Schedule 2
Localism Bill
5:30 pm
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
I beg to move amendment 35, in schedule 2, page 173, leave out line 2.
Hugh Bayley (York Central, Labour)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 36, in schedule 2, page 173, leave out lines 22 to 24.
Amendment 37, in schedule 2, page 173, leave out lines 27 to 29 and insert—
Amendment 38, in schedule 2, page 173, leave out lines 30 to 40.
Amendment 39, in schedule 2, page 173, leave out lines 41 to 44 and insert—
Amendment 24, in schedule 2, page 215, leave out line 8.
Amendment 25, in schedule 2, page 215, leave out line 12.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
Amendment 35 to schedule 2 is on permitted forms of governance for local authorities. This group of amendments would make changes to another proposed power for the Secretary of State. Instead of the Secretary of State having the power to make a provision prescribing arrangements for local authority governance, the amendment proposes—in familiar phrasing—that the Secretary of State reports to Parliament on any proposals for new governance arrangements for local authorities and presents a Bill to Parliament to bring in any new arrangements.
The Bill is caught in the conflict between localism and the taking of centralised powers—a conflict that we keep coming back to. Earlier, I mentioned the important fact that 11 of our 14 witnesses who gave evidence about local government had issues with the powers that the Bill gives to the Secretary of State. The Opposition welcome the idea of innovation in governance arrangements, but Parliament has an important scrutiny role, in terms of prescribing arrangements for new forms of governance. It should not be for the Secretary of State alone to agree or deny those arrangements.
The Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007 introduced executive arrangements in place of the committee system for most local authorities, with two of the three executive leadership models involving directly elected mayors. Through that legislation, moving to a mayoral system could be achieved through petition, or through prior approval from local electors through a referendum. That is unlike the situation under the Bill, which seeks to impose mayors on 12 cities, and perhaps on many more later.
The 2007 Act reduced the leadership options for English councils to just two—directly elected mayor with cabinet, and indirectly elected leader with cabinet. It also meant that councils could adopt a mayoral system simply by resolution, without the need for a referendum. As we know, some councils have expressed the wish to return to the committee system of governance, and I understand that. I was a councillor in Trafford, and was a committee chair and a vice-chair when the leader-and-cabinet system was introduced. A number of my colleague councillors felt that their role had been taken away from them.
The Bill brings in the option of councils returning to the committee system that was in place before the Local Government Act 2000. We support that change, but we do not support an enduring power for the Secretary of State to prescribe new governance arrangements without the scrutiny of Parliament. As I keep saying, the Bill has not had enough scrutiny and consultation, and that starts to show in places.
Clearly, there is a debate going on about what constitute effective forms of governance. Councils will be forced by the swingeing cuts imposed on them to look at different ways of doing things. They may then make proposals to the Secretary of State for those different governance arrangements, if they believe that those arrangements would be an improvement. We have councils that want to outsource everything they do, and councils that want to run the charging model of easyJet and Ryanair. Potential airline passengers have choice: they can always fly with another airline or travel by another form of transport. However, residents of an area cannot choose another council without moving. It is therefore right that we have some balance when considering what could be important changes to forms of governance.
Labour Members believe that the right balance would be to have rigorous parliamentary scrutiny of any new governance arrangements proposed, rather than giving powers to approve governance arrangements to the Secretary of State. I want to avoid getting into the same debate time and again in Committee, but I have to say that Labour Members do not believe that statutory instruments constitute a rigorous form of parliamentary scrutiny. I served in the Whips Office for some time, and I know that a debate goes on when one tries to get Members to serve on SI Committees. The debate hinges on Members asking, “How long will I be there for? Is it only five or 10 minutes?” We should dispel here and now the notion that that constitutes rigorous scrutiny. I have known SI debates to last for half an hour or 40 minutes, but in such cases all the Members tend to sit there tutting.
As I said with regard to the Secretary of State’s powers over the general power of competence, it was made clear last week that many individuals and organisations are unhappy about the extent of the powers given to the Secretary of State in different parts of the Bill. One witness stated that the Secretary of State needs to prescribe less. The Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government, the right hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells—this will come to haunt him—said that we can go through these powers
“one by one, and you have my word that I do not intend this to be centralising”.––[Official Report, Localism Public Bill Committee, 27 January 2011; c. 168, Q281.]
The power for the Secretary of State to prescribe new governance arrangements is centralising. He could prescribe new arrangements even where he has not had a proposal from a local authority. He could also refuse to accept a local authority’s proposals for new arrangements. Those matters ought to be dealt with through full scrutiny, not just through regulations.
I trust that the Minister will accept that the power contained in the Bill is centralising. It will not empower a local authority if the Secretary of State refuses a proposal just because it does not suit his views. It is not properly democratically accountable to have major changes in governance for local authorities without full—fuller than a statutory instrument—parliamentary scrutiny. I hope that the Committee will support the amendments.
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
I thank the hon. Lady for her welcome announcement that the Opposition are rethinking their views about the committee system in local government; that is a very welcome recantation—that is, perhaps, not too strong a word. The removal of the committee system under the Local Government Act 2000 was widely regarded by local government colleagues around the country as an act of vandalism. In every subsequent local government Act put in front of the House by Labour Members, there was a challenge on that point—on reinserting the provision. I am pleased that this time we have their consent.
I want to give the broader context of schedule 2. It is lengthy, but about 98% of it consists simply of a reprint of part 1A of the Local Government Act 2000. That includes quite a number of the powers for the Secretary of State, which have just been reproduced lock, stock and barrel. I hope that Opposition Members will bear that in mind when they level their poisoned darts at us for including them in the Bill.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
The general view outside this place, and the view of the Opposition, is that there should have been a redrafting—that some of the powers and provisions are not in keeping with localism. That is the problem. It is not good enough just to reprint them from a Bill from 10 years ago, and say “That is why they are there.”
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
That is an interesting point, coupling the twin arguments, “We were right in the first place” and “The Government have not reformed Labour’s proposals enough.” The hon. Lady is entitled to argue that she was right first time round or, alternatively, that she was wrong first time round. I am not sure which argument she is deploying on this occasion.
Gavin Barwell (Croydon Central, Conservative)
Does my hon. Friend not think it remarkable, given what the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South has just said, that her amendments do not amend what she thinks are the defects in the previous legislation, but instead strike out a provision that allows the Secretary of State to give local authorities more freedom in their governance arrangements? How can anyone regard giving local authorities more options as more centrist? That completely passes me by.
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. I want to draw the Committee’s attention to the construction of the Bill. Earlier, I was reprimanded by the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South for quoting from it, but I will run the risk of a second reprimand by pointing out that what she is planning to do is delete the third of three options that appear in proposed new section 9B(1) of the reprinted 2000 Act. That, of course, is implemented via the final paragraph of 9B(4), which says:
“‘prescribed arrangements’ means such arrangements as may be prescribed in regulations made by the Secretary of State under section 9BA.”
I refer the hon. Lady to subsection (4) of section 9BA, which appears immediately underneath:
“In considering whether or how to exercise the power in this section, the Secretary of State must have regard to any proposals made under subsection (5).”
Subsection (5) says:
“A local authority may propose to the Secretary of State that the Secretary of State make regulations”,
and so on. In other words, we are proposing something that is in the hands of the Secretary of State, acting on consideration of proposals produced by local authorities.
That brings me to a point that my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford East made about whether we should be changing Bradford’s executive members. There we go: 9BA(4) allows Bradford to come to the Secretary of State and say, “Please may we have 12?” or whatever number or circumstance it thinks appropriate. The Secretary of State must have regard to that. I am not a lawyer, but I think that is a very strong requirement on the Secretary of State. If he chooses to proceed, he comes back to the paragraph of text that has been challenged and, if the Opposition are successful, is about to be deleted. I have to say to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford East that if that were deleted from the Bill, the Secretary of State would not have the power to listen to representations from Bradford, and we would all be stuck with the systems set in statute. As for the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South saying that the measure is in some way centralising, that seems to defy the rational use of language, because if we remove the line from the Bill we will have two options, prescribed by a statute that does not give anybody the capacity to change them without getting yet another Act of Parliament through the House.
We are offering a system in which the Secretary of State must have regard to proposals that come from local authorities to change the governance systems—“governance” is a hard word to say; I have to be careful about that—that they operate, and a system that introduces flexibility on their behalf. It is not taking anything away from local government; it is bringing something to local government. The whole basis, therefore, on which this string of amendments has been tabled is misconceived.
Nicholas Dakin (Scunthorpe, Labour)
The Minister is spelling out his position very clearly. Can he explain to me, however, how the imposition of a referendum on shadow mayors for 12 authorities sits comfortably with a localism agenda? Surely localism should start from the people, and not be imposed from the centre. How does that sit with localism? I would also like to know about the cost of referendums. The cost to London was identified by the councillor who gave evidence as approximately £5 million. Local people should choose how to spend their money and not be forced to spend it on referendums they might not want. If the Minister could also explain the criteria by which the 12 cities were identified, that would be helpful.
