Clause 23
Local Transport Bill [ Lords ]
6:14 pm
Norman Baker (Shadow Secretary of State for Transport, Transport; Lewes, Liberal Democrat)
It is, because there was an elected body that answered to the public at large and was mostly in line with the public, as a local council or an ITA would be, and an unelected person who nevertheless had authority over that body and exercised theoretical powers that were entirely inappropriate. That is the parallel.
The Minister has constructed a rather Heath Robinson approach of hurdles and safeguards, for reasons that we know very well—to provide legal protection to local councils, ensure that they can carry through their intentions in terms of quality contracts and minimise the risk of successful legal action. However, her proposals are flawed in this respect: bus companies that are threatened with a significant loss of revenue but have plenty of money to use at present will not hesitate to use every possible avenue to protect their position. It does not matter how many safeguards the Minister includes; they will still take that approach if they can.
Furthermore, for the bus companies it need not be a matter of winning but of holding up progress, using every legal opportunity to thwart the introduction of quality contracts and making more money in the period before the quality contract is finally approved by judicial review or other process. I appreciate the Minister’s intention of limiting that period, as she mentioned, but nevertheless I think that will be the intention of some bus companies—not all by any means, but one or two. Whatever she does, she will not achieve the end that she seeks.
Conversely, new clause 5 would not weaken the position. It would maintain the best of what the Minister is proposing in the legislation while enhancing local democracy, which many people in this room want to enhance through the introduction of better arrangements, particularly for quality contracts. The ITA will pass on to the approvals board its deliberations, which the approvals board will then have the right to thwart if it chooses. I appreciate that it might not do so, of course; it might act within the narrow confines that the Minister seeks to set. It might be entirely harmonious with the ITA, but nevertheless it can thwart the ITA if it chooses. It can interpret the public interest in a way that the elected representatives for that area do not. It may have a different view of the public interest, and it is therefore a challenge to the democratic local body. It might not take account of issues that are not written in, such as the environment and so on.
I suggest that the approvals board should be set up and that the expertise that the Minister wants to pull in should be enjoined and used productively. She spoke of the approvals board engaging in discussions with the ITA—that is right; it should be a harmonious exchange of views—but under her proposals, if a local authority proposes a scheme that the approvals board rejects either wholly or in part, the ITA might feel that it must exercise its powers of appeal and move to the next stage. That is written into the Bill in clause 22, I believe.
Under my suggestion, the approvals board would be an important statutory consultee. It would deliberate on the same basis as the Minister seeks to do, and would return its thoughts to the ITA, which would have the final decision. The parallel that I made on Second Reading, which the hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe made again today, is with the Environment Agency. The Environment Agency is an important statutory consultee on planning matters. It makes recommendations to planning authorities and regional flood committees. They do not have to adhere to the recommendations; they almost always do, but if members of those authorities identify an overriding public interest issue, which they feel that as elected people they must pursue, because that is what they were elected on or for whatever reason, they have the right to override the Environment Agency—perhaps not in total, but in a particular respect that they regard as important. That option of overriding in one particular respect is not available under the Minister’s scheme; her option is an appeal to the Transport Tribunal.
Any ITA seeking to exercise the power would have to think very carefully indeed. It would have to think about the legal risk arising from not adhering to the approvals board, and the financial consequences that might flow from that. It would have to consider whether the Transport Tribunal, which would still exist under the proposed system, will take the view that the ITA has been irresponsible in not following the approvals board advice. It would have to take into account whether there would be a problem further down the line if the matter went to the courts. As an elected local body, however, it would still have the right to say that its judgment was different to the approvals board, which had in this case got it wrong. Its members could say, “We must have the right as elected local people to take the decision, whatever the risks.” They would bear the risks if they got it wrong, but it is better that they get it right, than that they do not and can be effectively controlled, if it comes to it, by the decision of the approvals board. That is the suggestion that I am putting to the Minister.
The amendment would retain the expertise that the Minister wants for the approvals board. It would make the approvals board important in terms of the advice it gives to ITAs or councils when undertaking quality contracts; it would retain the Transport Tribunal option, which is the independent appeals process that the Minister rightly said has to exist; and it ultimately would retain the High Court and judicial review process, should somebody wish to go down that road. It would also remove one of the hurdles that I fear will make quality contracts unattractive to local authorities, which neither the Minister nor I want. It would legitimise the process by having the decision taken at a democratic level by an elected body, rather than by an unelected approvals board. With all due modesty, I suggest that my proposal is the best of both worlds and I hope that she will give it serious consideration.
The Minister recognises that there are rules for local authorities, for example on road charging, which we shall no doubt come to later in the Bill. The onus on local authorities with regard to road charging is rather less than what they can do with quality contracts. They have more freedom to act on road charging, and it might be argued that it is rather odd to tie them down on quality contracts, while allowing flexibility on road charging. Personally, I would allow flexibility on both. That is a particular view, but there is inconsistency on that issue in the Bill.
The Minister said earlier that the approvals board will be able to make modifications and she used that as a justification for her scheme. Under my proposal, the ability of the approvals board to make modifications would be enhanced because it would report back to the elected body, which might say that its suggestion was sensible and would take it on board right away. As the Bill stands, the approvals board may feel reluctant to impose its will on local authorities because it is not elected. If it could refer back to the ITA or the local authority with one or two suggestions, it might feel easier about making modifications and improvements to the scheme, and the ITA might feel easier about accepting them.
I hope that I have made the case for my alternative suggestions. I am not being difficult, but the Minister will recognise that keen voices on the Labour Benches are questioning this part of the Bill and the approvals procedure. I am keen to find a solution that maintains the integrity of what she wants, but provides extra democratic legitimacy, and, with respect, new clause 5 would achieve both those ends. I hope that she will consider it sympathetically, if not today, on Report when she could, if she does not want my new clause, introduce a similar provision.