The three speeches/headings immediately before

1. 1 earlier: Michael Howard

   I must first correct the Secretary of State. He said that I was a member of the Chilcot committee, but I was not a member of the original committee. The Conservative representative on that committee was Lord Hurd of Westwell, and I took his place when the committee changed its responsibility and began to supervise the work of the officials in the Home Office who have sought a way to meet the nine tests set out by the original committee. Although we have not yet achieved the objective of finding a scheme that meets those tests, those officials have been carrying out their work thoroughly and conscientiously in their attempt to meet that objective.

   I decided that I should contribute to this debate because of my membership of the committee and I am therefore primarily concerned with the question of the admissibility of intercept evidence. Until the contribution by the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth), it looked as if I need not trouble the House with my contribution, because—in sharp contrast to what happened in the other place—there seemed to be a splendid degree of consensus this evening on this subject. Indeed, until this happy consensus descended on the House, I thought at one point that I would be in the very unfamiliar position of voting with the Government against my own party. Happily, that will not be necessary.

   It is worth setting out the history of the matter, partly to excuse the fact that my contribution lacks all novelty. I am here to repeat the arguments that I put before the House on the Second Reading of the Counter-Terrorism Bill on 10 June 2008 and the Second Reading of this Bill on 23 March this year. After I made my intervention on the former, the provisions that would have made intercept evidence admissible at coroners' inquests were removed from the Bill. I do not lay claim to a causal connection between my intervention and the removal of the provisions: I merely set out the facts. I was therefore somewhat surprised when this Bill appeared and those provisions reappeared. Once again, I voiced my opposition on Second Reading, and once again—this time at Committee stage in the other place—the Government removed them from the Bill, and I was happy to see that. It is noteworthy that on that occasion they were removed from the Bill without a Division.

   It therefore came as an even greater surprise that, on Report in the other place, those amendments designed to provide for the admissibility of intercept evidence were put back into the Bill, this time against the wishes of the Government but at the behest of both the principal Opposition parties in the other place. I am especially grateful to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) for accepting the Government's view that to put those provisions in this Bill would have damaging and profound consequences for our intercept regime, which makes it unnecessary for me to take the very unfamiliar position of supporting the Government in the Lobby this evening.

   It is important that the House understands that I do not take this position because I object in principle to the admissibility of intercept evidence. On the contrary, I have made it clear on numerous occasions, both in the House and outside, that I would very much like to see provision made for intercept material to be admitted in evidence, especially in cases of those accused of terrorism and other serious criminal offences. But things are not as simple as that. They are certainly not as simple as was suggested by the hon. Member for Cambridge.

   The work that has been carried out by the officials in the Home Office, and which has been supervised by the Chilcot committee in its present form, has been exhaustive, and it continues. The nine tests that were set out by the original Chilcot committee were necessary if we were to protect a capability of the greatest importance in keeping the people of our country safe. It is one of the frustrating things about the argument that one cannot go very far into the details of justifying the need for those tests without getting perilously close to putting the capability at risk. I am sure that the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith), who sits on the committee with me, would agree, although I must point out that I do not speak for the committee. It would be foolhardy to retain in the Bill the provisions that were inserted on Report in the other place. They do not meet the tests of the original Chilcot committee and, if they were to remain in the Bill, they would be a risk to this country's strategic intelligence capability that no responsible Government should take.

2. 2 earlier: Robert Marshall-Andrews

   I will be very brief—briefer than I would otherwise be—one reason being that like many Members of the House, I would like to hear the views of the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard), if, indeed, Mr. Deputy Speaker, you were minded to call him at any stage. In that hope, I will be as brief as I can be.

   I am grateful to be able to make a contribution in order to deal with what is a grotesquely overstated problem on the part of the Government. My good and right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has always been a master at creating theoretical, if not to say theological, problems with which he is able to torment Labour Back Benchers—he has had a good go at my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore)—and at trying to get them to sort out such problems. The plain fact is that by the Secretary of State's own admission, the problem that this draconian measure seeks to remedy either does not exist or is so infinitesimally small that it would be a grotesque misuse of the House's power to hand the Executive such a very large extension of their powers.