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
I am more than ready to do that, but may I suggest that we wait until we reach a clause that has anything whatever to do with that?
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
We are talking about governance arrangements, and the specific provision that the hon. Member for Scunthorpe was criticising, relating to the mayor, will not be dealt with through the procedure that we are considering at all. It is covered by specific clauses, and we will have the opportunity to scrutinise them later.
On the second broad issue—given that the amendments are completely misconceived, I could perhaps stop, but I will just go on—the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South claimed that statutory instruments were essentially a nullity as far as the House was concerned. Well, for 13 years, the Labour party put through an average of, I think, 3,000 statutory instruments a year. If we multiply 13 by 3,000, that is 39,000, or some other very large number of statutory instruments, and as she reported from the Government Whips Office, the question was whether they were going to take longer than five minutes. I do not know what scrutiny was like for Government Members under the previous Government, but the I hope that the Opposition in this Parliament take the scrutiny of statutory instruments seriously, as the Opposition did in the previous Parliament, and I am sure that she will be a model of excellence on that in the coming five years.
On the value of statutory instruments, as compared with Acts of Parliament, as a way of holding Ministers to account, yes, it is a lesser procedure. It is a procedure where progress can be made much more rapidly. We need a flexible system that allows the Secretary of State to give local authorities more, not fewer, choices, and that allows him or her to do so expeditiously and without unreasonable delay. That is exactly what the text of schedule 2 does, and exactly what would be defeated were we foolish enough to support these amendments.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
Briefly, the Minister was trying to give us the idea that the Secretary of State would feel bound to move on the proposal that he got from Bradford, or any other local authority. As I read it, however, proposed new section 9B(1) says that the Secretary of State “may” do that. One can posit a case in which certain favoured authorities are allowed new arrangements, and certain other authorities are not. My concern is about “may”. My amendment says that if the Secretary of State has proposals, they “must report to Parliament”. That wording is stronger, so I will push the amendment to a Division.
Division number 6 - 9 yes, 14 no
Voting yes: Nicholas Dakin, Jack Dromey, Julie Elliott, Barbara Keeley, Siobhain McDonagh, Ian Mearns, Nick Raynsford, Jonathan Reynolds, Alison Seabeck
Voting no: Gavin Barwell, Fiona Bruce, Alun Cairns, Greg Clark, Stephen Gilbert, John Howell, Brandon Lewis, Bob Neill, Eric Ollerenshaw, Henry Smith, Iain Stewart, Andrew Stunell, David Ward, Bill Wiggin
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
I beg to move amendment 40, in schedule 2, page 180, line 27, leave out from beginning to end of line 22 on page 191 and insert—
Hugh Bayley (York Central, Labour)
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 19, in schedule 2, page 204, line 17, leave out ‘may’ and insert ‘must’.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
Amendments 40 and 19 aim to strengthen the scrutiny function in local authorities. The Minister conveniently exhorted me to work hard on scrutiny over the next five years, so I hope that he, and the team at his side, will support the amendments. They show, like our amendment on Second Reading, that we believe that the scrutiny function is important and we want to help local authorities to move it along.
The Centre for Public Scrutiny sent Committee members a briefing on the need for the changes. It is a national charity that aims to promote transparent, inclusive and accountable planning and delivery of public services, and supports the individuals, organisations, and communities to hold decision makers to account. Holding decision makers to account has been today’s theme, and we raised questions on that on Second Reading. The Centre for Public Scrutiny reminds us that the Bill consolidates a range of existing scrutiny legislation brought in by various Acts, but in many ways it does not go far enough.
It is timely to look at scrutiny now because the amendments offer the opportunity to clarify the inconsistencies in legislation, to take account of changes to policy and practice since it was passed, and make the law on scrutiny easier to understand for those who practise it and have a stake in good scrutiny. Amendment 40 brings in some provisions proposed in the Local Authorities (Overview and Scrutiny) Bill, which had cross-party support but failed to be enacted due to lack of parliamentary time.
Some people believe that scrutiny has failed to be effective and others have commented that they cannot find successful examples, but there are many, some of which I will quote later. Local government groups have called for the introduction of stronger scrutiny powers and for more resources to be available to the scrutiny committees or for the scrutiny function. The all-party group on local government published a report of its inquiry, “The Role of Councillors”, in June 2007. It argued that after the legislation was introduced in 2000, the Government concentrated on the executive decision-making function of councillors and said:
“Now there is a need for some rebalancing, as it is vital for the democratic representation of communities that there should be an effective role for all councillors. In developing the role of councillors who are not part of the executive, overview and scrutiny has had varying levels of success. The powers of scrutiny, and scrutiny support, should be strengthened to increase its effectiveness.”
The Centre for Public Scrutiny feels that, while scrutiny may not have had a high profile nationally, it has helped to secure, and is securing, significant improvements for local people in a number of different parts of the country. In fact, the centre gives good scrutiny awards every year, and it tells me that last year it received nearly 100 entrants, most of which were of an extremely high standard.
Some may ask what the scrutiny functions are doing. The scrutiny work has resulted in significant cash savings for the authority or its partners, and in improvements in dialogue between the council and local residents. Some of the work has also led to measurable improvements in local services, including some high-quality work on value for money. Many scrutiny functions have therefore successfully tackled issues that can go beyond the council’s powers or that involve councils working with other authorities. What they do is very much in the spirit of this Bill because they enhance local partnership working and can look at local crime and disorder policy. They also help areas meet the challenge of finding financial savings and, most importantly—particularly as we will talk about community empowerment later—they can open up decision making on policy development to democratic accountability for the community. Those are the reasons why scrutiny is important.
Much of that work has been carried out in innovative ways, not just in formal committee meetings but through councillors going out, speaking to local people and gathering evidence. Members may have heard some of the examples of notable practice—one case is very much close to home. Wyre Forest district council reviewed renewable energy provision. South Derbyshire district council was engaged in a long-running review of slow broadband speeds in the district. That led to key successes, because BT announced that it would upgrade three exchanges that serve the district to superfast broadband. That is the sort of service improvement that can be brought about.
Tunbridge Wells borough council worked jointly with Maidstone borough council to review the local provision of mental health services. I am sure that the Minister knows of and supports that, but I understand that the review was very well received and that it resulted in the new mental health forum, which is chaired by the Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government, the right hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells.
The Centre for Public Scrutiny believes that that type of increased partnership working and local autonomy in relation to a wide range of public services means that, in future, it will be become increasingly difficult to discern whether a service is delivered inside or outside a council, and that is why we have to look at the scrutiny powers. The centre feels that the current scrutiny powers and those in the Bill do not always help scrutiny functions to investigate the issues that directly affect local people if their influence is limited because a partner agency is involved. One of the key recommended changes is to equalise the powers that scrutiny has over the council and other partners, including health and crime and disorder partners. They currently have slightly different responsibilities under different legislation—for historical reasons, scrutiny powers have come together in different ways—and the change will help augment local democratic accountability.
The changes suggested by amendment 40 seek to achieve that and to clarify and simplify scrutiny legislation, which has become increasingly complex over the past 10 years. Current scrutiny legislation can impose unreasonable requirements on the scrutiny function, and resource issues are being discussed in relation to that. However, the current legislation still fails to give the clout that scrutiny across the board needs to give its work the profile it deserves. Proposed new section 9F in amendment 40 offers a complete rewrite of all the sections relating to scrutiny in part 1. The issue is also linked to the new health provisions: the Secretary of State for Health emphasised yesterday how important the scrutiny function would be in local councils once the changes in the Health and Social Care Bill are enacted.
The amendment would maintain the existing framework of scrutiny, allow practitioners more scope to innovate, and keep the broad powers similar to what they are now. It will make the business of scrutiny easier to transact both for practitioners and for those they hold to account. The proposed changes bring together the existing, separate regimes for the scrutiny of health, crime and disorder and other local government matters.
Although the powers for a reference to the Secretary of State for Health in the case of any substantial variation in NHS services are kept separate, everything else has been merged together. I think that we all understand from the number of interventions on the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Health that references to the latter tend to be on larger issues, such as the closure of hospitals. Scrutiny powers to challenge and hold partners to account are, in amendment 40, broadly similar to those that exist for the partner authorities, and there are safeguards that require scrutiny to be exercised in a proportionate manner. Those who are included in the new scrutiny powers that are suggested in the amendment might feel that that is too much for them, but there is a framework for those greater powers to engage with local service delivery issues without being limited and constrained by current anomalies.
Amendment 40 also expands the number of organisations with which scrutiny can engage. Instead of a list of organisations, the definition of such partners is given under designated persons, which is a class description, and it is the same as the definition that is about to be adopted in the proposed Local Government (Wales) Measure. In Wales, the Measure has gone through significant pre-legislative scrutiny, and that definition has not been found wanting.
The Bill has not had the benefit of pre-legislative scrutiny, although, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich said, if ever a measure cried out for pre-legislative scrutiny, this is it. We may benefit from the pre-legislative scrutiny that has been carried out in Wales, because we were denied that opportunity here.
