Clause 39
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill [Lords]
5:30 pm
Mark Simmonds (Shadow Minister, Health; Boston and Skegness, Conservative)
Clause 39 is quite important because it relates to the use of the man’s sperm after his death, irrespective of whether the embryo was implanted before or after his death. Subsection (1)(c)(i) refers to the circumstance where a man has consented to the use of his sperm after his death. Will the Minister confirm whether it would be standard practice on the consent form relating to clause 37 for a man to also give consent regarding use of his gametes after his death, or whether that is completely separate? Also, how does it work in relation to married couples, where a consent form is not required because consent is presumed? Can it be proved otherwise? Is specific post-death consent required?
The further point I want to make about clause 39 is that subsection (1)(d), which I do not understand, gives the woman the right to choose whether the man is considered the father of the child. Presumably, if the original father, prior to his death, consented for his genetic material to be used for the treatment for the purposes of creating a child after his death then he is the genetic father. Unless the woman has remarried, and therefore under common law the new husband is the father, why does the woman have the right to be able to choose whether the man is considered the father? He is the father; he is not an anonymous donor. Perhaps the Minister could also explain—I know that the right hon. Member for Coatbridge, Chryston and Bellshill will be interested in this—why there is a difference between England and Scotland on the 42 days and the 21 days requirements.