Clause 1
Serious Crime Bill [Lords]
10:30 am
Douglas Hogg (Sleaford and North Hykeham, Conservative)
I support the hon. Gentleman’s remarks. I have tabled a number of amendments in this group, one of which is in the same terms as those used by the hon. Gentleman in moving the lead amendment. The purpose of my amendments is to enhance the standard of proof required before the order can be made. The Committee will see that I have incorporated the higher standard of proof with regard to both of the elements set out in clause 1, which is to say that the court must be satisfied not only that it is beyond reasonable doubt that the individual has been involved in serious crime, but, secondly and differently, that the order would protect the public in the way set out in the Bill.
It is important to understand how far-reaching the orders are. For that purpose, we need to look at clause 6, which sets out the consequences of an order. Until one has addressed those, one cannot understand how important it is to have a high standard of proof for the making of the order. If one looks at subsection (3), one will find that the orders are among the most draconian ever contemplated by the legislature in this country. The power of the court is not confined to the making of the orders in subsection (3); they are but examples. It says:
“Examples of prohibitions, restrictions or requirements that may be imposed on individuals (including partners in a partnership) by serious crime prevention orders include prohibitions or restrictions on, or requirements in relation to—
(a) an individual’s financial, property or business dealings or holdings;
(b) an individual’s working arrangements;
(c) the means by which an individual communicates or associates with others, or the persons with whom he communicates or associates;
(d) the premises to which an individual has access;
(e) the use of any premises or item by an individual;
(f) an individual’s travel (whether within the United Kingdom, between the United Kingdom and other places or otherwise).”
The Committee needs to understand that an order made under those provisions will wholly restrict a person’s liberty in every material way. It could be used to prevent him from earning his living; to prevent him from travelling; to confine him to a particular part of the United Kingdom; to prevent him from living in his own house; to prevent him from visiting another person’s house; to prevent him from talking to individuals; to prevent him from using his bank, and so on. It is some of the most draconian legislation that I have had the misfortune to see.
Those are facts. In what circumstances should such draconian orders be made? Let us consider the order-making power that is set out in clause 1, to which the hon. Gentleman referred. He was absolutely right: such orders can be made in respect of a person who has committed no substantive offence of any kind, because that is the effect of subsection (1)(a) and (b). The definition of involvement in serious crime is set out in clause 2; it embraces convictions, to which we will come shortly, but it also embraces such offences as facilitating
“the commission by...another person of a serious offence”.
Incidentally, the definition of a serious offence in the schedule includes unlawful fishing and other such examples.
Let us stand back and consider the matter seriously. Through the Bill, the Government propose to incorporate the most draconian restrictions that one can readily contemplate, in respect of people who have committed either fairly trivial offences or no offence whatsoever. I ask rhetorically: is that what this House should do? I hope that the answer is no, it is not.