Gavin Barwell (Croydon Central, Conservative)
The combined effect of amendments 40 and 19 is to stipulate that authorities that choose to operate under the committee system must have a scrutiny and overview committee. Does the hon. Lady regard requiring an authority to do so as a localist measure? As a former councillor herself under the committee system, does she recognise that under that system all members of an authority are engaged in scrutiny work as a function of being on a committee, as opposed to an executive system where a split exists between executive and non-executive members?
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
The briefing that we have received from the Centre for Public Scrutiny, which I recommend to the hon. Gentleman if he has not already read it, stated that scrutiny has moved on from the notion of committees. I gave examples—one of them was close to home for the Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government, the right hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells—whereby scrutiny reaches out beyond the committee sitting or the council into the community, which is what we want to see. I do not believe that it is in any way non-localist to state that those councils that return to the committee system must have a scrutiny function. Scrutiny is very important. In his opening remarks, the Secretary of State for Health referred to the importance that health scrutiny will assume in almost every area of the country.
Gavin Barwell (Croydon Central, Conservative)
The hon. Lady has made the case with passion that she thinks that that is important. When he criticised the Government earlier, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington said that the attitude was one of “We know best.” Does the fact that the hon. Lady thinks that scrutiny is important justify making all local authorities do what she would like them to do?
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
I hate to think what sort of local authority would not want to have some form of scrutiny in this era of huge change, particularly in the NHS. I cannot see how that would work.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
No; I will try to make progress now. To summarise, amendment 40 would introduce more powerful scrutiny committees to follow up on their recommendations, which is important. It would remove anomalies such as councils co-opting statutory education co-optees, which they do not need to do. It will equalise roles and responsibilities across counties and districts in two-tier areas. That anomaly can no longer be justified. It will clarify the roles and responsibilities of joint committees, which are an increasingly popular way to transact scrutiny business in a proportionate manner.
Cross-authority working—about which Ministers from the Department for Communities and Local Government talk a great deal—is important, so cross-authority scrutiny will also become important. I have given the example of the joint scrutiny work on mental health services that was carried out by Tunbridge Wells and Maidstone borough councils. I feel sure that the Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government, the right hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells would appreciate measures that enable better joint work on scrutiny across authorities.
Greg Clark (Minister of State (Decentralisation), Communities and Local Government; Tunbridge Wells, Conservative)
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for referring to something that has worked successfully, and I have no doubt that both councils would want voluntarily to continue those arrangements. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Erdington said earlier that we should trust local government and fire and rescue authorities, and the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South herself said that she could not see an authority choosing not to have these arrangements. Why does she not want to trust local government in the way that her colleague does?
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
Because we believe that scrutiny is important. Members should look at the briefing from the Centre for Public Scrutiny. Amendment 40 includes as part of its text that every local authority must have a scrutiny function—that is important. Members may not agree, but what about the citizens who live in an area where there is no scrutiny? Particularly now, when we have lost one tier and will be losing another tier in terms of primary care trusts so that things will all go straight to GPs. None of us really has an idea how all that will work. This is the time to strengthen scrutiny.
The difficulty for many scrutiny functions in a variety of councils is that they are restricted as to who they can call, and in their resources. They cannot move into areas such as health or crime and disorder, yet those are the very areas that local people expect councils to deal with. As a constituency MP, I have had incredible problems with utilities, areas that flood and so on—there are many things. Citizens and residents tend not to understand that councils do not have authority over those things.
We believe in the scrutiny function in this place. Select Committees have great powers to call witnesses and use resources in that way. It is not right in any way to deny it to local authorities.
Amendment 40 would remove the power of the Secretary of State to issue regulations and guidance, so, to that extent, it is not centralising. Regulations and guidance are unnecessary and are not in the spirit of localism. I hope that the Committee will support the amendments, which would strengthen the important scrutiny function in local authorities.
Brandon Lewis (Great Yarmouth, Conservative)
I will not keep the Committee long. I found the hon. Lady’s words surprising. We keep hearing that the Opposition are in favour of localism, but yet again we have an amendment that would tell local government how to do something. I fully support the Government’s position and oppose the amendment for a couple of reasons.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
It may help the Committee if I make it clear that these amendments were tabled at the request of the Centre for Public Scrutiny. They do not give the Opposition’s position, which is that we support scrutiny and want to extend it. Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the Government do not support scrutiny and do not support resourcing it and giving local authorities powers?
Brandon Lewis (Great Yarmouth, Conservative)
The hon. Lady might like to clarify when she speaks later whether the Opposition actually support the amendments or whether a quango has told them what they must support in a Committee. I am not sure what she is arguing. The simple fact is that the Government’s position is to say to local authorities that they should scrutinise, but how they scrutinise is something that they can decide locally. It is true localism, not the top-down control that the Opposition argue for through the guidance of a quango paid for by the Government.
The hon. Lady says that she used to work with a fourth-option authority that had a committee system. I was on a committee system fourth-option authority in opposition and then as the leader of one for five years. It had an overview and scrutiny committee in the format laid out in the current legislation. The committee structure is a complete farce. I have not spoken to anyone in a fourth-option authority that still has committees who has not found the same thing: senior officers wasting their time and, therefore, taxpayers’ money trying to find something for the overview and scrutiny committee to do. That makes a farce of the law. They want to make it seem that something is happening when it is not. The reality is that in a committee system, the committee, which back-benchers sit on, take part in and are involved in, performs the scrutiny role itself and is self-perpetuating in that way.
Ian Mearns (Gateshead, Labour)
I served in a local authority for 27 years and am aware of different ways of running the committee system in different places. In my local authority in Gateshead, we had an open committee system whereby there was no whipping beforehand and committees could go on at length, rightly, to scrutinise properly the proposals put forward by officers and senior members. In other local authorities not too far away from where I was, the committees were pre-whipped and proposals went through on the nod. If that was to be the system adopted under the new proposals, it would seem only fair to allow a scrutiny system to be adopted, unless, of course, the local authority determined otherwise.
Brandon Lewis (Great Yarmouth, Conservative)
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but he fails to point out that, ultimately, on any council, there is always a council meeting where councillors—whether in opposition or not—can make comments and speak against an issue that they were not happy with when it was brought up earlier.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
If the hon. Gentleman thinks that the existing powers are fine, can he say how scrutiny—for example, in the case of the changes to the NHS—is going to happen? Is he clear about that?
Brandon Lewis (Great Yarmouth, Conservative)
First, I would refer to good opposition. Secondly, I would refer to the Government’s position in schedule 2, which states:
“Executive arrangements by a local authority must include provision for the appointment by the authority of one or more committees of the authority”.
It goes on to say that authorities must have scrutiny. What type of scrutiny that is and how it is structured is up to the local authority. The core difference is having the local decision made by a local authority that is answerable to the electors. If a local authority is acting in a way that the electors do not like, that puts the power back in the hands of the electors. That is what local elections are about. That is what democracy is about. As a democrat, that, not the amendment, is what I support.
Alun Cairns (Vale of Glamorgan, Conservative)
I could not support my hon. Friend more strongly. It is strange, however, that the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South made a comparison using the Welsh Assembly Government’s Local Government Measure, which is currently going through, because that is the most centralising piece of legislation that has been in front of the Assembly. It is so centralising that the Labour party in Westminster would find it extremely difficult to support, because it takes powers away from local authorities and into the centre.
Brandon Lewis (Great Yarmouth, Conservative)
I am grateful for that intervention. I cannot support the amendment. From what the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South has said, it seems that it was created by a quango and the Opposition have not necessarily thought it through and do not necessarily even support it. The Government’s position in the Bill as it stands is perfectly legitimate: having local power making local decisions with local people being able to deal with that at elections if they want, rather than having some farcical situation that does not add up and is, yet again, top-down control from the Labour party.
David Ward (Bradford East, Liberal Democrat)
I find myself in a difficult position considering quite a prescriptive Bill and an even more prescriptive amendment, so I disagree with everybody so far. For consistency, I retain my fundamentalist position, which is that it should be for a local authority to decide how to carry out its own scrutiny. I see nothing wrong, whether it is centralism or not, in ensuring that there is a duty on the local authority to carry out an overview and scrutiny function and a duty to disclose what that is, so that the local electors know. As with the previous group of amendments, I believe that local electors have a right to be badly governed and badly scrutinised locally, but it should be for them to decide.
Returning to the previous string of amendments, I was won over by the argument for the prescribed arrangements, and I wonder why we cannot extend that to the overview and scrutiny function. If it does, I am sorry, but I have missed that. I was won over by the argument that the prescribed arrangements for governance allow the local authority to approach the Secretary of State and say, “We don’t like that, and we don’t like that. We think this is better for us.” Could that not be extended into a prescribed arrangement for overview and scrutiny, which local authorities could then ask the Secretary of State to think about with a view to a local choice?
