Henry Bellingham (Shadow Minister, Justice; North West Norfolk, Conservative)

I beg to move amendment 97, in clause 7, page 4, line 19, leave out from ‘if’ to end of line 24 and insert

‘the coroner has reason to believe—

(a) that the deceased died in custody or otherwise in state detention; or

(aa) that the deceased died whilst serving in the armed forces; or

(ab) that the deceased died at a centre for provision of medical treatment, and the coroner has a duty to investigate the death within section 1,’.

Roger Gale (North Thanet, Conservative)

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment 95, in clause 7, page 4, leave out lines 22 to 24 and insert—

‘(aa) that the deceased died at a centre for provision of medical treatment, and the coroner feels there are reasonable grounds for an inquest,’.

Amendment 71, in clause 7, page 4, line 27, at end insert ‘or

(iii) any other state official,’.

Amendment 94, in clause 7, page 4, line 29, at end insert—

‘(2A) Any person falling within section 36(2)(a) or (b) may make a request to the senior coroner that a jury be assembled for the purposes of an inquest.’.

Clause stand part.

Amendment 96, in clause 30, page 16, line 13, at end insert—

‘(including a decision under section 7(2A)’.

Henry Bellingham (Shadow Minister, Justice; North West Norfolk, Conservative)

The clause is all about whether a jury is required, and I entirely accept that having a jury sit with a coroner will be the exception rather than the rule. The overwhelming majority of inquests take place without a jury, and it would be completely impractical if that were not the case, because the costs and logistical implications of having a jury are significant. On the other hand, however, having a jury in place in an inquest is a comforting factor for the bereaved, and we should not ignore it, because we are discussing families who will be going through an appalling period in their lives. They will have lost someone, often in tragic, unexplained or violent circumstances, and having a jury in place can provide a great deal of comfort. They feel that because a jury is made up of ordinary people like them, it is more likely to be sympathetic and understanding. We are not talking about the adversarial characteristics of a Crown court, but about a completely different system altogether. In that respect, the clause—in particular, subsection (2)—is too restrictive. I entirely accept, however, that we have what we might call an escape provision in subsection (3), which states:

“An inquest into a death may be held with a jury if the senior coroner thinks that there is sufficient reason for doing so.”

So, there is a fall-back position.

Amendment 94 would enable any person falling within clause 36(2)(a) or (b) to make a request for a jury to be empanelled, and it would be for the coroner to decide. Amendment 95 would extend the grounds on which a jury could be used and empanelled and add to the existing list private hospitals, so the situation could involve not only someone dying of unnatural causes in a state hospital, but someone doing so in a private hospital.

Tim Boswell (Daventry, Conservative)

Would my hon. Friend like to reflect on the fact that in many cases, with the developments in the health service, persons receiving treatment in a private sector establishment will be funded by the public authorities through the NHS? If we do not move forward, we might have the same problem that we have had with state-financed persons in care homes where, if it is a private home, some provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 are said not to apply.

Henry Bellingham (Shadow Minister, Justice; North West Norfolk, Conservative)

My hon. Friend is quite right on that point. We should look at clause 7(2)(c), which contains the words

“that the death was caused by a notifiable accident, poisoning or disease.”

That will obviously cover private hospitals or establishments as well. It is important that we get that in the Bill.

Amendment 96 is consequential on amendment 94. Amendment 97 would extend the grounds for an inquest with a jury and remove some restrictions that are in the Bill, which refers to the fact

“that the deceased died while in custody or otherwise in state detention and that either the death was a violent or unnatural one, or the cause of death is unknown”.

Amendment 97 would effectively take out that restriction.

I would like to pick up on a briefing sent to us the other day by Inquest—an organisation working for “truth, justice and accountability”—which I submit the Government should listen to more often. Its briefing note reads:

“However, we raise a note of caution in that new clause 7(2) differs from the current Coroners Act 1988 clause 8(3) in that it does not specify that an inquest must be held with a jury if the death occurred in prison and was neither violent nor unnatural, or where the cause of death was unknown, or does not fall within the other criteria set out in 7(2) a — c. The intention here is to allow coroners discretion not to have a jury in cases of deaths of detainees where there is clearly no reason to do so.”

My concern is that we will see fewer such inquests taking place with juries. That which is meant to be the exception to the rule could become the default position.

I am concerned about what the Government are doing here. Obviously, we want to see a system that is as efficient as possible, but we also want a system that is fair. As I said at the start of my brief remarks, it is important that the public have complete confidence in the system. When we are talking about deaths that are at the most violent end of the spectrum and deaths where there are important questions about what happened—because, for example, we are looking at something that took place in state custody or in another part of the state system—having the security and comfort of a jury is important.

Madeleine Moon (Bridgend, Labour)

In looking at these proposals, I am a little concerned that what is being is suggested is an extension on an extension. Where do we draw the line? For example, why would we not include the death of a child in local authority care? Why would we not include the death of someone in a nursing home where medical treatment of a sort is being provided? At what point do we stop extending the number of people who require a jury to be called?

