Clause 85
Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Bill [Lords]
9:00 am
David Curry (Skipton and Ripon, Conservative)
I am delighted that we have all arrived in good order, at the right time and in the right place. Some of our constituents would no doubt find that a signal achievement.
We are now coming to provisions in the Bill that are, on the whole, helpful and sensible. The measures envisaged are not compulsory for local authorities, and their design is significantly left to those authorities, so we are moving away from the very prescriptive elements of the Bill. I am more comfortable with that. We should, however, recognise how complex the landscape that we are designing is.
If people were to take advantage of the opportunities presented by everything in the Bill, the landscape of power and authority in the regions would have the regional strategy at the top. Then there would be the two key elements—the leaders’ board and the regional development agency; a constellation of subsidiary, advisory so-called stakeholder bodies serving those; and the multi-area agreements, with or without statutory powers, or with or without attitude, as one might put it. Local area agreements would persist as well. There would be the economic prosperity boards, which might well incorporate transport bodies; there would be the Leeds and Manchester pilots, which might eventually lead to a more coherent form of city region; and underneath there would be the local authorities. Leaving London aside, those include the unitaries, the metropolitans, the districts and the counties, so they are quite a constellation. When I look at that landscape, it isn’t half complicated.
That gives rise to two issues. The first, and perhaps the minor one, is that I suspect what is happening is a bit of a recipe for the empowerment of officers. Many councillors would find it difficult to find their way through, and that would put a huge amount of power in the hands of the officers who will be riding shotgun on the new system.
Secondly, there is a question of accountability. We can see the common sense in multi-area agreements, but the bodies involved are, to a significant extent, not accountable. It is easy to see a logic when that is all put together, but if the question is turned around and things are looked at through the other end of the telescope, by asking how the citizen relates, finds a way in, or finds a voice, it is quite difficult. I do not think we have cracked the central issue of how to build in accountability to structures that are not accountable at a classical national or local level, but which sit between those levels. We still need to deal with that.
A lot of the clauses refer to the tutelage of the Secretary of State. That is inevitable and inescapable, for two reasons: first, because local government still functions significantly on money that is voted by the taxpayer at national level—the grants to local authorities are still a significant part of their funding; and secondly because local government bodies carry out statutory duties, and, indeed, some of the proposals will enhance those. Therefore it is inescapable that the Secretary of State should be the ultimate accounting power in relation to delivery by those statutory bodies. I hope that we shall not get too hung up on that, because I venture to doubt whether, if a future Government—perhaps of a different complexion from the present one—were to put forward measures in this context, the relevant part of the architecture would be significantly different.
I am sorry if I have been giving a sort of Second Reading speech, but, as we are about to discuss economic prosperity boards, I think they must be seen in the context of the extraordinarily complex and, in a sense, quite confusing structures that are likely to be created. We must ask ourselves who will manage them and how, at the end of the day, Joe or Jane Citizen will relate to them.