On the choice between prescriptive and very prescriptive, there is a long list of named or prescribed bodies, which extends the scope of overview and scrutiny beyond the authority itself. Is that not already covered in the Bill where it is stated that the local authority can look at anything that concerns anybody within the area? A couple of broad clauses already cover that point.
Nick Raynsford (Greenwich and Woolwich, Labour)
As I made clear at the start of our proceedings, I have an interest in this matter as I am chair of the Centre for Public Scrutiny. [ Interruption. ] I made that clear at the outset, and it is right for me to repeat it now. I must say to the hon. Gentleman who referred to it as a “quango”, that it is not a quango, it is a charity.
Brandon Lewis rose—
Nick Raynsford (Greenwich and Woolwich, Labour)
I will give way to the hon. Gentleman in a moment, but I would like him to listen to my point. I thought that his party was keen to encourage the voluntary sector, charitable organisations and the big society, and that he would be slightly less churlish in his references to an organisation that works to support the public interest by promoting good-quality scrutiny and more efficient government.
Brandon Lewis (Great Yarmouth, Conservative)
I am sorry if the right hon. Gentleman took my words in that way. I referred to the organisation as a quango on the basis of my understanding that its funding came from the Government through local government, that it was entirely funded that way and that it is effectively a Government body. I was amazed that the Opposition seemed to be tabling amendments that came from such a body, rather than from their own thought processes.
Nick Raynsford (Greenwich and Woolwich, Labour)
I assure the hon. Gentleman that the CFPS is a charity that receives and seeks funding from a range of sources, including charitable donations and money earned from informative conferences and publications. I do not ask him to accept that point from me, but I ask him to look at the work done by the CFPS over the years. I hope he will accept that it is a worthwhile organisation.
Scrutiny has advanced significantly over the past 10 years, but the legislative framework has not kept pace. My hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South highlighted that in her introductory remarks, and I want to highlight two areas where that point is very relevant. First, there is a growing focus on scrutiny by local authorities of organisations outside the local authority. We are particularly aware of the changes being introduced by the Secretary of State for Health, and there is a strong presumption of scrutiny of local health arrangements being exercised by local authorities. Secondly, there are a growing number of partnerships between local authorities and other partner bodies. A scrutiny function that embraces that situation can ensure that those partnerships genuinely work in the public interest.
In the previous Parliament, I had the fortune, or otherwise, to inherit a private Member’s Bill which fell at the election, as mentioned earlier. It was designed with all-party support to extend the principle of scrutiny to partnerships. But for the general election, it would probably have been enacted by now, but it fell because of lack of time. The principle of rationalising scrutiny functions to embrace partnerships and take on board the new functions of scrutiny beyond the local authority boundary is a reality. Although Conservative Members may want to have a pop at the Labour party about centralism, I ask them to think seriously about the benefits of having effective scrutiny in local government, particularly in those areas where local governments relate to outside organisations.
I understand that the Government may not accept the amendment—it is detailed and sophisticated and contains many provisions on which they may wish to spend more time. However, I urge Ministers to be serious about the issue, and recognise that it is important and that there is a need for clarification and for the law to be updated. If they allow a situation to develop where it is presumed that scrutiny will apply only in authorities with cabinet and executive responsibilities and structures, and not in local authorities with committee structures, a two-tier system will develop. The benefits of that wider scrutiny of partners and outside bodies will not occur in a local authority with a traditional committee structure because there is no obligation to have that scrutiny function. Quite serious problems will develop in the years ahead if the Government do not address this. I urge Ministers not to reject the provision in a partisan spirit, but to look at it as a genuine effort to extend good quality governance, not just in local government but more widely at a local level involving wider partners, and to see whether they can come forward in due course with alternative proposals of their own.
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
We have had an interesting debate in which a number of good points have been made. I hope that this will be the last part of the struggle between localism and freedom on one side and command and control on the other. Labour Members want to introduce yet another control on local authorities and yet another prescription on what they shall and shall not do. On this occasion, they would retrofit a scrutiny function on those smaller authorities that have a committee system at the moment and impose it on any authority that chose to go down that route in future. However, there does not seem to be much sign that existing rules and regulations prevent local authorities from being innovative. The hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South gave the Committee a number of examples of innovative, laudable and effective ways of carrying out the scrutiny function, for which I am grateful. Even if the existing rules and regulations are a bit rusty and creaky in places, they clearly do not inhibit such practice.
Let me deal with a couple of key points that have been made. The Bill, including the schedules to it, amounts to 406 pages, so it is understandable that Opposition Members have not directed their attention to page 236. Were they to do so, however, they would see that paragraph 87 of schedule 3 sets out a requirement for every local authority to have a health scrutiny committee. If there were such a loophole regarding health, the requirement in schedule 3 would block it. There is no requirement for a particular format, but the Bill includes a safeguard.
I can tell my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford East, who is a self-confessed fundamentalist on this, that the prescribed arrangements to which he referred are also capable of delivering on scrutiny. Bradford might want to propose an innovative way of approaching scrutiny and therefore want the flexibility to do that. It can use the route that we discussed under the previous clause to bring that to the attention of the Secretary of State so that it could become a prescribed system of governance for it and other local authorities. The amendment would impose additional and unnecessary duties on all local authorities, yet those who propose it freely admit that the scrutiny function already happens in all local authorities and that there is a lot of innovation and forward-thinking about how to do it.
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
I shall just develop my point for a moment.
While the Bill provides specifically for the health scrutiny function, I would also draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that the forthcoming health Bill also contains parallel requirements. There does not seem to be any need for the amendments in practice. They send exactly the wrong signal about what a localism Bill is about in theory, and I hope that that the Committee will reject them.
Nick Raynsford (Greenwich and Woolwich, Labour)
I will not get into a partisan dispute about imposition, but the hon. Gentleman’s argument that this is somehow prescriptive is unconvincing, given that the paragraph deep in the schedule to which he referred states that local authorities must establish health scrutiny committees. Frankly, that is an unconvincing argument against this attempt to create a coherent scrutiny function that covers not just health, but wider partnership arrangements with other organisations, which should reflect the development of good practice and scrutiny over the years. It is surely a progressive approach and not one to be rubbished, although that is, unfortunately, what the Minister has done.
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
It is possible to be both progressive and centralist. I might acknowledge that this is progressive, and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman would acknowledge that it is centralist.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
I gave some examples of good scrutiny, but I do not want people to be misled into thinking that it is possible either under existing legislation or under the Bill to do everything that would be required for an effective scrutiny function, because it was made very clear to the Committee that that is not the case. It is important to address such things as the duty to attend meetings. In the House, our scrutiny function in Select Committees is enhanced by the power to require attendance. If that is missing, scrutiny is less effective.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Greenwich and Woolwich referred to the wider partnerships that will exist. I have given some examples of the substantial benefits of working with outside providers, such as BT’s work in mental health, but there are many areas in which scrutiny would not be effective, because the people called would not attend.
I would hope that Ministers would not use the disparaging language and tone of the hon. Member for Great Yarmouth. I deplore such a way of talking about a charity that is doing very effective work, and I hope that he will look at the briefing and think again. Dismissing everything as a quango is not an effective way of critiquing things.
Finally, I wish to address the distinction that the Minister keeps coming up with about what the Government think is localist. The Government apparently think that it is okay to impose mayors and to dictate that mayors become chief executives. If there is any imposition, the imposition is in this Bill, and we will come to that shortly. We think that this amendment is important, and we intend to return to the subject on Report, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
I beg to move amendment 2, in schedule 2, page 191, leave out lines 25 to 30 and insert—
Hugh Bayley (York Central, Labour)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 3, in schedule 2, page 191, line 31, leave out ‘prescribed’.
Amendment 4, in schedule 2, page 191, line 34, leave out ‘prescribed’.
Amendment 5, in schedule 2, page 191, leave out lines 38 and 39.
Amendment 6, in schedule 2, page 192, leave out lines 23 to 28.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
We need touch on amendment 2 only briefly. It has been tabled in the spirit of the transparency and openness that already prevail in good local authorities. However, the group has also been tabled in the spirit of localism, because amendment 6 would remove the link to regulations in which the Secretary of State prescribes the circumstances in which meetings must be open to the public, or in which meetings or proceedings will be held in private. In the spirit of localism, such conditions cannot be prescribed by the Secretary of State. To avoid undue secrecy, however, the presumption of holding executive meetings in public seems to provide the right balance. When I checked, I found that a great number of councils specify in their constitution that there is such a presumption, but I think it is right to include such a provision in the Bill while we are considering all things local government.
Amendments 3 to 6 would also remove the Secretary of State’s power to prescribe which written records are made of decisions made at meetings held in private or by individual members of a local authority executive. Matters such as what records are kept are better decided locally and defined in a local authority’s constitution. A number of local authorities already operate with such a presumption, and I have seen good examples from Durham and East Sussex. I trust that the Committee can support the amendments.
