what resources we need to accomplish it, but I hope that those two things are matched up. I say that because one of the things that flows out of all these interventions is that they increase instability; we become the target by being in these places and we fuel terror and al-Qaeda, acting as a recruiting sergeant while these places act as a training ground for it. This is a bad precedent to set. We may think that it is good for us, but when Chinese marines invade the Philippines or-dare I say this-the Gulf, in pursuit of what they see as a humanitarian mission, we will regret inventing it

I hope that we will see an end to gratuitous moralising in the conduct of foreign policy in the next few years-I hope that will start at some point this spring. I hope that we will see intervention only when it can be quick and successful or where it is clearly and essentially in our national interest. I hope that we will stop seeing foreign policy, as we have so often seen it with Labour Foreign Secretaries, as some sort of reality TV show in which the Foreign Secretary of the day has to give his view on everything, irrespective of whether it is our business, and struts his stuff on the world stage, looking good and lecturing others. Foreign policy is about the long-term protection and enhancement of the United Kingdom's interests. Sometimes that will involve the promotion of democracy, but more often it will, and should be, about achieving stability.

— from debate entitled “Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Defence”

The three speeches/headings immediately before

  1. 1 earlier: Derek Twigg

    I am not saying that. As my hon. Friend will have heard, some have argued that it will take 30 years, but the fact remains that it will take some time. We know, for instance, that the training of the Afghan army is proceeding better than that of the Afghan police. Many people are having to be trained to take over responsibility for security. How can anyone say at this stage whether that will take a year, two years or three years? We shall have to make the judgment at the appropriate time. If we say that we will be out of there in two, three, four or five years, what does that tell the Taliban? What does it say about our commitment there? The issue is our commitment and the message we are sending to our enemies; we must get that right at the beginning. I am not going to specify a time limit, although I do not want us to be there for 30 years. We must ensure that we complete the project of training the security forces and securing stability in Afghanistan in the correct way.

    I should like to hear from Ministers how the training of the Afghan police and armed forces to take over responsibility for security will be paid for in the coming years. The cost, and our contribution, will have to be substantial. We are not talking about just two, three, four or five years. As we have heard, Afghanistan is a very poor country. How could it sustain those arrangements on its own?

    We must continue to maintain 100 per cent. political commitment to Afghanistan, to ensuring that our NATO allies contribute more, and to dealing with corruption, which is particularly important. I hope that President Karzai will be true to his word, but I suspect that the task will be much more difficult than we expect. We must deal with it on both the national and the local level. We need a proper system of justice so that people need not seek justice from the Taliban.

    There should be no illusions that there will be a western-style democracy. I cannot believe that anyone seriously imagines that that is possible, and we should not give the impression that it is. What is needed is a system that takes account of tribal and ethnic issues, and as I have said, security is key to that. The Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr. Jones), mentioned events in Musa Qala. We need security so that the Afghan people can see that we are making a difference to their lives-for instance, in schools and hospitals.

    I recall visiting a hospital in Lashkar Gah-if it could be called a hospital; it was just an old building containing one or two bits of equipment. There was a long queue of people who were trying to be seen, and doctors and nurses were desperate for equipment and support. We must do more, whether it is building more bridges, building better housing or providing more commerce and business. That must be part and parcel of what we are doing in military terms as well.

    We must also try to understand the tribal system better and bring more of the elders on board. We should work with tribes and elders in the villages and elsewhere. I am not in favour of the argument that we should pay ex-Taliban fighters to do our work for us or with us. We may be able to bring some over to our side, but I am not sure that there can be a wholesale policy at this stage. However, I have not been in Afghanistan for more than a year, so I could be mistaken.

    If we are to talk of reconciliation, we should do so only from a position of strength. The same applies to the Afghans. I referred earlier to the danger that the insurgents would see our weakness if we spoke the language that I have sometimes heard spoken about reconciliation. Of course reconciliation will be necessary-there is a history of reconciliation in the case of all insurgencies-but it must take place from a position of strength, and must involve the Afghans themselves.

    I recently spoke to a mother who was very proud of her son and what he was doing out in Afghanistan. He believes he is making a real difference there, and she does as well. She believes it is a cause worth fighting for. However, she also mentioned the political and press debates about the undermining of the morale of our service personnel in Afghanistan, and the support that they need. They believe they are doing a job out there, and we must give them wholesale political commitment.

    The job will be difficult, and it will be absolutely tragic for those who lose their lives, for their families and for the casualties who are wounded, many of them seriously. However, I come back to my earlier point: we must look at all these issues, but we must make decisions based on what is in the interests of our national security and of western security, and, of course, on what is in the interests of the people of Afghanistan. They must also be based on the Pakistan security issue and the consequences of that going wrong. We must make the point time after time that this is about stopping terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda getting back into Afghanistan or getting a base. It is about maintaining security there, and preventing Pakistan from going to the insurgents and their being given a chance to get into power there.

    There is a further point, too, which seems to have been lost. We said at the outset, back in 2006, that we were in Afghanistan in part because of the poppy and heroin. That is a major problem, and we should not shy away from the fact that we said that. It is part of the process as well; after all, 90 per cent. of the heroin that ends up here comes from Afghanistan.

    Our aims must be to build a stable, more secure Afghanistan, to provide security, to allow the country to develop and to make sure we train up its armed forces and police; that is key to our future there. However, in order to ensure success in Afghanistan, we must have 100 per cent. political will to see this through, and we must make sure that our armed forces, who are sacrificing their lives, see that political will. We must also make sure there are enough troops and service personnel out there. We must have boots on the ground in order to make sure that development and security come about.

  2. 2 earlier: David Winnick

    I hope to make a speech on this issue if I catch the eye of the occupant of the Chair. Meanwhile, may I ask my hon. Friend whether he is really saying that it does not matter if victory is not secured in the next few years-in another eight, 10 or 15 years?

  3. 3 earlier: Derek Twigg

    I thank my hon. Friend for that information.

    I hope that President Obama will indeed decide to put thousands more American troops on the ground, although I think he has been right to take his time in making his decision. However, I should be interested to know whether the Opposition can confirm their position regarding NATO. I have been consistent in criticising some members of NATO for not providing more troops, equipment and other resources in Afghanistan, as has the hon. Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox). I have heard him do so time and again from the Opposition Front Bench.

    According to newspaper reports at the weekend, the Conservatives are saying that we must recognise the constitutional difficulties of some of our NATO allies. The United Kingdom and, perhaps, France could provide an expeditionary force, but the others would be there merely to support us. I do not know whether those reports are true, but if that is Conservative party policy, it is very worrying. We must continue to apply pressure; we cannot be half-hearted. As I said earlier, there must be 100 per cent. commitment from NATO and our allies to ensure that we see this through to the end. We cannot allow people to do little bits here and there. The Taliban will see that as a weakness in any event.

    I do not consider it helpful to set a time scale at this stage; we have not travelled far enough down the road to do so. Talk of withdrawal from some areas of Helmand, and of when we will leave Helmand, can only give succour to the Taliban. It will give them the impression that we have real problems and are facing defeat. I cannot see a political reason for such talk. We must be very strong in that regard. We are asking our service personnel to fight and sometimes to die out there, and clearly there will be many casualties. Given what we are asking them to do, they must be 100 per cent. sure that there is 100 per cent. political will to see this through to the end. The comments I have read and heard recently, in the press and elsewhere, are not helpful in that respect.

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