Henry Bellingham (Shadow Minister, Justice; North West Norfolk, Conservative)

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her intervention. All the examples that she gave could be covered by clause 7(3), which states:

“An inquest into a death may be held with a jury if the senior coroner thinks that there is sufficient reason for doing so.”

I hope that, in the circumstances to which the hon. Lady alluded, the coroner would take the view that a jury should be appointed.

The Minister could well argue—perhaps she will—that we already have plenty of cover in the Bill, but the concerns that have been put forward by, for example,  Inquest and the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers should be looked at. I hope she can respond positively to our proposals.

Jennifer Willott (Cardiff Central, Liberal Democrat)

I wish to speak to amendment 71, which is in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge. It picks up on the point just mentioned by the hon. Member for Bridgend about the circumstances in which a jury should automatically be considered for an inquest. Clause 7(2) states:

“An inquest into a death must be held with a jury if the senior coroner has reason to suspect...that the death resulted from an act or omission of...a police officer, or...a member of the service police force”.

It is not clear to me why the list of responsible state officials is restricted to only those two classes of people. Amendment 71 would insert the words “any other state official”, meaning that it would be clear, under subsection (2), that someone who had died at the hands of, or in the care or custody of, the state would be eligible for a jury inquest. Will the Minister comment on why the requirement is limited to a police officer or a member of a service police force? It is not clear why the measure is quite so restricted.

Madeleine Moon (Bridgend, Labour)

Does the hon. Lady agree with me about what is of most concern? Clause 7(3) states that a jury may be required for an inquest when a senior coroner thinks that there is sufficient reason for doing so. There is almost the creation of a second class of citizen when one compares people who have been in the care of a local authority, or in a residential care or nursing home, with those covered by the items listed in amendment 97. We must look towards giving parity of esteem to all individuals who have any involvement with the state.

Jennifer Willott (Cardiff Central, Liberal Democrat)

I completely agree. The main purpose behind the amendments is to clarify the situation.

The other category that is missing, in addition to the example that has just been so clearly given, is, amazingly, the security services. There would be a lot of public concern if someone who died in a hands of the security services was excluded from the provision when, if the death had happened at the hands of the police, they would not be. Adding the words “any other state official” would clarify the situation, as would dealing with the issue raised by the hon. Member for Bridgend.

The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk made many valid comments. I will be grateful if the Minister responds to the point that, aside from the point about parity of treatment if a person dies in the care of a state body, subsection (3) gives a coroner quite broad discretion on the cases for which they would summon a jury.

Does the Minister have any figures on the number of inquests that take place under the coroners’ existing discretionary power? What proportion of jury inquests take place because they are prescribed by law, and how many are held because the coroner has chosen to use their discretion? If a large proportion of jury inquests are called at the discretion of the coroner, we might be a bit more relaxed about the use of such a power. If few are ever called, however, I would be concerned about relying too heavily on subsection (3) as a clear-up measure.

Clause 7(2) removes one of the existing reasons why juries have to be called: when a death occurs in circumstances that, if continued, could be prejudicial to the health and safety of the public. We heard about many such cases during our evidence sessions, and members of the Committee have mentioned such inquests during our deliberations. Clearly, one would expect that the Minister would intend for those types of cases to be picked up under subsection (3), if necessary. There has not been any policy justification as to why health and safety cases have been removed from the list of those that require a jury hearing, although other cases that require a jury have been left as they are. Will the Minister clarify why that has happened?

As we have already discussed, the right of people to have a jury at an inquest does not need to be too broad because coroners are extremely experienced in undertaking inquests. They can tease out the truth of different circumstances. However, it is a fundamental part of justice being seen to be done that juries are called in inquests, especially those involving the state. If we limit too greatly the circumstances in which juries are called when the state is involved, people’s view on the success of the whole system will be clouded.

We know that only a very small proportion of inquests have juries. A small increase in the number of cases that automatically need juries would involve small and limited costs, but it could have an impact on public opinion. It is important to ensure that we are seen to be fair and not over-restricting the cases for which juries may be called.

Bridget Prentice (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Ministry of Justice; Lewisham East, Labour)

The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk probably knows what I am likely to say about amendments 94 to 97. He knows that I do not think that every death in custody or state detention necessarily needs an inquest with a jury. The most obvious example would be if someone died of natural causes in a prison hospital. Why should there automatically be an inquest then when there would not be one for someone in similar circumstances in a general hospital?

David Howarth (Cambridge, Liberal Democrat)

I presume the answer to that is to ensure that the person did die of natural causes in a prison hospital.

Bridget Prentice (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Ministry of Justice; Lewisham East, Labour)

I think the post-mortem would probably establish that. It is not necessary to have a jury to sit waiting for that to be discovered.

David Howarth (Cambridge, Liberal Democrat)

Who is to be the finder of fact if there is a dispute? Is it to be the coroner or members of the public? If a death occurs in custody in any way, the finder of fact should be ordinary people.