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
As the hon. Lady says, many authorities have open executive meetings as a matter of course or policy. My own borough of Stockport is one, and I would commend that approach to local authorities. We need to be careful with what we are saying, however, to ensure that we do not produce perverse outcomes. Among the requirements proposed is that every decision should be recorded. That sounds a good idea, but let us be clear that existing regulations require executive decisions made in connection with the discharge of a particular executive function to be recorded. Even if such a meeting is held behind closed doors, the decision should be recorded. The proposal would—probably inadvertently—impose quite a burden through the recording of all sorts of decisions, and not just those that are related to the discharge of an executive function. It goes very much wider and deeper than is required from that point of view.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
I will say this for the first time, although I might do so again: the Minister has an army of civil servants and parliamentary draftsmen to draft things. If he is saying that he could accept the spirit of our proposal, we would be happy to allow our amendments to be altered so that any complexities or technicalities could be addressed. Perhaps he will tell us whether he is in favour of a presumption of openness and transparency under which executive committees should meet in public, unless they decide the circumstances are not suitable to allow that.
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
I want to give the hon. Lady as much comfort as I can, but I remind her that the Bill, as far as practicable, avoids prescription for local authorities. I undertake to consider the point that she raised, if that would be helpful. I hope that she will take stock, however, because neither the Government nor the ministerial team are in any way inclined to add burdens to local authorities, and we would not want any provision in this area to impose an unreasonable burden.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
I beg to move amendment 7, in schedule 2, page 194, line 27, leave out from beginning to end of line 39 on page 196.
Hugh Bayley (York Central, Labour)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 42, in schedule 2, page 195, line 22, leave out ‘may’ and insert ‘must’.
Amendment 43, in schedule 2, page 199, leave out lines 4 to 25.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
The amendments would remove the proposal to allow an elected mayor to be the chief executive of a local authority. Of all the powers in the Bill to direct the Government’s arrangements for local authorities from Whitehall, this is the strangest. We have been hearing about it from the Secretary of State for some months, but I am not convinced that there is any compelling reason why elected mayors should become the chief executives of their authorities. I agree with the evidence of our witnesses—doubtless that will cause amusement—because, from my experience, Professor Jones was right to say:
“There are two types of leadership that you need: political leadership looking out to the world of politics…and administrative leadership…It is very rare to find one person who can combine those two leadership roles. When you look at different systems around the world, you find that there is always a duality of leadership—one person who deals with the politics and one person who deals with the administration.”
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
I will make a bit more progress, if I may. Professor Jones continued:
“Whether a local authority or a central Government is a success or not depends on the interaction and the partnership between the political leader and the administrative leader.”––[Official Report, Localism Public Bill Committee, 25 January 2011; c. 42-43, Q68.]
The proposals in the Bill mean that the council leaders of our 12 largest cities could find themselves becoming shadow mayors, whether they or local people want that or not. The next pressure would then be for the mayor to become the chief executive.
Henry Smith (Crawley, Conservative)
There are indeed examples from around the world of political and administrative roles being combined at the top. I know that we are talking about a localism Bill, but perhaps the most famous example is the President of the United States.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
I did comparative US and UK politics for my degree, but I do not think that the Committee has time to get into that tonight.
Under the Bill, the leaders of our 12 largest cities could find themselves becoming shadow mayors, and then there will be pressure on them to become the chief executive. In an article about how the Bill will affect Leeds, the Yorkshire Evening Post said:
“A Department of Communities and Local Government spokesman said: ‘Mayors will move to the mayoral management model and ensure that their mayor is the chief executive officer.’”
There does not seem to be a lot of localism in the thrust behind the provision.
Professor Jones said in evidence to us that the Bill would produce
“Whitehall dominance: the same old ministerial games still being played; Ministers intervening; and civil servants devising their schemes and drawing up papers very similar to the Bill before the Committee.”––[Official Report, Localism Public Bill Committee, 25 January 2011; c. 42, Q65.]
Here we have an example of that. Even before Parliament has debated the Bill, which is in itself centralising and imposes governance arrangements on our 12 largest cities, we have DCLG officials turning what might have been an option into something that will have to be ensured. It is very telling that such conversations are happening. Ministers have already been picking fights with local authorities that have a mayor if they are appointing chief executives.
I have been an assistant engineering manager in the IT industry and I was also a councillor in Trafford. I started as vice-chair of social services and later became cabinet member for all children’s services. We sometimes had to deal with tricky and complex issues—particularly around children—and I valued the advice that I received from senior officers. That is the real difference. In addition to administrative leadership, professional advice is needed from people with a depth of experience. Even though I have a managerial background, I would not have felt ready to take on the chief executive role or assumed that I had the knowledge to co-ordinate all the county’s functions, including staffing.
Let me give a brief example of the difference between the co-ordination role of professional officers and the role of elected leaders. On 2 November, we had a terrible gas explosion in Irlam in which a number of people were injured, one very seriously. Three houses collapsed, with people trapped inside, and 200 families had to be evacuated. It was clearly a major incident. Barbara Spicer, the chief executive of Salford city council, took over and co-ordinated the work at the explosion site with the police and emergency services. She and her team did a brilliant job on that day and in the following weeks getting emergency aid, and supporting and helping all the families affected. This is, I think, the first opportunity that I have had to mention that incident in Parliament and to say how grateful I am, as the local MP, for the work that she did. I know that some very difficult decisions had to be made, because there was an ongoing police inquiry. Our chief executive was able to undertake the role because she had done detailed work on contingency planning with police and other agencies, and that stemmed from her long experience in senior roles in different authorities.
If Salford had had an elected mayor, under the preferred model being put forward by DCLG and the Secretary of State, that mayor would have directed those operations without the skills and the professional competence required—depending on the individual. Is it now being suggested that there is no need for professional competence for the running and co-ordinating of our local authorities, because I find that terribly worrying?
When the Secretary of State has talked about local authority chief executives and the role of elected leaders, he has said:
“A lot of chief executives are very nice people whom one can take home to meet one’s mum. But they haven’t got a job anymore. All of the position could be subsumed into the leader’s role.”
Alison Seabeck (Plymouth, Moor View, Labour)
My hon. Friend makes a good point. She may well remember that a football mascot got elected as mayor in Hartlepool. To be fair to the gentleman concerned, he has been doing a very good job— [Interruption.] No, to be fair, he has committed himself fully, but he could not have done that job, as he would be the first to admit, without having had the fall-back of good officers and a good chief executive to guide him through those early years.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
I thank my hon. Friend for that example. This is a massive miscalculation. It is a mistake to muddle political leaders and professionally skilled chief executives, or professional senior officers of any discipline. We can draw a parallel with the Health and Social Care Bill, which was debated in the Chamber yesterday. That Bill will force professionals into roles that they do not want, that they are not trained for, and that they do not want to do. It forces commissioning and other managerial functions on to GPs who only want to get on with their medical role.
The Localism Bill will muddle up political and professional roles in local authorities, and it is a recipe for confusion. All that will happen is that somebody will be chief executive, even though they will not be given that title, because local authorities will still need a person to perform that role. It is wrong to make the assumption that muddling those roles will work, so I urge the Committee to support the amendment.
Mr Bayley, may I seek your advice? Will amendment 42 be debated separately, or should I speak to it now?
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
Before anyone tries to pull me up on it, amendment 42 is an alternative to amendment 7. Although amendment 7 would remove the mayoral management model altogether, which would be our preference, amendment 42 would provide that when a mayoral management model comes into force at the mayor’s request, the mayor “must” set out their plans for the new combined role, rather than “may” set them out.
The Bill provides that the mayor may issue reports on plans covering such things as the co-ordination of the local authority’s functions, the number and grades of staff in the local authority, the organisation of staff, and the appointment and management of staff. Those are significant policy areas, and any new executive mayor would have broad powers to reorganise and restructure a local authority—that might be something that the Government want. With the removal of the separate and professional role of chief executive, however, there is a serious risk that such areas could be mismanaged. We know of examples of the executive mayor model getting into difficulties. A mayor in such a position could politicise the appointment of staff, which might lead to serious mismanagement of the local authority, meaning that it could not carry out its functions or keep within a legal budget. There are examples of that happening, so it is important that we have as much democratic accountability and scrutiny as possible.
Gavin Barwell (Croydon Central, Conservative)
The hon. Lady may be aware that the Greater London authority is considering abolishing the position of chief executive while keeping a head of paid service. That would be done under legislation passed by the previous Government. If the Labour party has the concerns that she is setting out, why did it allow that situation to arise for London?
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
It is not a question of allowing it; it is a question of forcing it. In the quote I read earlier, the DCLG spokespeople said that there would be a requirement, which is our concern. In fact, the Secretary of State has said that a mayor “will” become the chief executive.
The key point for amendment 42 is that any mayor’s plans must be published in full to enable full scrutiny and discussion, and any new mayor should not have the option of avoiding that.