   May I explain why? Juries know all about covert, intercept, intelligence-based evidence. Let us take for the moment the example of juries in criminal trials. If a jury sits down and hears that a massive police operation nipped a huge bank robbery in the bud, they know perfectly well that covert information and intelligence was behind it, unless they are barking mad and come to the conclusion that the entire flying squad happened to be assembled at that particular point. Of course, if that arrangement is successful, there is no problem. The problem does not arise, and we do not have to worry about public interest immunity in a criminal court if there is a successful operation and people are caught red-handed.

   It is exactly the same with a coroner's inquest. If somebody has been shot by agents of the state because they were believed to be a terrorist, there is no problem if it turns out that the person is a terrorist who was carrying bombs or was in the process of plotting. Such problems do not exist. Coroners will not be asked to investigate that kind of evidence. The problem happens when something goes terribly and demonstrably wrong, which is why it is so rare.

   However, when something goes that wrong, and when something goes as wrong as it did the Jean Charles de Menezes case, there must be a public inquiry. Having a private, secret inquiry in those circumstances would be a devastating indictment of our system and of the use of Executive power. Despite the engaging way in which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State talks about judicial oversight and superior judges—as I said in an intervention, it is always nice to hear him adulating superior judges on the occasion that he wishes to enlist their assistance in taking over jury trial—the measure is no counterweight or counterbalance to a jury sitting in an open inquiry, listening to how something has gone terribly and demonstrably wrong at the behest of the Executive.

   My right hon. Friend says that the power will be exercised only rarely, but we have heard that before on many occasions—I am going to stop in a moment to give the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe a decent rein—such as when the House debated giving up jury trial in tampering cases. It was said in this House and in the other place that it would only happen in the rarest of cases, and only when the defence had been heard in full on the basis of all the evidence. That has simply not happened. There are two cases now in which the defence has simply not been informed of the reason why jury trial has been denied.

   My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State may believe that it will happen rarely or will never be used, but the power that we would be giving to the Executive should never be given by this House, unless we were told in the clearest possible terms that to do so was a grave and immediate necessity. No one has made that case today, and in those circumstances I will take great pleasure in supporting the ingenious amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore). I could not get it past the Vote Office, but it is a brilliant idea.

3. 3 earlier: David Howarth

   In what I have said so far, I have spoken solely about the proposal of the hon. Member for Hendon, without considering the wiretap point, to which I will come separately. Both situations involve the same sort of judgment, although different levels of risk might be involved, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman says.

   I can understand the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) about waiting for Chilcott, and the Secretary of State's argument that we cannot just insert the Chilcott criteria into the Bill; in fact, that probably would not produce the result that my noble Friend was looking for. However, some of the things I have been hearing about the legal objections to which Chilcott referred elliptically in his last report do not make any sense to me. If there are human rights objections or any sort of objections to schemes of partial disclosure, how much more do they apply to schemes of no disclosure at all? That is the argument I have been unable to follow throughout the entire debate.

   I also cannot understand why anyone on the Government side, as the Secretary of State has rightly acknowledged, says that we must wait for Chilcott, because the original version of clause 13 included a scheme that would allow an inquest—admittedly a juryless inquest—to hear wiretap evidence. There are other examples of wiretap evidence being used by various tribunals—for example, in control order and financial restriction proceedings—so the Government have not waited for Chilcott and have done those things already.

   This issue comes down to not trusting jurors—and, by the way, not trusting coroners. The idea is that there is some security risk specifically in the coroner's court and in the jury. The problems one hears about, such as fishing expeditions and certain information coming out if some forms of wiretap were admissible, already apply in the cases where wiretap evidence is already admissible, and would also apply under the original clause 13. It comes down to whether the Government are right to distrust the jury in the coroner's court so much, and whether the risks arising simply from the jury are worth taking. The Government have not yet proved their case on that. How do we know that juries are so unreliable?

   My view is that the House should support the amendments put forward by the hon. Member for Hendon. I do not want to take up the House's time with a Division on the Government motion to disagree, because we have already heard that the official Opposition will not be opposing it, so there is no chance of defeating the Government. However, there is a serious chance of defeating them on the hon. Gentleman's amendments, and I urge all my right hon. and hon. Friends to support those amendments in a few moments.