Damian Green (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Ashford, Conservative)

I beg to move amendment 9, in clause 14, page 10, line 7, at end add—

‘(8) Nothing in this Act shall enable any of the officers designated under this Part to use any personal data of UK citizens to restrict their right to enter or leave the United Kingdom for legitimate purposes.’.

We now come to a more contentious part of the Bill dealing with the use and disclosure of information. The Minister will be aware that this matter is extremely fraught. Conservative Members think that it is hugely important and that far too much of the relevant Home Office policy is proceeding in the wrong direction, with a dangerous tendency to collect too much information and to give the various organs of the state too much power to share it with one another without the permission of the person about whom the information was collected. Through amendment 9 and, even more so, amendments 10 to 12, we seek either to probe or change Government policy.

It is arresting to think that an amendment need be tabled to a Bill to prevent legislation from being used to bar British citizens from entering or leaving their own country for legitimate purposes, but we seek to do just that. Essentially, our worry is that the powers taken by the Government in this clause might allow them to do precisely that. The Bill does not make clear how UKBA intends to use the data collected from this function in conjunction with the e-Borders function, which is also being introduced. I would be interested to hear what the  Minister has to say about databases and information sharing. He will be aware how much information will be available through the e-Borders system and the customs information being collected under clause 14, which will provide the Government with more information that presumably will be recorded. This is a classic example of where two sets of information collected perfectly properly might be combined and then used improperly.

It would be helpful to the Committee if the Minister could set out the extent of the information that could be brought together partly under the aegis of clause 14. As well as the provisions in the Bill, the e-Borders database can track and store international travel records, names, addresses, telephone numbers, seat reservations, travel itineraries and, potentially, credit card details. I am sure that the Minister will be proud to tell us that, when it is fully up and running, the system will monitor all 250 million journeys made in and out of this country each year. He will be aware that the Government propose, rather controversially, to store the data for up to 10 years. We think that that is excessive and that some of the data being collected will be ineffective in tackling cross-border crime and hugely intrusive for the entirely innocent. It will also be massively expensive.

It is even more toxic, however, to combine that with the use and disclosure of customs information under clause 14, because huge questions remain to be answered—on top of those about e-Borders—about the intersection of these different systems. The intrusion of privacy of anyone, even the most innocent British traveller crossing their own borders, is going up and up. The amount of information that will be collected and stored for many years by the Government goes up with every piece of legislation. It is not the appropriate time or place to debate the e-Borders system—the Minister knows that we think other countries have implemented similar but better systems in far shorter periods.

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (also in the Home Office), Home Office; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

It is the best in the world. People come here to look at it.

Damian Green (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Ashford, Conservative)

The Minister says that it is the best in the world. I dare say that some other countries come to look in at it, and I would see what they say when they have left. The specific problem with the clause is that yet again, the Government are falling through the trap of making the system as intrusive as possible for the respectable traveller, whether coming to Britain or taking a trip away from here, while not necessarily collecting all the information that will be needed to track our professional criminals or terrorists. Essentially, my fear is that we are setting up the worst of all worlds, where the general aggregation of private information about entirely innocent British citizens will be more intrusive than any other regime in the democratic world. At the same time, it is not at all clear that those who quite properly should be stopped and checked and have their details down will be caught.

One of the paradoxes that the Minister needs to address is the sheer weight of information that is being collected, and the sheer length of time that it is being collected for, which may well militate against the effective action against those who we all want to stop. We have seen the manifold failures of databases—again, this is  not the appropriate clause under which to discuss the matter—and it must have impinged on the Government now that simply collecting more information about entirely innocent journeys and people and keeping it for longer is not the most effective way of making our borders secure. It is not, in this context, the best way of ensuring that we get the appropriate customs information and then using that information to contribute to the general safety of the border.

As people increasingly understand that point, those who find their journeys made more difficult—they might have to queue for longer—or feel that they have to give up unnecessary information to immigration and customs officials, their resentment about the queues and the information that they are giving will increase. They will want to know that every piece of information collected is necessary, and also what is going to happen to that information, even if it is not left on a disc or a laptop stuck on a train by somebody going home at night. Who in Government has access to it? It is precisely apparently harmless clauses in Bills such as this one, about the use and disclosure of customs information, that allow information to be collected and spread. That should ring alarm bells in anyone who cares about privacy.

I invite members of the Committee who have not necessarily studied every last comma of the Bill to look at the clause very carefully, and look at the powers that are being given to officials to collect and disseminate information. We are now entering a part of the Bill that is potentially quite dangerous for the future of the privacy of innocent British citizens and for the effectiveness of the attack on immigration and customs crime, which is the purpose of this part of the Bill. I hope—but not very expectantly—that perhaps Minister can reassure me on those points.

Tom Brake (Carshalton & Wallington, Liberal Democrat)

I welcome the opportunity for us to examine a new area of the Bill that I hope will allow us, without stepping too far away from its content, to touch briefly on issues that many hon. Members from both sides of the House have raised relating to the use and disclosure of information. Given the Government’s preference for setting up large databases, this may give the Minister another opportunity to jump up and ask, “Are the Liberal Democrats in favour of large databases or against them?” He has to acknowledge that Liberal Democrats, as a party, are not luddites. Therefore we do not necessarily have any objections in principle to large databases. However, we are concerned about the information that is being collected in such databases, the duration for which it will be kept and the controls that exist in respect of access to that data: who has access to it and whether it is appropriate for them to have it, and so on. We also have significant concerns about the potential for large chunks of data to be lost. It is appropriate for the Minister to respond to those concerns in respect of this part of the Bill and to provide some reassurances about the safeguards that will be in place to ensure that these data are managed, the minimal nature of the data that will be collected and the maximum controls to safeguard those data and restrict access to them.