David Ward (Bradford East, Liberal Democrat)
I have struggled with the prospect of elected mayors anyway, which does not help my consideration of amendment 7, but if they are in place, I have no real objection to the elected mayor proposing anything that they want to the authority—within reason, of course. What concerns me is proposed new section 9HB of the Local Government Act 2000, which is covered by amendment 42. Am I reading the provision right? Does it say that the proposition made to the authority has to be agreed by only 34% of its members? Surely that is a drafting error. We should be talking about figures of two thirds, 50% and so on. I query that such a huge transfer in power could take place on the basis of a very small minority of the elected members of an authority.
Stephen Gilbert (St Austell and Newquay, Liberal Democrat)
I shall not detain the Committee for long, but I would like to make some points about a visit I undertook yesterday with the Communities and Local Government Committee. We had the pleasure of going to talk to the elected mayor of Torbay. I was struck by what the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South said about there being no compelling reason to have such a provision in the Bill. The compelling reason is that mayors in some local authorities want to take this step. When I talked to both the mayor and chief executive of Torbay, I was struck by the enthusiasm with which they were looking at some of the powers in the Bill and their potential.
I shall give one clear reason why both the mayor and the chief executive in Torbay indicated that they were considering this avenue: it is about where responsibility lies and the buck stops in local government. Who is the person who has the power and can take the decisions on things about which local people want their local authority to respond? We are all aware of cases in which there is a confused relationship between the leader of a local authority, the mayor and the chief executive. People do not see the best line of approach and who is taking the clearest decisions. For the sake of our democracy, that is something we need to address. In addition, some local authorities want to go down this road and some populations would welcome the clarity that would result from giving elected people further responsibility over services.
Ian Mearns (Gateshead, Labour)
I understand that the hon. Gentleman found compelling evidence on his trip to Torbay that the authority in that one place might want to go down that route. However, in the eyes of the local electorate, who would be the most qualified person to take over the dual role of mayor and chief executive? From the perspective of the local population, given the expertise that they would want from the head of paid service in the local authority, the answer would probably be the chief executive. Although the chief executive would appoint a head of paid service, he would still be the head of paid service. I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman has taken account of the implication in the Bill that 12 very large local authority areas will be compelled to go down that line. It is not a question of whether they would want to do that. Torbay might, but Manchester or Birmingham might not.
Stephen Gilbert (St Austell and Newquay, Liberal Democrat)
When we get to the relevant provision, I am sure that we will properly explore that matter. However, as I understand the Bill, 12 major cities will be subject to a referendum on whether they want an elected mayor. I do not think that giving somebody a choice is quite the same thing as compelling them to do it. The hon. Gentleman makes the point that we would still need a head of paid service, but of course we would not—the Bill makes that clear. The Bill will enable some local authorities—Torbay or perhaps the Greater London authority—to make arrangements that will empower one individual to set clear directions for the authority. Such directions are sometimes vague at present, and they are not transparent or clear.
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
If I may, I shall deal with a couple of the practical, factual points that have emerged in the debate. I direct hon. Members’ attention to proposed new section 9HO of the 2000 Act, which is on page 202 of the Bill. That provision makes it clear that the mayor cannot simultaneously hold one of the posts listed in the proposed new section. As the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South will see, the position of the authority’s director of children’s services, as appointed under the Children Act 2004, is included on the list. The mayor cannot double up on that, so there will be, to address the example she gave, a chief officer with that function and responsibility. Proposed new section 9HO(2)(a) makes it clear that the authority will continue to have a head of paid service and chief executive officer, although not a chief executive. Other provisions make it clear that that person will have responsibility for staffing, appointments and so on.
Ian Mearns (Gateshead, Labour)
I am interested in the relationship. If the mayor becomes the chief executive officer and there is a separate head of paid service—I accept that there is that distinction—would it mean that in the new relationship under which the mayor is the chief executive officer, the head of paid service would be impelled to follow instruction from the mayor?
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
As I think we all understand, a local authority is not a regiment of soldiers. An obligation to follow a command does not have the same force as it would in a military situation. The position will be exactly the same as if the deputy chief executive received an instruction from the chief executive, because if it were lawful and sensible, it would be followed. I do not think that the Nuremburg defence would get the head of paid service very far, if he said that he was just instructed to do something. I am not sure how I can answer that question in a meaningful way, except to say that there would be a power relationship between the mayor and the head of paid service, with the head of paid service carrying out the instructions that he or she received from the mayor.
Ian Mearns (Gateshead, Labour)
I accept that distinction, but there would be a different nuance from if, under the current arrangements, the deputy chief executive of the council was given an instruction from the leader of the council. The deputy chief executive would have to take advice from his chief executive and other legal officers about following a particular set of instructions.
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
As the hon. Gentleman said earlier, local authorities have different cultures. I could point him to some local authorities in which what the leader says is the word of God to everybody else, but I could also point him to others in which the word of the chief executive is more towards that position. A wide range of things is happening in local authorities at the moment, and our proposal is within that wide range.
I will pick up two other points that were made. I was asked whether there are any examples of a move from dual leadership to single leadership. The example that I have in front of me is that of the elected mayors of North Rhine-Westphalia in Germany. The dual leadership model has ended there and the exact system that we propose has been introduced.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bradford East asked whether the Bill contained a misprint, but we have used the exact same legislative provision for when elected mayors propose a budget—the wording reflects existing legislation. A practical example is that a two-thirds majority of the Greater London assembly is required to overturn the Mayor’s proposed budget.
David Ward (Bradford East, Liberal Democrat)
That is slightly different, because that is about overturning a decision of a mayor who is in place. This is about a decision to upgrade the mayor that is taken by a tiny minority. Surely there is a difference between someone who has been elected and is already in place seeking a mandate and, in this case, someone seeking a mandate from a minority.
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
I will have to take further advice and return to that point later in the debate, if I may. I do not want to mislead the Committee with an off-the-cuff reply.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
It would be helpful if the Minister came back to the Committee on this one, because my note says that that is the case—if the elected mayor proposed to his or her local authority that they should switch to the mayoral management model, the local authority would need to pass a resolution by two thirds the other way to refuse it. The switch would pass on a third, therefore.
The Minister says that that brings forward a proposal relating to other mayors and budgets, but that is a very different thing. As I said earlier, the mayoral model mayor can take on all those extra functions—on staffing, on organisation and on which staff are appointed—but he does not even have to issue reports. Amendment 42 was intended to make him issue a report, so that there would be some scrutiny. I hope that he will come back to us on that.
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
I have just told the Committee that that is what my colleagues or I will do as the debate progresses.
In a broader context, the Government want our largest cities to have powerful and visible directly elected mayors accountable to their citizens. Mayors can act as ambassadors for their authorities and areas. We want mayors who will build effective partnerships and use their powers to provide strong, visible leadership and firm direction for the city and the city’s administration.
The Government believe that where such mayors exist, there is no need for a high-profile and highly paid chief executive sitting alongside the mayor and carrying out many of the same activities. Therefore, proposed new sections 9HA to 9HE set out the broad framework, which we have called the mayoral management arrangements, under which the mayor could become the chief executive officer of the authority, to whom the head of the paid service reports directly.
Proposed new section 9HC provides that those local authorities operating the mayoral model as a result of a referendum must adopt the mayoral management arrangements
“within a reasonable period after the first election… of an elected mayor… and… in any event, within the first term of office of the mayor”.
Amendment 7 would remove that requirement and we shall resist it.
Ian Mearns (Gateshead, Labour)
Those arrangements would be forced into place quite soon after the agreement was made. Do the measures at all affect, in retrospect, any of the existing mayoral model towns and cities around the country?
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
The arrangements are specifically for the new category of mayor, if I may call it that, in the large cities. Other provisions foresee the possibility of existing mayors adopting such powers on their initiative over time. That is what my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford East was referring to.
The measures will give councils an opportunity to streamline their administration and to make significant savings—taking council chief executives off the payroll and combining the remaining head of the paid service post with other statutory posts such as monitoring officer or finance officer. Under the mayoral arrangements, the mayor can issue reports—currently issued by the head of the paid service—on matters such as how the council can discharge its functions and the number and grades of staff it needs to do so.
Amendment 42, it appears, would limit the mayor’s discretion, compelling him or her to issue such reports regardless of whether they were necessary or appropriate. If we put in place a mayor with substantial executive powers, it seems sensible to let him or her exercise those powers.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
I referred to amendment 42 and said that it proposed replacing “may” with “must” because the plans might be for substantial changes—how things are to be co-ordinated, the number of grades of staff and their organisation, or how staff are to be appointed and managed. Is the Minister saying that it should be optional for a newly created—newly imposed—mayor to issue such reports? If he decided not to issue the reports, because he did not have to, there would be no scrutiny of what he was doing. He could politicise everything he did in managing staff and there would be no way of anyone knowing what he was doing.
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
I believe that the existing scrutiny functions, which we decided not to amend, will safeguard the hon. Lady’s concern and the councils concerned from such a risk. Of course, it is quite appropriate that they should be so safeguarded. There will still be a role for the head of the paid service. It will not be the same as that of a chief executive, but more like that of a chief operating officer. Under those arrangements, the head of the paid service will still be responsible for appointing, dismissing and disciplining all but the most senior members of staff. Personnel issues in relation to senior staff will continue to be the responsibility of the full council and therefore not the mayor alone. As for the other responsibilities of the head of the paid service, that will be a matter for each authority to decide.
