Clause 4
Serious Crime Bill [Lords]
5:45 pm
Vernon Coaker (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Home Office; Gedling, Labour)
It might be helpful to the Committee if I gave some opening remarks. It is the Government’s intention that clause 4 and schedule 13 be opposed.
The Government want to support the efforts of the security services and law enforcement in their fight against terrorism and serious crime. No one on this Committee will disagree with that aim, I am sure, but whether or not it is possible to increase the effectiveness of interception, attempting to do so by extending its use to the evidential arena is difficult, not least because, as the agencies have made clear, interception is one of their most effective tools and there is a danger that its evidential use would seriously hamper the fight by undermining its use and effectiveness and seriously impact effort elsewhere.
Why do they say that? What have they to protect? Is the police view on intercept evidence not different from that of the intelligence agencies, and how is it that our agencies cannot do what every other country using interception does? Those points have been raised repeatedly in recent discussions, so I shall address some of them now.
There is no difference in view between the law enforcement and intelligence communities on intercept as evidence. Close scrutiny of what key figures have said on the subject shows that they support what the Government have been saying—the laws should be changed to allow intercept evidence if safeguards can be put in place to protect sensitive capabilities, techniques and resources, and the benefits of changing the law outweigh the risks of doing so.
The Attorney-General, whose office has been working closely with the Home Office; the Director of Public Prosecutions, who recently gave evidence before the Joint Committee on Human Rights; and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, who is often misrepresented as an unqualified supporter of intercept as evidence, believe that safeguards are essential. Without safeguards, there can be no benefits.
Let us consider Lord Lloyd’s proposal. Where are the additional safeguards required? The model before us has none. What have UK intercepting agencies to protect that is not dealt with perfectly adequately in the overseas jurisdictions using intercept evidence? The answer is the very thing that sets the UK apart and, I would say, ahead of overseas jurisdictions.