Clause 12 - Power of court to order a summary of its judgment to be published
Defamation Bill
12:15 pm
Robert Flello (Stoke-on-Trent South, Labour)
Clause 12 makes a relatively minor change to current legislation, but one that is welcomed as it provides a further means of non-financial recompense for a successful claimant in a defamation case. The clause provides the possibility for a court to order the unsuccessful defendant to publish a summary of the judgment. The wording of the summary and the time, manner, form and place of its publication is to be agreed by the parties, but if the wording cannot be agreed, the court can settle the matter. If there is disagreement over the time, manner, form or place of publication, the court can take into account what is considered reasonable and practicable before making a judgment.
I do not think that there is anything with which to disagree in the clause. I hope that such means for recompense for a defendant will be much valued. It is worth speaking on the clause, because I think that what will be of interest is the interaction between this and whatever comes out of Leveson. I am hopeful that, with the wide-ranging hearing that Lord Leveson seems to be having, these words from this Committee today will fall upon him, and someone will point out to him, if they have not already, this particular clause. It will be interesting to see where that goes.
Paul Farrelly (Newcastle-under-Lyme, Labour)
I want to make three points about the clause. First, in connection with the point made by my hon. Friend, one of the unintended consequences of the clause may be to encourage a defamation action, because a litigant may be safe in the knowledge that—as drafted—where there seems to be a sure-fire outcome, they can get the court to order the publication of a judgment and order its provenance. That is one overarching concern. I am sure that the Minister would not intend that to be the outcome of the clause.
Secondly, if the parties cannot agree, or, in the case of a wealthy litigant, will not agree, does the Minister intend that a judge be in a position in which they can order where a judgment—effectively an apology—goes, and the size and content of it?
The third point, again in relation to the points made by my hon. Friend, is that nothing in the clause makes the court have any regard to any adjudication or decision by a press regulatory body. It is difficult for the Government to include a clause on having regard to an adjudication or decision by the successor to the Press Complaints Commission, but I hope that outwith the Bill the Government might come up with words that will make courts take into account any successor body coming out of the Leveson inquiry or any future proceedings of the House.
Jonathan Djanogly (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (HM Courts Service and Legal Aid), Justice; Huntingdon, Conservative)
The clause extends the circumstances in which the court may order publication of a summary of its judgment, currently available under the summary disposal procedure. Alongside the adjustments in the law included elsewhere in the Bill aimed at supporting freedom of expression, we recognise the need to ensure that effective remedies are available to provide redress to people whose reputations have been seriously harmed. We also recognise, however, the concerns around editorial independence and the need to strike the correct balance in the law. Therefore, the provisions in clause 12 of the Bill, while giving the court the power to order publication of a summary of its judgment in defamation proceedings, will encourage the parties to reach agreement where possible on the contents of the summary and issues such as where, when and how it is published. The provisions enable the court to settle the wording of the summary and give directions on those other matters only in cases in which agreement cannot be reached.
I note the point made with respect to the Leveson inquiry and I agree that the clause should be brought to its attention. As regards the idea suggested by the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme that the clause might encourage defamation actions, we do not believe that that will be the case. We consider that there is a need to improve the remedies available to claimants in this way, to ensure that the right balance is struck. As to whether we should go further and enable courts to order publication of apologies and so forth, that was opposed by the Joint Committee and most of those who responded to our consultation; such a measure would not be appropriate. We share the Joint Committee’s view that there is no value in forcing a person to make an apology that might be neither meaningful nor sincere.
Paul Farrelly (Newcastle-under-Lyme, Labour)
One effect of the clause—perhaps intended—might, equally, be to bolster effective regulation in the future, whereby a successor to the Press Complaints Commission knows that parties may go to court if editors do not act responsibly with respect to content and families.
Jonathan Djanogly (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (HM Courts Service and Legal Aid), Justice; Huntingdon, Conservative)
That is a possibility, but let us hope that they all start acting responsibly—or continue to do so.
