Clause 5 - Additional review functions of the Commissioner

Justice and Security Bill [Lords] – in a Public Bill Committee at 12:45 pm on 31 January 2013.

Alert me about debates like this

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Photo of Diana R. Johnson Diana R. Johnson Shadow Minister (Home Affairs)

The Opposition welcome the clarification of the Intelligence Services Commissioner’s role in clause 5. While we appreciate that the clause is drafted to codify existing practices, it is nevertheless important given the sensitivity of the commissioner’s work. Given that the Bill reforms the roles of both the commissioner and the Intelligence and Security Committee, what thought have the Government given to aiding better co-operation between the two? What co-operation is there between the ISC’s staff and the staff of the commissioner, especially in the light of what may happen to the ISC’s secretariat in future? I want to be clear about the relationship.

Although the clause is meant to give statutory cover for the extended role, much remains at the Prime Minister’s  discretion, with most of the guidance being dependent on it. The Opposition therefore welcome the fact that the directions will be published to Parliament, as far as that can happen, but has any draft guidance been prepared? How often will the guidance be renewed? What role will the ISC have in influencing the directions given to the commissioner?

Photo of James Brokenshire James Brokenshire The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department

Clause 5 adds additional functions to the statutory oversight remit of the Intelligence Services Commissioner. It enables the Prime Minister to issue a direction to the commissioner, either the Prime Minister’s own or on the commissioner’s recommendation, to keep under review other aspects of the functions of the agencies or any part of Her Majesty’s forces or Ministry of Defence engaged in intelligence activities.

As the hon. Lady highlights, the commissioner has an important and valuable oversight role. We believe that the extension of the commissioner’s functions will provide a clear statutory basis for the duties that the commissioner has occasionally agreed, at the request of the Prime Minister, to take on outside his statutory remit. For example, the commissioner monitors compliance with the consolidated guidance on detention and interviewing detainees by intelligence officers and military personnel in relation to detainees held overseas. The Bill will ensure a clear and transparent basis for that work. If the measure is passed, the Prime Minister will give a direction to the commissioner to undertake that role. A draft direction to that effect has been published alongside the Bill as an example of how the power of direction is intended to be used. A direction given by the Prime Minister to the commissioner must be made public as the Prime Minister considers appropriate, except where doing so would be contrary to the public interest, such as, for example, if it prejudiced national security. In practice, we expect the Prime Minister to write to the commissioner and a copy of that letter will be placed in the House of Commons Library. It is important, for the reasons that the hon. Lady gave, that the commissioner’s role is as open and transparent as possible, within the restrictions of national security.

The hon. Lady raises issues about the co-operation between the ISC and the commissioner and that is under consideration and development. I am sure that future discussions about the work of the ISC, and the secretariat that will sit alongside it, will cover any other bodies that co-ordinate with or strengthen the ISC or the commissioner, so I am grateful to her for highlighting the point.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordinglyordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration of the Bill be now adjourned.—(Mr David Evenett.)

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.