We are becoming an increasingly surveyed society. Although it has not yet been confirmed that we are a surveillance society, with the number of CCTV cameras, databases and different ways of collecting data on people  that are being rolled out, any opportunity to try to redress that balance through this Bill as it relates to the use and disclosure of information, including the use and disclosure of customs information, is helpful. I will listen carefully to what the Minister is about to say about the safeguards.

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (also in the Home Office), Home Office; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

I understand the intent of the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington in seeking safeguards.

Let me start my reassurances by saying that the clause relates to the powers that Revenue and Customs and immigration officers have already. The clause is about how they share information with each other for their own purposes. This is not, as the hon. Member for Ashford said, about the electronic borders system, but about how customs and immigration officials hand information to each other, particularly with regard to the purposes of prosecution of customs and immigration offences.

Tom Brake (Carshalton & Wallington, Liberal Democrat)

I thank the Minister for confirming that that is what this process is about. However, does he agree that it is precisely at a moment of transition where structures and procedures are being changed that the potential for breaches, for instance, is at its greatest?

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (also in the Home Office), Home Office; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

I agree; that is my experience. That is why the hon. Gentleman is right to press me on that point. However, let me build on my reassurances, because they are important.

To understand the purpose of the clause and see who it applies to, Committee members have to look specifically at clause 14(2) and at clause 15, with its prohibition on disclosure of personal customs information, which is the other side of the coin. My reassurances are not just contained in clause 14, but are built upon in later clauses. In relation to the exercise of the existing functions, the provision is an essential tool in support of law enforcement, national security and securing the border effectively. It is also necessary to be able to secure the optimum development of the officers involved.

We talked earlier about the benefits of coming together, which means that officers need to share information in respect of certain cases. That is the purpose of the clause. However, there is a restriction and prohibition on the disclosure of information imposed elsewhere in part 1 of the Bill and in other enactments, and in any agreement to which the United Kingdom is party. Those restrictions and prohibitions will be particularly important in relation to personal customs information.

The provisions in the relevant clauses apply only to customs information acquired by the UK Border Agency from sources other than Revenue and Customs or the Revenue and Customs Prosecutions Office. There is a separate confidentiality framework for the use and disclosure of information provided by Revenue and Customs and the Revenue and Customs Prosecutions Office, which is set out in existing legislation including, in particular, as the hon. Member for Ashford will remember, the UK Borders Act 2007.

All information within the UK Border Agency is shared, held and retained in line with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998. The agency has implemented enhanced procedures to protect personal data in the  light of the recommendations of the review of information handling. We have adopted those recommendations, which include the appointment of a senior information risk owner and the use of encrypted laptops and removal media only, if they contain personal data and are to be taken outside secure premises. A new centralised encryption service, a new system for reporting security instances and an information charter have been established.

Let me emphasise that my assurances relate to the wider database that does not leave the premises and can only be used by us, as opposed to the carrier information that the hon. Member for Ashford mentioned. That is not directly relevant to the clause, which is about sharing customs information inside the agency.

Amendment 9 replicates an amendment tabled in the other place, during Report stage. First, it probes the nature of the information that it is envisaged the UK Border Agency will acquire given the provisions of the Bill, and the purposes for which that information might be used. Secondly, through the amendment the hon. Member for Ashford probes the e-Borders programme once again. However, it would prevent a designated customs official from using the personal data of a UK citizen to restrict that citizen’s right to enter or leave the UK where there is an apparently legitimate purpose for the journey.

In layperson’s terms, the issue before the Committee is this: if a person wanted for criminal purposes is leaving or entering the country, where that journey is for legitimate purposes, do the officials have the power to interfere? We argue that they do. Let me use an extreme example to illustrate my point. If a wanted  terrorist is leaving the country to genuinely go on holiday to Majorca, I suggest that you, Sir Nicholas, would want me to instruct my officials to arrest him and not let him go because he is making a legitimate journey. We come to the heart of the matter. I respect the hon. Gentleman’s saying that legitimate British holidaymakers should not be interfered with—quite right, too—but we need powers and information to stop criminal activity.

The hon. Gentleman is looking perplexed.

Damian Green (Shadow Minister, Home Affairs; Ashford, Conservative)

The amendment talks about officers designated under this part of the Bill, which does not include police officers. If a suspected terrorist was going across the borders, I imagine that the police would have something to say about that.

Phil Woolas (Minister of State (also in the Home Office), Home Office; Oldham East & Saddleworth, Labour)

Ah, the trap has been laid and the quarry has fallen into it. So are my immigration and customs officials not to seize that person and hold them in the holding centre, after which the police would be called, as is so at the moment?

Nicholas Winterton (Macclesfield, Conservative)

Order. I hesitate to interrupt just as the excitement is mounting, but it is 1 pm. However, before I adjourn the Committee, can I advise all hon. Members that when they have left the room will be locked, so any papers and other documents and possessions can be left here in the knowledge that they will be secure and safe?