Clause 104
Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill
7:45 pm
David Heath (Shadow Secretary of State for Justice & Lord Chancellor, Ministry of Justice; Somerton and Frome, Liberal Democrat)
I am grateful Mr. O’Hara, and I hope that I can curtail the debate a little.
The lead amendment would simply insert the word “and”, which is of limited value. However, I want to explain my concerns about the clause. Let me say at the start that nothing I say should in any way be interpreted as to suggest that I do not recognise the real problem of people causing nuisance or disturbance in hospitals and other NHS premises. It is absolutely deplorable when that happens, but unfortunately it is a growing trend. It worries me as much as I am sure it worries other members of the Committee. I am therefore intent on ensuring that if there are ways of reducing the risk of such a disturbance, we should take them.
I start from the premise that I am not convinced that we need a change in the law to achieve the Government’s objective. My fear is that we are back in the wonderful world of sending signals. The clause is sending a signal that one must not be naughty in hospital. However, nobody is taking the trouble to ascertain whether the change in law will help the authorities to investigate, arrest or prosecute successfully.
On Second Reading, I drew the attention of the Lord Chancellor to what appeared to me to be the extremely pertinent case of Porter v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, 1999. The reason that I drew attention to that case was that it very clearly set out that where there is a breach of the peace, a civil trespass and a person refusing to leave the premises after being asked to leave, the attendance of the police and an arrest for breach of the peace are entirely in order. Therefore, there is no problem at the moment with the police intervening in precisely those circumstances.
I do not know whether anybody has had a chance to look at the case since the Second Reading debate and to see why it should not be applicable in the case of health service premises as opposed to any other premises. It seems to me that it gives a clear indication that the police would not be acting improperly if they were asked to deal with such a disturbance and to apply existing law. That is the first point.
The second point is that if there are, for some reason, the police or anybody connected with the health service have insufficient powers, why are the Government seeking to address this nuisance in respect only of NHS premises rather than other public premises and other Government offices? As we all know, there are premises run by the Department for Work and Pensions, for instance, where there is every bit as much of a risk of violent and disturbing behaviour on the part of the occasional client as there is in a hospital. Why is the protection afforded by the clause not open to other premises that are run by the state for the benefit of the citizen? There is no obvious answer.
I come to the third question. If the Minister can satisfy me that it is necessary to deal with health service premises and not any other Government premises, why does he restrict the application of this clause to hospitals? This point was made by hon. Members on both sides of the House on Second Reading. If the provision applies to hospitals, it should surely apply to other premises on which treatment is carried out on behalf of the health service, which are not described as hospitals: surgeries, clinics and any other premises where a doctor, nurse or paramedic of one kind or another practices.
Perhaps I should declare my interest as a qualified optician, although I have not practiced within the health service, or anywhere else, for a very long time. Presumably, there may be circumstances in which I re-register and provide services under contract to the health service again. If I did, why would I not be protected; why would a GP not be protected; why would the practice nurse not be protected in the same way as a hospital? That is why I tabled amendment No. 339, which covers all treatment provided by NHS staff members, who are defined in the clause as anyone working directly for the NHS or under contract to it, which covers every possible NHS treatment that might be provided. Why are those other NHS staff members excluded?
Amendments Nos. 337 and 338 would remove subsection (1)(c), which makes the extraordinary exclusion that the one type of person who cannot be subject to the provision is someone who arrives at a hospital seeking treatment. An awful lot of the people who cause disturbances in hospitals arrive seeking treatment—ask anyone who works in accident and emergency or trauma units and they will confirm that. Those people are specifically exempt from the provisions of the clause, which seems extraordinary. I suspect that it is to avoid any potential human rights implications of effectively refusing treatment to someone who has suffered a serious injury. I can only presume that that is the rationale, but it makes the clause almost ineffective. It means that staff can shoo off people who are so-called friends of a patient, but when patients—they may be intoxicated or simply fed up with waiting, and expressing themselves violently or not liking the treatment that they are getting—start throwing their weight around and causing a disturbance, the clause will not apply. A policeman, if called, will be required to assess whether the person causing the affray requires treatment and whether they are seeking it—a diagnosis that I would suggest the average police constable is not well equipped to make.
There seem to be a number of anomalies in the clause, well intentioned though its. I support the intention behind it, but the Minister needs to explain why it has been framed as it has and allay my suspicion that it is another press release translated into statute rather than a serious attempt to mitigate a real nuisance.