The Bill puts in place a number of safeguards. There will still be a chief finance officer to ensure financial propriety, and a monitoring officer. I have already mentioned, for instance, the requirement for a children’s services officer.
Nick Raynsford (Greenwich and Woolwich, Labour)
The Minister has mentioned the chief finance and monitoring officers. Will they report to the chief operating officer or to the mayor?
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
On their pay and rations, and organisation and so on, they will be reporting to the head of the paid service. He will be responsible and they will be part of that paid service. Clearly, the political direction and the direction of policy will be in the hands of the mayor. That is the intention of having an executive mayor in that position.
Nick Raynsford (Greenwich and Woolwich, Labour)
The Minister will be well aware of the sensitivity of the issue. There may be a question of financial concern, which might lead the chief finance officer to wish to make a report, or one involving the chief monitoring officer, who may be concerned about probity. If either of those officers is ultimately directed by the mayor, that might make it virtually impossible for them to act in the way Parliament has rightly given them powers to act—to maintain the integrity and probity of the local authority.
Andrew Stunell (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Hazel Grove, Liberal Democrat)
The first thing I would say—I think the right hon. Gentleman knows this—is that each officer named in the schedule is a statutory appointee with statutory duties and a statutory duty to blow the whistle, if I may put it that way. That statutory duty is not taken away by the legislation or by the introduction of the mayor. Of course, there will still be members of the council. There will still be a full council with a proper set of processes and checks and balances in place. There is provision in the legislation to ensure that all members of the council, including the elected mayor, continue to receive impartial, professional and robust advice from council officers.
I said to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford East that I would come back to the Committee on the 34% issue, and I will write to the Committee setting out the position as soon as possible. I urge the Committee to reject the amendment.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
I will not press the amendment to a vote because we consider the matter so important that we want to come back to it on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
I beg to move amendment 8, in schedule 2, page 196, line 43, leave out ‘or requiring’.
Hugh Bayley (York Central, Labour)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 9, in schedule 2, page 196, line 43, leave out
Amendment 10, in schedule 2, page 196, line 45, at end insert ‘or elected leader’.
Amendment 11, in schedule 2, page 197, line 1, leave out
Amendment 12, in schedule 2, page 197, line 4, at end insert ‘or elected leader’.
Amendment 13, in schedule 2, page 197, line 6, after ‘mayors’, insert ‘or elected leaders’.
Amendment 14, in schedule 2, page 197, line 17, after ‘mayor’, insert ‘or elected leader’.
Amendment 65, in schedule 2, page 197, line 23, after ‘mayor’, insert ‘or elected leader’.
Amendment 15, in schedule 2, page 198, line 37, after ‘mayor’, insert ‘or elected leader’.
Amendment 16, in schedule 2, page 198, line 39, after ‘mayor’, insert ‘or elected leader’.
Amendment 17, in schedule 2, page 198, line 45, after ‘mayor’, insert ‘or elected leader’.
Amendment 64, in schedule 2, page 198, leave out lines 46 to 48.
Amendment 18, in schedule 2, page 198, line 48, after ‘mayor’, insert ‘or elected leader’.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
Although it sounds as if it would mean a lot of change, amendment 8 would just remove the power for the Secretary of State to require a specified local authority to confer a local public service function on its elected mayor. Labour Members believe that that power is another centralising measure. I remind the Committee that the Minister of State offered to go through the powers one by one to check whether they are centralising.
For the Secretary of State to require a local authority to confer a local public service function on its elected mayor is centralising—how can it be anything else? If the mayor or elected leader does not want that function, it should not be imposed on them, and I do not know why the right hon. Gentleman wants to draw up orders requiring that provision. It is not in line with localism.
Part 7 deals with the transfer of additional powers to the Mayor of London, and there has been a great deal of consultation and involvement with the Mayor and the GLA about that. Why is the transfer of powers being dealt with in one way for London and differently for other cities? There was no question of requiring power to be conferred on the London Mayor. It was done through substantial consultation and agreement.
Amendments 9 to 14, 65, 15 to 17, 64 and 18 would allow the transfer of functions to elected leaders as well as to elected mayors. Ministers have said that they believe in localism and that the Government should not prescribe governance arrangements, but then this Bill prescribes and it directs, particularly in respect of governance arrangements for local authorities, and schedule 2 is another example. It confers a local public service function only on elected mayors, not on elected leaders. I am not sure which Minister will reply, but I ask why the Government are taking such an approach.
For those local authorities and their local residents that do not choose to have an elected mayor, why should an effective leader with a different model of governance not take on extra powers? We could deduce that, by offering the carrot of extra powers only to elected mayors, Ministers are trying to bring yet another pressure to bear on local authorities to do what they want. The Government also want to take the powers to impose mayors on any local authority, so perhaps it is only a short-term carrot, because the big stick will be imposing mayors on local authorities in the long term. I urge members of the Committee to resist this further attempt at centralisation, give equality to local authorities and support the amendment. I hope that they can do so.
Julie Elliott (Sunderland Central, Labour)
I want to speak about the unfairness of the powers as I see the position, coming from Sunderland, which is the largest city in north-east England. It is not in the list of 12, although our smaller neighbouring city of Newcastle is. The proposals, if they are not amended, mean that an elector voting in Sunderland will be voting for people with less power for that larger population than electors voting 12 or 13 miles away in Newcastle. To me, that is an unfair anomaly.
The impact assessment published by the DCLG stated that, 10 years ago, the people of Sunderland voted against having a mayor. That is correct, but that was for a mayor under a completely different system with completely different powers. If there are such unequal powers, how can we possibly say that the Bill is fair and is putting power back into the hands of local people? It will not. It will create huge inequality.
I have cited a stark example of what would happen in my area, but such examples will transpire throughout the country if the amendments are not accepted. Those proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Worsley and Eccles South are sensible and clear, and would equalise the playing field so that local people who elected their local politicians, whatever system of government it be, would be electing people who had the same powers to act on their behalf and would not be prescribed to by the Secretary of State.
Bob Neill (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Bromley and Chislehurst, Conservative)
There has been a restructuring of the ministerial team to deal with the amendments and to share the burden. I say to the hon. Member for Sunderland Central that we make no bones about the fact that, as a matter of policy, we believe that it is in the interests of England’s great regional and provincial cities to have the opportunity to have directly elected mayors.
Bob Neill (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Bromley and Chislehurst, Conservative)
I will come to that. We chose the 12 major cities outside London that have not so far had a referendum. As the hon. Member for Sunderland Central said, the people of Sunderland had a referendum and chose not to have a mayor, which is why it is not on the list. I will make two other points. If the people of Sunderland wish, under existing provisions, to meet the threshold for a referendum through a petition for a mayor, there is nothing to prevent them doing so. Leicester, which is also a city that we originally considered, has decided to have a mayoral referendum under existing legislation. If the hon. Lady believes that Sunderland wishes to be included on the list and tables an amendment on the subject, the Government will consider it sympathetically.
Julie Elliott (Sunderland Central, Labour)
That completely misses the point. My point is about the unequal nature of the powers prescribed by the Secretary of State, whichever form of government an area has. When people vote in elections for a tier of government, the powers that they vote to elected politicians for them to perform their functions with should be equal. It is not about whether areas have a mayor, a leader-and-cabinet system or a committee system; it is about the equality of powers that politicians have.
Bob Neill (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Bromley and Chislehurst, Conservative)
With respect, the hon. Lady is wrong, because a directly elected mayor has the specific legitimacy of their personal and direct electoral mandate. It is perfectly proper to give extended powers to someone who has been directly voted for by the people of their city, as opposed to someone who has effectively been elected by the members of the majority group on the council—in practical reality, that is the leader. I have every respect for leaders of councils, but there is a difference between a directly elected mayoral figure and a leader, even under the strong leader model, which is why it is perfectly legitimate to give mayors additional powers.
I should not have said that Leicester will have a referendum; it has decided to have a mayor. I think that that is because Leicester city council is controlled by the hon. Lady’s party, which has decided to move to the mayoral model without even having a referendum, so the hon. Lady’s argument is not consistent.
Ian Mearns (Gateshead, Labour)
Another anomaly in the north-east region is that since the unification of both Durham and Northumberland counties into unitary authorities, Durham is now the biggest geographical and population area of the single-tier authorities in that region. It has a population of almost 500,000 and, although it is a geographical county, it is a unitary authority. It should not therefore be discriminated against in relation to Newcastle or anywhere else.
Bob Neill (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Bromley and Chislehurst, Conservative)
The same proposition applies if the hon. Gentleman wants to table an amendment on Durham. It is a bit rich to talk about Durham as an example, because it was his Government who imposed a unitary authority on the people of Durham, without giving them any referendum—and they did so by secondary legislation.
