Schedule 1
4:00 pm
Evan Harris (Oxford West and Abingdon, Liberal Democrat)
I beg to move amendment 248, in schedule 1, page 107, line 22, after ‘practicable’, insert
‘and in any event within 24 hours’.
The amendment seeks to probe how long someone can be detained under the schedule before being brought before a court. When the measure was originally introduced in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill, the relevant schedule provided that an individual in breach of a rehabilitation order could be detained for a maximum period of 72 hours before being brought before a court. That was controversial enough at the time. The Joint Committee on Human Rights said in its report on that Bill, at paragraph 1.55 of the fifth report of Session 2007-08:
“However, we are concerned that these measures may in fact lead to the detention of women for up to 72 hours for failing to attend a meeting, and in fact may eventually lead to their imprisonment for failure to comply with the terms of court orders.”
The Minister clarified the latter issue—he cannot envisage a situation in which merely not turning up to meetings or having to be arrested because of not responding to a summons would lead to imprisonment—but it was a fact that the women could be detained for up to 72 hours under those provisions. As I understand it, in this Bill there is no such 72-hour limit. In fact, it says that an offender can be detained for an open-ended period of time before he or she must be brought before a court. The Bill simply states that he or she must be produced “as soon as practicable”.
The Minister will be aware that article 5 of the European convention on human rights is engaged in any indeterminate detention. We are not dealing with control orders or terrorists or anything like that, so it is necessary for the Government to explain why there is no time limit in the Bill. Why could the individual detained for breach of a rehabilitation order not be brought to a court within, say, 24 hours, as proposed in my amendment? That is what I am proposing. I am sure that the Minister will be able to answer that.
While I am on my feet—I hope to avoid a schedule stand part debate—I shall deal with one other issue and make two points on the approach in the schedule. First, on the definition of a “reasonable excuse”, at the moment the Government have provided that, if an individual
“has failed without reasonable excuse”—
the Minister has used that wording himself—
“to comply with the order...The court...must revoke the order...and...may deal with the offender”
“in any way” that the court would have been able to if he or she had been convicted of the original offence.
That much I understand, but there is a problem, because the consequences of the original order are rather uncertain for the individual subject to it. If someone does not turn up to the meeting, the question of whether they are brought back before a court depends essentially on whether their supervisor is of the opinion that they failed to comply with the rehabilitation order without reasonable excuse. There is no attempt to define what a “reasonable excuse” might be. Given that the sort of people who may be subject to the orders—as I think has been acknowledged—are likely to be vulnerable and leading chaotic lives, which may include drug dependency or severe economic deprivation, it is unreasonable not to provide a clearer definition of “reasonable”. Even if the Minister thinks it is reasonable, there is a question of legal certainty, in which people subject to criminal sanction are entitled to know—to have a clearer idea at least—what part of their behaviour is likely to lead them into trouble and a possible conviction. I would be grateful if the Minister could clarify that.
I want to make the point that I was in the middle of making when Mr. Bayley, who was in the Chair, said that it would be best made under schedule 1 stand part, rather than the clause that brought in the schedule. Although the Minister heard what I said about the impact of compulsory rehabilitation, I would be grateful if clarified the basis on which compelling rehabilitation is likely to be effective, especially in the absence of, or in contradistinction to, voluntary rehabilitation involving properly funded resources and people outside the criminal justice system seeking to engage with those vulnerable individuals.