Clause 13
Equality Bill
4:15 pm
Vera Baird (Solicitor General, Attorney General's Office; Redcar, Labour)
One of the key objectives of the Bill is to simplify the law and make it more accessible. I do not think for one minute that the only people who are going to read it are lawyers, the easy-read bit at least. We deliberately put the plain English—the explanatory notes—face to face with the necessary legalese to make the Bill accessible to people way beyond lawyers. With that principle in mind, it makes sense to talk in ordinary English language.
The word “because” is much more natural when one looks at the reason for something. If someone is asked, “Why did you do such a thing?”, the answer will mostly likely be, “Because.” It is highly unlikely that people will say “on the grounds of”, and that is the point. However, the two terms mean the same thing. I do not know what they mean in—I am glad that the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon is here to hear me mention it again—the “Evan Harris English Dictionary of Peculiar Terminology”, but in the “Oxford English Dictionary”, the word “because” is defined thus:
“By reason of, on account of”—
on the grounds of. It is absolutely spot on and synonymous. I do not think that it can be argued that there is any difference of meaning—they are absolutely synonymous.
The question in a case of direct discrimination is, “Why was he treated in that way?” The answer would be, “Because”, and that is what we need to capture. It need not give rise to any legal wrangles. The courts are now rejecting suggestions that a change in language necessarily implies a change of meaning. There is no change of meaning. I have said it twice; perhaps I have said three times now. It is very clear that there is no change of meaning.
In a 2005 case, Regina v. Z in the House of Lords, Lord Woolf said:
“Techniques in drafting of section 3 of the 2000 Act and section 19(3) of the 1973 Act differ. Section 3(1) of the 2000 Act is drafted more succinctly and more clearly than its predecessor. It is in a crisper, more contemporary style. However, there is no reason to think that the difference in style means that it should be interpreted in any different way from its predecessor in the 1973 Act.”
All the less reason for any court to think that it should be interpreted differently. Now I am saying for the fourth time: there is no change in the meaning from the change of words.