Results 1-20 of 55 for trident speaker:Harry Cohen

Written Answers — Defence: Nuclear Weapons (20 Jul 2009)

Harry Cohen: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what his latest estimate is of the lifetime cost of a replacement system for Trident.

Written Answers — Defence: Trident (28 Feb 2007)

Harry Cohen: ...the Secretary of State for Defence how much military-grade (a) plutonium and (b) enriched uranium the UK has produced in the last five years; what level of production is required for the existing Trident missile programme; what additional amounts of each type of military-grade material will be produced by the proposed UK nuclear power development programme; how much of each type of...

Business of the House (23 Nov 2006)

Harry Cohen: When will the decision of this morning's Cabinet on Trident replacement come before Parliament? Bearing in mind the concerns of the Quakers that the Government have not conducted "a proper threat assessment" or explained "the purpose and relevance of 'nuclear deterrence' in relation to current security threats", will the White Paper properly address those issues or will it be a new dodgy...

Defence in the World (10 Jun 1999)

Mr Harry Cohen: ...the then Secretary of State in 1993; the SDR does not provide a new statement of the government's nuclear deterrent posture in the present strategic situation within which the sub-strategic role of Trident could be clarified. We recommend the clarification of both the UK's strategic and sub-strategic nuclear policy. The Government's response to the Select Committee on 19 May was the same,...

Defence Equipment (26 Apr 1999)

Mr Harry Cohen: ...to the fighting in Kosovo? We could never use nuclear weapons against Serbia, or in any similar war. What is the point in keeping them? That is an example of wrong priorities. Procurement for the Trident programme is still taking place, and that money could be saved immediately. During the Minister's speech, I raised the matter of cruise missiles. I understand from a Press Association...

Orders of the Day — Strategic Defence Review: Second Day (20 Oct 1998)

Mr Harry Cohen: ...not comprehensive. Some areas of defence policy were not covered thoroughly enough. An example is nuclear weapons policy. I welcome whole-heartedly the announced reduction in warheads carried on Trident, but, as the Select Committee pointed out, the United Kingdom's strategic and sub-strategic nuclear policy needs clarification. That policy remains at best unconvincing, and at worst...

Oral Answers to Questions — Defence: Trident (12 Jan 1998)

Mr Harry Cohen: Is this not so much a matter of cost as a matter of non-proliferation? Did we not say in opposition that there was not a case for any more warheads on Trident than there were on Polaris? Does it not take a leap of imagination to say that, with the cold war over, there should be more warheads on Trident now than there were on Polaris then?

Bills Presented: Defence Policy (28 Oct 1997)

Mr Harry Cohen: ...that remains true? There are disturbing reports from across the Atlantic of new nuclear weapons being developed. In the post-cold war period, that seems unnecessary. My second point is about Trident. My opposition to its expense, uselessness in practical defence terms and immorality is well recorded. However, in 1995 a commitment was made that, on coming to power, a Labour Government...

Defence Estimates (15 Oct 1996)

Mr Harry Cohen: ...single hidden cost in British history. Such opacity continues today, and even some senior Opposition Members believe the Government's line that, by the next election, 98 per cent. of expenditure on Trident will have been completed. That is plainly wrong. Ninety-eight per cent. of procurement or capital costs may have been spent or committed by then, but that ignores the running costs,...

Royal Navy (1 Feb 1996)

Mr Harry Cohen: Would the Minister be prepared to order a replacement for Trident, at huge cost, which I outlined in my speech, if it meant that the conventional Navy would be run down as a result, which could happen?

Royal Navy (1 Feb 1996)

Mr Harry Cohen: That will not do. Millions of pounds were spent on the Trident programme as well. Spending money on both Polaris and Trident must be regarded as a lack of planning. In fact, the Trident programme has not gone so wonderfully, but I shall say more about that later. In a future debate I may deal with the MOD's new procurement building, which has also cost millions of pounds. It is a castle with...

Royal Navy (1 Feb 1996)

Mr Harry Cohen: The Minister is nodding. I am pleased that he agrees with me. He must therefore accept that the Conservative Government will end up not replacing Trident because of the same economic argument and that a Conservative Treasury will say that enough is enough. Despite their macho stands, both main parties will have to come to terms with the enormous cost of maintaining nuclear weapons and...

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (16 May 1995)

Mr Harry Cohen: ...weapon states to move towards disarmament. Now that the Government have the indefinite extension that they wanted, how will the disarmament process work? The Defence Select Committee said that Trident was a significant enhancement of the UK's nuclear capacity. If the Foreign Secretary is not to call that Committee a bunch of liars—and I hope not—how will we meet our disarmament...

Points of Order (8 Dec 1994)

Mr Harry Cohen: ..., South (Mr. Simpson) and it seems to say that the Ponsonby rule does not apply because extra money will not be spent. That is highly dubious in this case. If Britain is to move from Polaris to Trident missiles, extra money will definitely be spent. The agreement covers, a 10-year period, so extra money is likely to be spent during that period. If that is the reason that the Government...

Orders of the Day — Defence Estimates: Second Day (18 Oct 1994)

Mr Harry Cohen: ...include Britain, France and China—quite right, too. Against the trend, Britain is preparing to double the number of strategic nuclear warheads in its stockpile— a maximum of 96 on each Trident submarine against a maximum of 48 on each Polaris submarine. Aside from the deployment of actual weapons, the Government's policies on nuclear testing have been detrimental to the...

The Army (4 May 1994)

Mr Harry Cohen: ...Navy debate because I was on a parliamentary trip to Kazakhstan, where I was examining matters relevant to defence. So this will be my only chance to put the record straight on my exchange about Trident with the Minister of State for Defence Procurement. During Question Time on 8 February I said that there had been a doubling of strategic warheads—

The Army (4 May 1994)

Mr Harry Cohen: ...say about the Army. I was here for much longer than 20 minutes; I heard the bulk of the opening speeches and the subsequent speeches as well. I said to the Minister that 96 strategic warheads for Trident submarines had replaced 48 for Polaris submarines. The Minister replied: the hon. Gentleman has got his figures seriously wrong."—[Official Report, 8 February 1994; Vol. 237, c....

Oral Answers to Questions — Defence: Nuclear Weapons Arsenal (8 Feb 1994)

Mr Harry Cohen: Instead of the Government's creative accountancy in the area, will the Minister consider how other countries view Trident? Especially since the non-proliferation treaty is coming up for extension next year, would an equivalent Minister of another country consider doubling the strategic warheads, as 96 strategic warheads per Trident submarine have replaced 48 per Polaris submarine? Has not the...

Statement on the Defence Estimates (18 Oct 1993)

Mr Harry Cohen: ...for missile purposes. The British Government openly oppose that—or rather, secretly oppose it, because they will not be accountable for their actions—and want the material for their Trident programme. They should join the United States to get that fissile material cut-off and at least declare their stocks and open them up to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection. In...

Orders of the Day — Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992 (21 Jun 1993)

Mr Harry Cohen: .... Presumably, then, the Prime Minister was indulging in wishful thinking. The Minister said: we maintain a minimum nuclear deterrent for security. Obviously, "minimum" means more in the context of Trident. Basically, the policy means that the Government want nuclear weapons for ever in the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister was being dishonest in India when he said that he does not want...