Schedule 2
Political Parties and Elections Bill
3:00 pm
Michael Wills (Minister of State, Ministry of Justice; North Swindon, Labour)
I think that the hon. Gentleman is referring to the conditions in which legal aid might be available. If I may, I will write to him on that point. It is a complex area and I would rather get it right, in writing, rather than mislead the Committee inadvertently.
Amendment No. 107 relates to the appeals process for a person who has been issued with a non-compliance penalty for failure to comply with a discretionary requirement. It would amend the process by removing part of proposed new paragraph 9(3) of the schedule. The schedule currently allows a person to appeal against a non-compliance penalty on certain grounds. The amendment would remove those grounds of appeal, and instead provide that a person served with a non-compliance penalty would have a period of 28 days from receipt of that notice to appeal, but the grounds of such an appeal would no longer be clearly set out. We believe that the grounds of appeal against a non-compliance penalty should be clearly set out and the amendment would muddy the water by removing them.
We followed the drafting of the 2008 Act and the civil sanctions it imposed, and we cannot see any good reason to depart from that operational design in relation to the sanctions of the Electoral Commission, in comparison to other regulators. As always in such matters, when we are talking about transposing the requirements of the 2008 Act, if members of the Committee can make a reasonable case for making separate provision in relation to the Bill, we would be happy to consider it.
Amendment No. 50 is similar to amendment No. 66, but in this case it would provide for appeals against stop notices to be heard by the High Court, rather than a county court as the Bill currently provides. As I said earlier, the Government believe that county courts are a more appropriate forum for appeal; they are where electoral law appeals are heard. Using the High Court might place a strain on its resources, when the county court provides a perfectly adequate opportunity for appeal.
Amendments Nos. 78 and 44 both relate to information that must be included in the notices issued by the commission when it proposes to impose a discretionary requirement. I am not altogether sure why amendment No. 78 has been tabled, as new paragraph 7(2) already stipulates the available period for making representations, which must be no less than 28 days beginning with the day on which the notice is received. It also clearly states that the notice must specify this period. Therefore, the amendment does not change the required contents of the notices and is unnecessary.
Amendment No. 44 would alter the wording of new paragraph 7(2). The amendment stipulates that, in a notice of intention to impose a discretionary requirement, the commission must include a specific date for the commencement of the period for making representations against it. As currently drafted, new paragraph 7(2) requires such a notice to include information about the period for making objections. It also states that that period may not be less than 28 days, beginning with the day on which the notice is received. That provision closely follows the sanctions laid out in the 2008 Act. We do not see a reason for changing the operational design of those sanctions, nor why they should be made different for the Electoral Commission in comparison to other regulators.
We also believe that the amendment might compromise the rights of the recipient of the penalty, for instance if there were a delay in receipt. That is why we prefer the model set out in the 2008 Act, in which the relevant periods begin on receipt, as that offers a fair opportunity for all in terms of making objections.
Amendment No. 43 would remove the list of grounds for which appeal against imposition of a discretionary requirement is allowable. It would also impose a 28-day limit on the right of appeal. That would be unhelpful and unnecessary. The grounds for legitimate appeal will help those on whom a discretionary requirement is imposed to understand when it is worth them pursuing an appeal. The grounds for appeal are not exclusive and there is also provision for prescribing other grounds in secondary legislation, but in reality, a court would be likely to entertain an appeal only on grounds similar to those set out in new paragraph 6(6). We believe that stating that explicitly in the Bill will help people to understand their position in determining whether to launch an appeal against a commission decision to impose a discretionary requirement.
On the timing of appeals, we will need to decide with the commission and the courts, after further consultation, the appropriate timetable for appealing against a decision of the commission. That will be a matter for the rules of court rather than for legislation, as was decided in the 2008 Act. If it is a matter of pressing concern to members of the Committee, we will see what we can do to advance it, so that we can return to it in a meaningful way on Report.
I assure the Committee that the Electoral Commission is aware that its operation of the new civil sanctioning powers needs to be responsible and clear. We keep coming back to that point, but it is aware of that. As we have discussed, it is required to produce guidance on how it will use the powers and set out explicitly what the sanctions that it is imposing require, and within what time frame.
I assure the Committee that the sanctions will be overlaid with a statutory instrument setting out important procedural matters relating to the civil sanctions regime. Where it deals with the most pressing matter in the schedule, it will be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, but both routes will offer the House ample opportunity to scrutinise the detail of the sanctions and their operation if it so wishes.
In light of those reassurances and explanations, I hope that the hon. Member for Huntingdon will withdraw the amendment.