Clause 51
Counter-Terrorism Bill
11:45 am
David Heath (Somerton and Frome, Liberal Democrat)
These proposals return us to a debate on clause 42 that we held in a pre-emptive fashion. I set aside amendment No. 43, which deals with the point of insanity that we have already covered, and deal instead with the period for which notification requirements apply, which is the purport of amendments Nos. 39 to 42. As the Bill is constructed, there is an indefinite period for serious cases and a ten-year period for less serious cases—any terrorism offences are serious. My amendments would effectively put break clauses in those periods every five years. The initial notification period would be for five years; in the case of a serious offence, it could be renewed on a five-yearly basis to the point of being an indefinite notification. In the case of less serious offences, it would be for five years in the first instance, which could be renewed to apply for a further five years, thereby making the ten years that the Government are requesting through the Bill.
The most important thing is to allow the courts to consider the individual’s circumstances, the environment in which the order is made and to ensure that the notification orders are still appropriate. They may be inappropriate because the person has changed their views and conduct entirely and can demonstrate that that is the case to the satisfaction of the courts. It may be, as the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield said earlier, that people who have engaged in terrorist activities can sometimes make quite substantial changes to their lifestyles to the point where they become part of Administrations in the UK or abroad. Those would be cases in which, I assume, it would be inappropriate to retain a notification procedure. The circumstances of the individual and their propensity to be a danger to the public may change.
It may well be that the political circumstances change entirely and we happily move out of this period. I do not see it happening in the very near future, but I would like to think that at some stage in the future we shall no longer have the present terrorist threat. There may be other terrorist threats, but I certainly hope that the present threat—the reason that the Government and we in Parliament are so engaged in taking forward these changes to legislation—will have a period. It is to be hoped that, at some stage in the future, what are effectively emergency powers will no longer be required.
I hope that that will happen in the short term; my fear is that it will not, and that we will be saddled with measures of this kind for some time to come. I do, however, think it is appropriate for a court to consider all the matters before it, and decide at a quinquennial review whether the notification procedure is still required. If necessary, it will renew it. If not, what I maintain are onerous requirements on the individual will be lifted at the point at which they cease to have an effect in terms of protecting the public and simply become a burden on the individual that is punitive, rather than for a wider good.