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Counter-Terrorism Bill
9:00 am
Dominic Grieve (Shadow Attorney General, Law Officers; Beaconsfield, Conservative)
The next of these miscellaneous clauses deals with the creation of a new terrorist offence in relation to eliciting, publishing or communicating information about members of the armed forces. If I may say so at the outset, I am perfectly aware of the nature of the Birmingham plot, and that there has been clear evidence that individuals have been attempting to obtain such information for the purpose of doing harm to members of the armed forces.
My concern is about the wording of this new offence:
“A person commits an offence who—
(a) elicits or attempts to elicit information about a person who is or has been a member of Her Majesty’s Forces which is of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism, or
(b) publishes or communicates information of that kind.”
A moment’s pause makes one realise that that is rather broadly drawn. On the face of it, because we are concentrating on information which is,
“of a kind likely to be useful”,
the truth is that almost any information is covered. A perfectly legitimate attempt by a law firm to write a biographical note giving details about a serving member of the armed forces might, quite innocently, reveal material which might be “likely to be useful”.
Indeed, I recollect, going back to the days of terrorist offences in Northern Ireland, a number of occasions when individuals were arrested in this country, with information on them that made the security services and the police think that a terrorist plot might be attempted. A map of the area where a Government Minister lived was found. There were details from telephone directories. There was information—all of which was publicly obtainable—that, when put together as a package, clearly indicated the possibility of a malevolent intent. Indeed, a prosecution was based on that.
On the face of it, the provision is now so widely drawn that anybody who attempted to elicit that sort of information might find themselves committing an offence. I cannot believe that that is an appropriate way in which to draft a criminal offence with a sanction of 10 years’ imprisonment. I appreciate that it could be argued that the wording in amendment No. 197 would cause another problem, as we would have to show the intention from all the surrounding circumstances—undoubtedly a more difficult hurdle for a prosecutor to get over than the current wording. However, just because something involves an extra hurdle, it does not justify our creating an offence as widely drawn as that set out in the Bill.
I know the usual answer given by Ministers in such circumstances, because I have heard it before: the Committee should not worry because no one will prosecute a 10 or 11-year-old boy who tries to elicit information about a hero figure who has come back from Afghanistan; the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Attorney-General, in their wisdom, would not prosecute such a person.
On the whole, the law must maintain an element of certainty so far as it is possible, and the clause creates an offence that is extraordinarily uncertain in its scope. Anyone, however innocently, eliciting information for a legitimate purpose about somebody who is, or has been, a member of the armed forces could be caught by it. It would be easy to show that that information might be useful to a person who was preparing an act of terrorism. If the Minister can come up with an alternative view of the drafting, I shall listen carefully. New Labour used to say that there was a third way, but at the moment I do not see it. The clause is much too widely drafted. It might also worry journalists who want to carry out legitimate journalism.