Schedule 9
Equality Bill
6:15 pm
Vera Baird (Solicitor General, Attorney General's Office; Redcar, Labour)
I accept that the matter is complicated. The organisation might be made up of organised religions, in which case we are in deep trouble. The hon. Gentleman has made a point. I do not doubt that it is a complex area, which is why it is better to lay down a framework and not be specific as we are invited to be from time to time by the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon and to leave distinctions to the courts.
Amendment 43 would reduce the clarity of the exception under paragraph 2 of the schedule by removing the definition under sub-paragraph (8) of employment
“for the purposes of an organised religion”.
The effect of amendment 189 would be to exclude from that definition those whose employment “wholly” as opposed to “mainly” involves duties between one of the definition’s two limbs. The existing exceptions about employment
“for the purposes of an organised religion”
do not contain the definition of what that expression means. However, contrary to what has been suggested, the new definition does not narrow the scope of the existing exceptions.
There has been some confusion about what is meant by
“for the purposes of an organised religion”,
and we have therefore included a definition of the term to clear up misunderstandings, to save courts and tribunals having to go into areas of potential religious controversy and to reduce the risk of the exception being misused. The definition is designed to make it clear that the exception applies to a very narrow range of employment, such as ministers of religion plus a small number of posts outside the clergy, including those that exist to promote and represent religion. I have found examples of that difficult to put forward. That was again what Lord Sainsbury had in mind when he talked about the existing exemption under regulation 7(3) of the Employment Equality (Sexual Relations) Regulations 2003. What he said was entirely consistent with the Amicus case, which was that regulation 7(3) was very narrow and affords an exception only in very limited circumstances.
Amendments 46 and 47 would allow employers with an ethos based on religion or belief to discriminate in relation to work by applying the requirement not only to be of a particular religion or belief, but a requirement under paragraph 2(4) of the schedule. For example, a hospice run by a religious order would be allowed to justify refusing to employ someone of that religion who was married to a divorcee. By contrast, paragraph 3 of schedule 9 allows employers with an ethos based on religion or belief to discriminate in relation to work by applying only a requirement to be of a particular religion or belief, and then only if that is an occupational requirement. That paragraph provides an exception that organisations with a religious ethos may rely on, in addition to paragraph 1 of the schedule. That additional exception recognises that such organisations need to be able to preserve their religious ethos and that is why it covers only the protected characteristic of religion or belief. Paragraph 3 of the schedule is designed to replicate the effect of the current exception under regulation 7(3) of the 2003 regulations derived from the framework directive.
Amendment 250 would prevent organisations with a religious ethos that are working on behalf of public authorities using the exception under paragraph 3. That exception allows religious organisations to require employees to be of a particular religion if it is an occupational requirement. To put it in a nutshell, the Government do not want to interfere with the religious ethos of the organisations, even though they deliver public services. It is rather, as the hon. Member for Glasgow, East is frequently driving at in many of his amendments and new clauses, the diversity of delivery. We think that we have hit an appropriate balance.