Clause 27
Serious Crime Bill [Lords]
12:45 pm
Vernon Coaker (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Gedling, Labour)
I point out to the right hon. and learned Gentleman that subsection (2) gives people with an interest in property the right to make representations to the court, which will consider whether forfeiture is reasonable and proportionate. We have included that proposal to ensure that it is reasonable.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman has done me a great service: he has saved me having to read out article 1. Without wishing to be sarcastic or flippant, there is a debate to be had on the interpretation of these articles and their application. On the protection of property, article 1 says that where it is in the public interest, consistent with the law of the country, just, and done appropriately through the courts, forfeiture of property is not inconsistent with compliance with human rights legislation.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman may say that it is not appropriate in these circumstances, or that he does not agree with it, but that does not make it any the less a fact that it is included in the protocol, for the very reasons that we are discussing: when the state wishes to pursue a particular line in order to prevent crime or to prevent people from benefiting from crime, they can clearly use that part of the protocol.
The amendment is unnecessary, and I shall try not to reiterate earlier points in explaining my reasons for rejecting it. The clause is a way of ensuring that those involved in serious crime do not seek to flout its provisions. As well as the offender risking imprisonment for breach of an order, it will be open to the court to order the forfeiture of anything in the offender’s possession at the time of the offence, and that it considers to have been involved in that offence.
For example, when someone has been found guilty of an offence relating to the distribution of child abuse material via the internet, it might be reasonable to place an order that forbids them from owning a personal computer. That would force them to use public access computers, from which they could not disseminate such material, if they needed access to the internet. If they were then found, in contravention of the order’s terms, to own a personal computer, it is reasonable that it should be forfeited. That is the purpose of the clause.
The amendment is unnecessary, because we do not need—as I have said on a number of occasions—to tell the High Court to act justly and proportionately in operating this provision, as it will do so whether we tell it to or not. For that reason, I resist this amendment and hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will ask leave to withdraw it.