Bridget Prentice (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Ministry of Justice; Lewisham East, Labour)

I am afraid I have to disagree with the hon. Gentleman. I would have thought that that was a pretty obvious example. If a post-mortem finds that someone died of natural causes, the coroner is more than capable of carrying out an investigation and a jury is not needed. In fact, about half of all deaths in state detention occur due to natural causes, and coroners are more than capable of dealing with them. If there were concerns about negligent care, the guidance issued by the chief coroner would almost certainly indicate that  the coroner should exercise their discretion and call a jury. Equally, as the hon. Member for Cardiff, Central said, in the vast majority of cases, coroners sit without juries, as they do when dealing with cases of deaths of armed forces personnel on active service. We have rightly heard tributes to the coroners in Wiltshire and Oxfordshire for the way in which they have dealt with the bulk of the inquests into deaths on active service in Iraq or Afghanistan.

I am unclear as to whether amendment 97 proposes jury inquests for all deaths involving armed forces personnel, including training accidents or even deaths off duty. I would certainly resist the idea that a jury would be necessary in such cases, unless the situation was similar to those cited in clause 7(2). The Government are criticised if we appear to be attempting to stop coroners who sit alone in military inquests from making critical remarks about Government policy, yet the Opposition are suggesting that coroners cannot carry out such investigations on their own and that they need juries. Opposition Members might have to address that contradiction.

Insisting on a jury for all inquests into deaths at a hospital, hospice, clinic or other centre for medical provision, whether public or private—a chemist’s shop, for example—is similarly unnecessary. Again, coroners’ independence shows that they are more than capable of carrying out inquests and of making robust and, if necessary, critical findings without the assistance of a jury. I am not convinced that jury inquests should be extended on that basis.

The hon. Member for Cardiff, Central asked why clause 7(2)(b) mentioned police officers. It is a restatement of the Coroners Act 1988. We extended the provision to include the service police force because we felt that if we were dealing with police officers in one form, we ought to deal with them in their other forms. The hon. Lady was advocating extending the provision to all state officials, but it would be difficult to define a state official. Let me put a scenario to her. If a tax inspector was driving between two inspections and was involved in a car accident in which someone died, it could be argued that he was acting in his capacity as a state official. However, if the accident happened after he had finished work and was driving home, would she suggest that that, too, would automatically require a jury? My problem with amendment 71 is that it lacks precision.

Jennifer Willott (Cardiff Central, Liberal Democrat)

The provision, as amended by amendment 71, would still be subject to the official acting

“in the purported execution of the officer’s or member’s duty as such”.

Therefore, they would be no more liable if they were driving between appointments than a police officer would be when driving without blue lights flashing. Either a rule applies or it does not. I would not have thought that a tax inspector driving between appointments could be legally considered as executing his duty, so he would not be covered.

Bridget Prentice (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Ministry of Justice; Lewisham East, Labour)

I do not accept the argument made by the hon. Lady. If we extended jury inquests to all such cases, does she not feel that it would be too wide an  extension in terms of who might be defined as a state official in those circumstances? It seems nonsensical to extend jury inquests.

David Howarth (Cambridge, Liberal Democrat)

The other, obvious answer to that is that someone who counts as acting on behalf of state authority for the purposes of article 2 would count as a state official here—that is certainly the clearest way of doing it. If the Minister thinks that the amendment is too vague, I ask her about this specific case: is she against adding the security services to the list?

Bridget Prentice (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Ministry of Justice; Lewisham East, Labour)

That would be a far better argument than that for the general extension to state officials. The hon. Gentleman mentions article 2, but it is not referred to in his amendment. My objection to amendment 71 is its lack of precision; if he came back with a different amendment, perhaps we would have a different debate.

I conclude by reminding the Committee that in clause 7(3), there is already the provision for an inquest to be held with a jury if the coroner thinks that there is sufficient reason for doing so. Therefore, if a death is attributable to the act or omission of a state official—as the Liberal Democrats would have it—in the purported execution of their duty, and if the coroner feels that the circumstances of the death require an inquest to be held, then it can be held. All the examples given by the hon. Members for Cambridge and for Cardiff Central can be perfectly covered by the subsection.

Finally, if an interested party believed that the circumstances of a particular case warranted an inquest to be held with a jury, but the coroner had decided not to call one, that party could appeal to the chief coroner under clause 30. Again, that will give sufficient protection in any case where people might feel that a jury inquest would be more appropriate. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for North West Norfolk will withdraw his amendment.

Henry Bellingham (Shadow Minister, Justice; North West Norfolk, Conservative)

I am grateful to the Minister for her comments, and in particular for pointing out that in subsection (3) there is a wide power for the senior coroner to empanel a jury if he thinks there is sufficient reason for doing so. I take on board that all my concerns, and the examples that I gave, could be countered by that.

The Minister hinted that there might be a degree of hypocrisy and opportunism on the part of the official Opposition in wanting to have more juries in place for defence inquests. However, there is no contradiction at all in our policy—in fact, we have argued consistently that there should be more transparency in those inquests. We will come in a moment to our concerns about secret and certified inquests, but we have never suggested that there should be anything other than more transparency. Having a jury in place, notwithstanding the Minister’s arguments, can assist with that transparency and above all lead the families involved and the wider public to conclude that justice is being done. On that basis, and based on what the Minister has told us—I want to reflect on what she said, and I may well come back to the issue at a later stage—I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.