I have set out my stall on that issue, and I will return to the gist of the amendment. The Government have made it clear—it is part of the coalition agreement—that we believe in encouraging directly elected mayors in the major provincial cities of England. Those cities are the obvious places for directly elected mayors because, as the hon. Member for Sunderland Central and others have indicated, they have a real sense of identity and place, and people and businesses identify with them. They are therefore the most appropriate places to start having the directly elected mayor model. That would exactly replicate what we see in the great provincial cities of Europe and north America. We take the view that those mayors, having the legitimacy of being directly elected, can be given additional powers.
The amendments would undermine that proposition, which is why I ask hon. Members to reject them. Proposed new section 9HF enables the transfer of functions to public services. We are enabling the transfer of the discharge of local public service functions; interestingly, as I understand it, that is exactly the approach adopted by the Labour-led Welsh Assembly Government in the Principality, so there are precedents there. The Opposition are not on the strongest ground on a number of fronts with these amendments.
Proposed new section 9HF, which the schedule will incorporate into the 2000 Act, provides a mechanism enabling the Secretary of State to transfer such functions by order. Of course, Parliament will scrutinise and debate that order, but if Parliament has willed that the mayor should have such powers by order, and it has therefore been properly scrutinised in this place, it is not necessary or appropriate to require further approval and scrutiny at the local level, which is what amendment 8 would require. It would create duplication that would undermine the authority of the House.
Initially, we envisage using the order-making power to confer local public service functions on mayors in the specified larger cities. I await with interest an amendment adding Sunderland or wherever to the list. However, we do not want to prevent mayors in other areas from having the power to exercise such functions as appropriate, so proposed new section 9HG puts in place a mechanism that would allow any existing or future mayors to apply to the Secretary of State for a transfer of those local public service functions, or an order conferring those functions on them.
Importantly, the new section ensures that a mayor has a democratic mandate to discharge any additional functions conferred by the Secretary of State. It does so by providing that a mayor can apply for additional functions in the first year of his or her term of office only. The application must include such information and evidence as shall be specified by regulations. A new mayor should, in the first year, demonstrate that the application was, in effect, part of their election platform, and that the electorate had endorsed the proposed transfer of functions by voting for them. That is an entirely localist and democratising provision.
Amendments 64 and 75 would remove those provisions, which are important democratic safeguards; I am sorry to see the Opposition seek to remove them. For those reasons, I hope that the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South and her hon. Friends will reflect, and that she will withdraw amendment 8. If she does not, I ask the Committee to reject it.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
I am not convinced on the point about the legitimacy of direct elections, because we will move on shortly to the issue of imposing shadow mayors, and I cannot see what legitimacy there is in direct elections when the Government will force a city to have a shadow mayor whether it wants one or not.
I think the Minister has missed the point. The point of the amendment, and the point so well made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland Central, is that there should be equality of treatment. The Government are taking a very poor approach in the Bill by not treating major population centres, such as Durham and Sunderland, equally, in terms of powers. The city of Manchester is a small slither in the middle of Greater Manchester, and yet it qualifies for a shadow mayor.
There is some strange thinking in the Bill. We do not go along with the imposition of shadow mayors, and there is strange thinking behind the places that were selected. Manchester is not one of our largest cities, but it is part of the very large conurbation that is Greater Manchester. If anything is problematic, it is picking out places and saying, “That one will have a shadow mayor.” I will withdraw the amendment. I do not intend to move amendment 44, because there is a set of amendments on governance arrangements, and we intend to come back to them on Report.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
I beg to move amendment 20, in schedule 2, page 206, leave out lines 29 to 31.
Hugh Bayley (York Central, Labour)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 21, in schedule 2, page 210, leave out lines 3 to 25.
Amendment 22, in schedule 2, page 210, leave out lines 26 to 47.
Amendment 23, in schedule 2, page 212, line 18, leave out from beginning to end of line 31 on page 214.
Bob Neill (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Bromley and Chislehurst, Conservative)
I shall be very brief, because I normally am. I am afraid that the hon. Lady misses the point, because ultimately the choice rests with the people, and the provision simply sets out a mechanism by which that is achieved. Nothing has contradicted that which has been said by my right hon. and hon. Friends. The position is that, ultimately, the decision will be taken by the people of those 12 cities in a referendum, which we anticipate will take place in May 2012. We have been clear about that, and we have said that it is proposed that in the interim—early in 2012—the leader of the council at that time will become the shadow mayor. That person, and therefore their nature, personality and gender, might have changed.
On the gender point, which did not sound very democratic, if the leader of Bristol council does become the mayor, there will indeed be three female mayors, and I hope that there will be more in due course. As it happens, all three will be members of political parties that support the coalition, so we need not take any lectures from Opposition Members.
Alison Seabeck (Plymouth, Moor View, Labour)
What legal recourse will the Government have if the leader and deputy leader say they do not want to take on the responsibility? The schedule does not go further down the pecking order than deputy leader, if a taker for the job cannot be found.
Bob Neill (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Bromley and Chislehurst, Conservative)
I think that that is a pretty hypothetical case, but, as we can see, subsections (2)(b), (3) and (4) make provision for those matters. I do not think that we will end up in that situation. If someone really does not want the job, he or she can stand down as leader and another person can be appointed in their place. If there is no leader of the council at the point that that is done, the deputy leader will become the shadow mayor. If there is no leader or deputy leader at the time the order is made, the fall-back position is that the Secretary of State has the power to designate a member of the authority as the shadow mayor. It is as simple as that, so that has dealt with that.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
I have read that the leader of Leeds city council says he will not become shadow mayor. The Minister says he is not aware of any cases—that is a case. With reference to the question from my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Moor View about what happens in the case of a council that does not want this, is it a localism measure to depose a council leader because he or she does not want to go along with such an imposition?
Bob Neill (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Communities and Local Government; Bromley and Chislehurst, Conservative)
Nobody is deposing any council leader, nor do we know whether the current council leaders will be the leaders when the measure comes into force. I think it presumptuous to say that that will remain the situation. With respect, the hon. Lady raises a false argument. There is a mechanism. Why do we say that there should be a shadow mayor? Because we believe that, with the new system, it is good to have a short period in which people can see an elected mayor in practice and get a sense of what is on offer. It is interesting to note, for example, that a considerable number of research and opinion polls suggest that directly elected mayors have much higher name recognition than the equivalent council leaders, so there is an argument for raising that profile.
All that will be subject to the will of the voters of the city in the referendum. It is worth remembering that the shadow mayors will be shadows rather than full mayors, so that the full mayoral model is not imposed—the shadow mayor will not have the power to take on the mayoral management schemes, taking over the role of the chief executive. Nor will shadow mayors be able to propose those changes to the council until after the referendum has taken place and they have—or have not—been confirmed in office. That is important: people will have chosen to go down the directly elected route, and then full elections for the mayor will follow.
This is a transitional arrangement, which we think is sensible. It is a new endeavour. I am sorry that the hon. Member for Worsley and Eccles South denigrates the situation of the city of Manchester. I do not belittle Manchester; it is a key economic driver in this country. She seemed to be hinting that the boundaries were too small. If she wants to take that to the logical conclusion, is she going to propose that Manchester expand? Is she going to say that to her friends who control the councils around there?
Perhaps the hon. Lady should recognise that New York, Paris and all the major French cities have not felt the need to change their boundaries. The five boroughs of New York operate within the existing city boundaries, going back pretty much to the beginning of the last century. The boundaries of Paris have not been changed since the creation of the périphérique. That is true of Bordeaux, Lyons, Toulouse—all the other major cities. The mayors of those cities work in collaboration with the surrounding municipalities and mayors, and, as hon. Members will know, in French, the communautés urbaines. That is exactly what can happen with joint working between local authorities here; it is no argument against having a directly elected mayor. In effect, this is an attempt to wreck this part of the Bill and I hope that hon. Members reject the amendments.
Barbara Keeley (Worsley and Eccles South, Labour)
We end the debate with the Minister misrepresenting me. There is an important thing to say about his comments on what I said about Manchester. This schedule and all the measures that we have discussed today are confusion and muddle. They involve imposition and are centralising; they do not involve localism in any way, shape or form.
I was a councillor in Trafford and I represent a constituency in Salford, which is a city next to Manchester. It behoves a DCLG Minister who is trying to impose shadow mayoralty on part of the 10 local authority areas in Greater Manchester to understand the politics. There is not a councillor in Trafford or Salford who would ever suggest that Manchester should expand its boundaries. We jealously guard our own positions. Salford is a city, and with two cities next to each other like that, we would never want that to happen.
The Government are creating a difficult situation for Greater Manchester. Given the geography and the fact that Manchester is just a sliver at the centre of Greater Manchester, it would be difficult indeed to try to direct or to give extra powers to what is only one tenth of the area—an important central part of that area, but only one tenth of it. I cannot tell the Minister how many times we have had discussions about mayors but always rejected the idea. We would keep on doing so.
The Committee will probably be glad to hear that I intend to withdraw the amendment, only because this is all such a mess. I very much want to return to the matter on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.